Cacique meeting Carrera’s Troops.
A brief Relation of Facts and Circumstances connected with the Family of the Carreras in Chile; with some Account of the last Expedition of Brigadier-General Don Jose Miguel Carrera, his Death, &c.
Don Juan Jose, Don Jose Miguel, and Don Luis Carrera, were the sons of Don Ignacio Carrera, who was the descendant of an ancient and honourable line of ancestors. His sons were destined for the service of their country; and were at an early age entered as cadets in the Spanish service. Don Jose Miguel was sent to Europe, as the war in the Peninsula was considered to be the most promising school for the acquirement of those qualifications which are most necessary to complete the character of an officer and statesman.
Having arrived in Spain, his merit soon recommended him to the consideration of his superiors; and in reward for his zeal, assiduity, and attention to the service, he was promoted by the regular gradations of rank to be lieutenant-colonel and commandant of a regiment of hussars.
At this time the revolution in America had begun to wear a favourable aspect. Buenos Ayres had solemnly declared her independence; and Chile (though apparently without a person capable of conducting her in so arduous an undertaking,) seemed willing to throw off the long-worn and galling yoke of the mother country. Carrera, anxious for the success of Chile in particular, and desirous of lending his arm in the cause of American emancipation in general, took the earliest opportunity to transport himself across the Atlantic; which he effected with some difficulty, owing to the distrust which was then generally entertained in Spain with regard to the loyalty of the American officers in her service.
374Previous to his arrival in Chile (about the year 1811) some attempts had been made towards the abolition of the Spanish authority. Carasco, the Spanish President, had been deposed, on a pretence of his incapacity to serve the Spanish monarch. The government was assumed by a Cabildo and President, all of whom were Americans, and enemies to the tyrannical system which had hitherto been observed and followed; but as they were entirely destitute of the abilities which were necessary to enforce the execution of their plans, and unequal to the power with which they had invested themselves, they were obliged to follow the old form of government; professing to take a lively interest in the welfare of their Spanish sovereign and his dominions, whilst they were really his most inveterate foes.
Such was the state of anarchy in which Don Jose Miguel Carrera found Chile on his arrival: without an army, without a navy, without funds, or any preparation whatever towards carrying on an inevitable and sanguinary war; the necessary effect of the steps which they had already taken. His country entertained the highest opinion of the virtues and abilities of Carrera. He was considered as the only person who could be found capable of extricating the state from the snares of that labyrinth into which it had incautiously plunged itself.*
* In this early part of this paper the reader is requested to remember that it is the party and family history of Carrera, and that the truth is more nearly that which is related in the Introduction; I have thought it right, however, to print it unaltered in any way.—M. G.
In order to effect this he was trusted with the supreme authority of President of the Congress; and also nominated general to command an army which did not yet exist, but of which the immediate formation and organization were looked to as the only guarantee of success and future safety to the new state.
It is not difficult to imagine the many inconveniences attending the levying an army designed to operate against the established authority, in a country more remarkable for its bigotry and superstition, than for virtue, liberality, or patriotism; and whose inhabitants, notwithstanding the servile and humiliating yoke under which they lived, were taught by their priests, that any attempt against the person or interests of their prince was an infringement on religion itself, and consequently contrary to the divine will of Heaven.
However, having great influence in the country, Carrera undertook to 375 silence the zealots, and set Chile free at any expense. He commenced by dedicating his fortune (which was very considerable) with those of his relations and friends to the cause of independence, thereby supplying the defect of a public fund. He began to recruit for his army, paying to each soldier a premium on his entrance, as practised in European nations; a method never used in America but by him. From the most respectable citizens he selected officers; who were indeed ignorant of all military knowledge, but whose characters, probity, and well-known attachment to their country, made ample amends for all other defects. The regiments thus organized were well clothed, armed, regularly paid, and disciplined under his own immediate inspection. Carrera was colonel of the dragoon regiment of national guards, general inspector of cavalry, and commander-in-chief of the national forces. His elder brother, Don Juan Jose, was colonel of grenadiers, and commandant of all the infantry; and the youngest of the three, Don Luis, commanded a regiment of artillery which had garrisoned Santiago in the time of Ferdinand VII. but had been prevailed on to espouse the cause of independence, and follow the banners of Chile.*
* There were only fifty soldiers of any kind in Santiago before the revolution. This statement is very wrong.—M. G.
It may be necessary to observe here, that the general head-quarters of the Spanish troops in Chile has generally been in the province of Penco, the capital of which is Conception. The troops which were in that garrison in the beginning of the revolution, were Americans by a great majority; and were, by the liberality of the inhabitants of the town, and the promises of the American officers amongst them, easily prevailed on to revolt and deny all future allegiance to the Spanish monarch. Thus far the revolution was unstained with blood; but a circumstance soon after occurred which menaced the country with the horrors of a civil war. The inhabitants of Conception asserted, that it was better adapted for the seat of government than Santiago, as it had a communication with the sea, and many local advantages favourable to commerce, &c. &c. Carrera endeavoured to convince them of the impropriety of such a measure; but finding that his arguments were not likely to dissuade them, he adopted other means. He opened a negociation with them; in which it was stipulated that the army of Conception, then encamped on the southern bank of the Maule, should not pass that river, nor that of Chile make any advance, during a certain time. Before the expiration 376 of the time fixed, emissaries had been sent to the army of Conception by Carrera: by their generous offers matters were amicably adjusted, a reconciliation and coalition of parties was effected, and the enterprise of removing the seat of government to Conception was totally destroyed.
The Spaniards having received reinforcements from Lima, Chiloe, and Coquimbo, began to concentrate themselves in the south of Chile, in order to oppose the progress of Carrera, who was not remiss in his preparations to meet them. He nominated a Vice-President in his absence, and marched to encounter them with the united forces of Chile and Conception. An infinity of actions, sieges, and skirmishes succeeded, in which the Americans, though little experienced in war, were generally victorious over their oppressors.
It was in these guerillas that Don Bernardo O’Higgins (now Supreme Director of Chile) first distinguished himself. His father was a native of Ireland, who had served some time in the English army; but not meeting the attention or preferment which he considered as due to his merit, he resigned, and passing to Spain, received an appointment in the army of that country; from whence he accompanied an expedition to Chile, where he evinced so much intrepidity, prudence, and application, in a war against the Indians, as induced His Catholic Majesty to create him a brigadier of his service, and captain-general of Chile. He discharged the duties of these high offices to the general satisfaction of his king and the people. He did not neglect the education of Don Bernardo, who was but a natural son by a woman named Isabella Riguelme, whose morals (it is said) were not altogether irreproachable. He was sent to England when young, where he continued some time in an academy or college. At the commencement of the revolution he resided on a farm which was bequeathed him by his father. His military rank was captain of country militias; but, in consequence of his extraordinary courage and serenity in several actions against the Spaniards, Carrera promoted him to the rank of lieutenant-colonel of the army of the line, as an encouragement to valour among his officers. O’Higgins continued to merit the esteem of his general, and almost every action brought him new honours: he attained at last the rank of brigadier-general; and Carrera placed in him as much confidence as he did in either of his brothers.
Subsequent to these flattering marks of favour and distinction with which he had been honoured, Carrera and his brothers were shut up in the garrison 377 of Talca (if I recollect rightly), and besieged by the Spaniards; the town was assaulted and taken; and the Carreras, with all the officers of the garrison, were made prisoners.
The whole command of the army now devolved on Brigadier-General O’Higgins; who, instead of taking the necessary steps to procure the enlargement of Carrera his chief, by exchange or otherwise, seized on the favourable opportunity of assuming the civil power, and caused himself to be proclaimed President: in these proceedings he was supported by the officers and soldiers of Conception, his native town. Brigadier-General M‘Kenna (who was afterwards shot in a duel by Don Luis Carrera) was appointed as second in command to O’Higgins. The city was governed as before, by a Vice-President, whilst the new President remained in front of the enemy. He was making vigorous preparations to carry on the war, when his attention was called to a quarter he least expected.
The Carreras having procured and distributed money among the Spanish soldiers who guarded them, were allowed to escape; of which O’Higgins being apprised, he offered a reward for their apprehension and delivery to him. However Carrera, from his popularity in the country, had little to fear from such a rival. He proceeded towards Santiago with his brothers, disguised as peasants; and on his arrival in that city, he requested of his brother Luis to have himself discovered that he might be made prisoner, at the same time assuring him that he would liberate him that very night. Luis acted accordingly. He entered a tavern; and calling a peasant, gave him some money, and desired that he would go and inform the town-major, that he could guide him to the house in which Don Luis Carrera was lodged: the countryman made some remonstrances; but being ordered peremptorily he obeyed, and soon returned with a guard, which made Luis prisoner.
In the meantime General Carrera, having an unbounded confidence in the soldiers whom he once commanded, introduced himself disguised (by being inveloped in a large cloak) into the barrack of the artillery; and on being challenged by the sentinels, he answered that he was Carrera; upon which the officers and soldiers crowded round their proscribed general with enthusiasm and approbation, swearing to stand or fall with his fortunes. He ordered them to form, and immediately marched at their head to the plaza, liberated his brother Luis; and as soon as his arrival in the town was known, he was joined by all the detachments in the garrison, and congratulated by all the citizens, who reinstated him in his former power.
378O’Higgins, on being acquainted with all that had happened, thought proper to prefer the gratification of private animosity to the safety or good of the public in general. He abandoned his station in front of the enemy, and with his whole force marched towards Santiago, to wreak his vengeance on his greatest benefactor,—on the man who had raised him from amongst the undistinguished multitude, to act in a sphere so far above his expectations!
Carrera being advertised of the redoubled marches of his rival, despatched deputies to meet and expostulate with him on the impropriety of having left the country unprotected and at the mercy of the Spaniards; and also to propose the union of their forces, and joint exertions to expel their common enemy (who profited by their disunion); after which they could at their leisure decide their private disputes either by the fortune of war, or by the general suffrage of the people in favour of one or the other. As O’Higgins, with the exception of a few detachments, had the whole of the veteran forces under his command, he rejected with contempt these proposals of Carrera; who making known to the citizens of Santiago, and the peasantry of the country, the issue of the negociations with O’Higgins, they saw that there was no alternative left between submitting to an usurper, or preparing to reduce him to subjection by force. The latter was unanimously agreed to. The citizens enrolled themselves in corps with alacrity; the country militia assembled; and being united, they marched out with Carrera to meet O’Higgins, and by a battle decide their fate.
Carrera’s men were badly armed, and ignorant of service; their antagonists were soldiers disciplined, and already accustomed to conquer.
Carrera chose a position on the plains of Maypu, which he fortified, and there waited the arrival of O’Higgins, who did not long detain him. The two armies being in front of each other, O’Higgins, having disposed his troops for the assault, commanded the charge, and led his soldiers on with his usual bravery. Carrera waited the shock of the enemy in his entrenchments, and on their near approach he opened on them a heavy fire which caused them to retire; they were pursued, and called on to surrender by the peasants of Carrera, who had given orders not to take the lives of any of the fugitives. The soldiers of O’Higgins, as if intimidated by the idea of their disloyalty to their chief, laid down their arms, and were generously received and forgiven. O’Higgins and his principal officers were made prisoners, and experienced the clemency of the conqueror. The spoils of the field were divided amongst the victorious volunteers; and the vanquished, from O’Higgins 379 down to the meanest soldier, were amply remunerated by Carrera for the loss of their baggage, &c.
After they had considered themselves prisoners for a few hours, the scattered remains of those corps (which but just now were his enemies) were incorporated in a division with their own officers, and, what is still more surprising, with O’Higgins himself at their head. This division was appointed to act as van-guard to the army; and O’Higgins thus reconciled, and obliged not only for his employment, but for his life, to Carrera, after receiving his instructions, marched to possess himself of a post which he was ordered to occupy in order to check the enemy.
Carrera, ever frugal of the blood of his country, endeavoured by unexampled generosity and clemency to engage those in his favour who, according to the laws of war, of society, and of nature itself, had justly forfeited their lives: but he unfortunately miscarried in his attempts to disarm his enemies by these laudable means. Noble actions can only shed their influence on noble minds, and are but lost on the envious and ungrateful. Nevertheless, Carrera’s noble forgiveness of so great a crime on this occasion throws a brilliant light on that disinterested magnanimity and humanity which characterised the actions of his public life. Though he had repeated instances of the ingratitude of those whom he had served, yet he was not the less ready to extend his generosity or protection to all friends, or enemies, who stood in need of it.
The Spaniards profited by the domestic dissensions of Chile. The strength of the army was much reduced by their strife, and the army of Carrera was obliged to take refuge in Rancagua; which the Spaniards besieged, assaulted, and after a defence of forty-eight hours, without intermission of fire, the town was taken for want of ammunition to defend it longer. In this action the patriots were obliged to supply the place of grape-shot by dollars, which they fired from their artillery at the close of the second day.
The remains of the army which escaped the fury of the Spaniards passed the Andes, with General Carrera and his brothers, O’Higgins, M‘Kenna, Benevente, Rodriguez, &c., and a vast number of respectable citizens, to seek an asylum amongst the patriots of the Provincias del Rio de la Plata; from whence, after recruiting their army, they expected to recross the Andes, and again dispute the fate of Chile with her oppressors.
After a short residence in Buenos Ayres, Carrera, who was without funds, saw that it would be impossible for him to effect his plans. He therefore proceeded 380 to the United States, from whence he expected to derive some assistance: in which he was not disappointed, being furnished with five armed vessels, in which he embarked seventy English and French officers (not including the naval officers who came employed in the vessels); arms, ammunition, and clothing, accoutrements, &c. for 12,000 foot; sabres, pistols, &c. for 2000 cavalry; with a great number of artizans of different denominations, their necessary implements, &c. &c.
He concluded a treaty of commerce with the Congress, in which it was agreed that the duty on American imports in Chile (when liberated) should pay the debt incurred in fitting out the expedition alluded to; and when paid, the duties were to continue at a certain rate per cent., as stipulated in the treaty. Whether this money was advanced to Carrera by the government of the United States, or by a certain number of the members of Congress, I know not. Having thus formed a connection which he considered respectable, he departed for the Pacific ocean, where his operations were to have commenced.
In the meantime the conquest of Chile had been meditated by Pueyrredon, governor of Buenos Ayres: nothing less than the universal extension of his influence over the United Provinces, and Chile, would gratify the ambition of this monopolist of power. He well knew Carrera’s character, though gentle, was not passive; and therefore he resolved to appoint O’Higgins as President of Chile, being, as he considered, a more apt instrument to facilitate his private views. San Martin was the general appointed to lead the expedition into Chile which was then raising in the province of Cuyo. The brothers of Carrera, who had remained in Buenos Ayres, were denied the gratification of accompanying this expedition to their native country, and had strict injunctions not to leave Buenos Ayres, where they were confined on parole.
Carrera, unconscious of the treachery which was designed against him, put into Buenos Ayres to take in fresh provisions, some troops and officers which he had left there, and to inform himself of whatever might have transpired relative to his country in his absence, previous to his passing the Cape to commence hostilities in Chile. No sooner did he arrive, than his vessel was seized by the government, himself and his officers made prisoners on shore; but they afterwards put Carrera on board a gun-brig in the river, as a place of greater security. His brothers saw the imminent danger which surrounded them: they escaped from Buenos Ayres; and, disguised in the 381 apparel of muleteers, expected to reach Chile undiscovered. But in Mendoza they were betrayed by a servant, apprehended, cast into a dungeon, and loaded with irons, by order of San Martin; from whence they never went forth, till called on to resign a life already made too loathsome by the tyranny of their oppressors.
Three of the vessels of the squadron of Carrera entered the Rio de la Plata; and on being informed of his imprisonment, they put to sea again, and returned to the United States.
By the connivance and humanity of the officer to whose care Carrera had been committed, he escaped in a boat which two officers had provided for that purpose: the commander of the gun-brig, to prevent suspicion, fired several guns after him, and ordered some boats to pursue him; but not before he was certain that he could not be retaken.
Carrera, after some hours’ sail, landed safely at Monte Video, and presented himself to General Le Cor, governor of the town, who received him with that kindness and respect which were due to his misfortunes and rank.
Pueyrredon carried on a private negociation at this period with the Portuguese court at Rio de Janeiro, relative to the delivery of the Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata to a prince of the house of Bourbon (Principe de Luco), reserving for himself a lucrative and honourable place in the state after the political regeneration it was expected immediately to undergo.
Carrera ingratiated himself so far with his Portuguese friends in court, that he not only was informed of the very important business transacting there, but also furnished with copies and most authentic documents of the whole proceedings.
Pueyrredon had much to fear from Carrera’s situation and residence in Monte Video, and demanded of the Portuguese an order that he should be delivered prisoner in Buenos Ayres, from whence he had escaped. Carrera was acquainted of this by his friend, who recommended him to hold himself in readiness to depart for Panana (a town in the jurisdiction of Artigas), in case the order should be granted against him; assuring him that he would give him notice, and time for his escape. A few days after, the order was received for his apprehension in Monte Video; and on being informed he departed, and with some difficulties reached Entre Rios.
Ramirez, who was governor of that province, under Artigas, received Carrera hospitably, espoused his cause against Pueyrredon, and became his decided friend. Soon as Artigas knew that Carrera was in his territory, he wrote to Ramirez, ordering him to secure him, and send him to his headquarters 382 on the frontier of the Brazils. The order came too late; Ramirez, though a stranger to him, had become his friend, and could not think of delivering his friend to destruction. He put the letter into Carrera’s hands, requesting he would direct him in so intricate a situation, and assuring him that he would sooner meet all the resentment of Artigas, than be guilty of delivering him. Carrera told him not to fear Artigas; and devised a plan by which Ramirez might establish himself, independent of Artigas, in the government of the province of Entre Rios for the present, and afterwards perhaps might supersede him in the government of the Banda Oriental. A palliating letter was written by Ramirez to Artigas, stating that Carrera was a patriot, a friend of his, and that he stood in much need of his talents in the prosecution of the war against the Porteños, or Buenos Ayrians. Artigas thought it unavailing to use menaces to enforce his orders at such an immense distance, and therefore affected to acquiesce in the request of Ramirez; not doubting that an opportunity might soon occur more favourable to the execution of his ungenerous designs against a man already too unfortunate. Artigas’s hatred to Carrera originated in an idea that Carrera, by his superior abilities, might supersede or supplant him in his government of the Banda Oriental.
Some time had elapsed since San Martin and O’Higgins had crossed the Andes; they had already gained some decided advantages over the Spaniards in Chile. The news of the battle of Maypú; the death of his two brothers in Mendoza, and that of his father in Chile; the confiscation of all their estates and properties; the declaration against them, the Carreras, as being traitors to their country, and to be proceeded against accordingly;—all came to him the same day: add to this catalogue of misfortunes, the imprisonment of his lady, Doña Mercedes, and Doña Jabiera, his sister, in Buenos Ayres.
The popularity of the Carreras in Chile appeared so glaringly to San Martin, that he resolved to end the existence of Don Juan Jose and Don Luis, whom he had left in Mendoza, lest they should escape, well knowing that in Chile he could hold no competition with them. He therefore sent an order to Luzuriago, governor of Mendoza, intimating the advantages that would accrue to the state from the immediate execution of the Carreras. Luzuriago, whose military preferment and admission into the honourable orders of new nobility established in Chile and Buenos Ayres, depended on his promptitude in assassinating those whom his employers would point out for victims, quickly put into execution the mandate of his fell master.
The Carreras were conducted to the public plaza, to gratify the envy, ambition, and revenge of a base tyrant. They died! But they suffered death 383 with such unshaken resolution, as astonished their savage executioners, and excited the pity and tears of their more feeling beholders: they refused to admit the officious assistance of the priests who were appointed to attend them; and walking arm in arm to the place of execution, they embraced each other most tenderly, recollected their absent brother in a very affecting manner, at the same time expressing a thought, that if he still lived he would undoubtedly avenge the wrongs and vindicate the fame of his most unfortunate brothers. Then seating themselves on the bench, and again embracing each other, they requested of the soldiers to despatch them: the soldiers fired, and they fell, clasped in each others arms. Thus died the Carreras, whose only crime was, that they loved their country too well, and were too much beloved by their countrymen!
After their death, the form of a trial was drawn up by a lawyer, in which they were found guilty of having left Buenos Ayres without a passport, in order to circulate sedition in Chile. This most ingenious trial was published in Buenos Ayres, Chile, and all parts of the United Provinces, in order to hide the deformity of a most horrid violation of the common rights of individuals, and of mankind in general. This mode of trial, however rare it may have been before, has since that time been but too common in America Independiente. It is a most excellent plan; for the dead speak not, and the evidences are always such as to meet the entire approbation of the executioners.
A bill of costs was presented, by order of His Excellency General San Martin, to Don Ignacio Carrera, in which he was charged with all the expenses arising to the state from the execution of his sons; viz. gaolers’ fees, plank and nails used in the seat on which they were shot, cordage (with which they were not tied), powder, ball, &c. &c. The aged and unfortunate father, whose property had been already confiscated, except a small allowance, discharged this unheard-of species of debt, and expired in a few days after!
Colonel Don Manuel Rodriguez, an officer of Carrera, who passed to Chile before the expedition of San Martin, and raised a force in the country, by whose influence and exertions San Martin was enabled to subdue Chile, was still more basely assassinated, because he was a known friend to the liberty of his country.
General Carrera had brought with him from the United States several printing presses; one of which had by some means escaped the general ruin: he had it in Entre Rios, where he lost no time in publishing manifestos of his 384 transactions and services during the revolution. His defence was ably stated, and in the sequel proved that he and his brothers were not traitors to their country, as had been declared by his enemies; but that those enemies were, or wished to be, traitors. He stated, and made appear from the most authentic documents, the treaty which existed between Pueyrredon and the Portuguese court relative to the delivery of the United Provinces. These manifestos were distributed by his friends through the whole country. The town and province of Buenos Ayres began to distrust the patriotism of their Director and his Congress: they saw the justice which actuated the Federalists or Montoneros in their threatened invasion of the provinces, and looked forward to them rather as their deliverers than as enemies.
Pueyrredon was sensible of his danger, and made timely preparations to meet it. General Belgrano, who commanded the army of Peru (then in Tucuman), was ordered to accelerate his marches towards the confines of Santa Fé and Cordova, where the first scene of action was anticipated.
Ramirez and Carrera, finding the minds of the Porteños to be in a proper mood for their reception, crossed the Parrana, and hostilities commenced in the province of Santa Fé, where many actions were fought, all of which redounded much to the credit and valour of the Federalists. All the posts which the Porteños held were taken with slaughter; and the remains of their army, under General Balcarse, took refuge in the town of Rosario, where they were besieged about fifteen days; and, fortunately for them, some vessels had come to receive them previous to the assault of the town. In these vessels they embarked with great disorder, losing many soldiers, their artillery, and baggage: they sailed down the Parrana, and disembodied at San Nicholas; Viamon, who was general-in-chief of the Porteños, was taken prisoner in this campaign.
The Federal army now completely victorious over the Porteños, marched towards the river Carcaraña, on the frontiers of Cordova, to encounter the celebrated army of Peru under General Belgrano, who had established his head-quarters in the Cruz Altra, a small town or village on the Cordova side of the Carcaraña. Here guerillas were blazing unceasingly at each other day and night, without any decisive advantage to one party or the other. Belgrano’s army was highly disciplined, accustomed to the dangers and privations of war, and had a desire to come to a general engagement, as they were much fatigued with the incessant toils, vigilance, and partial dangers inseparable from a soldier in front of his enemy; but he was too prudent to hazard all his hopes in a general action against troops already considered 385 invincible, and wished to await reinforcements in his present position before he would venture an attack: his soldiers became impatient, and desertion began to threaten his army with total annihilation, whilst the deserters passed over to the Federalists, and strengthened their lines.
The publications of Carrera were privately distributed and read in Belgrano’s army; protection was offered to all officers, soldiers, provinces, &c. who should wish to throw off the oppressive yoke of the metropolis, Buenos Ayres. Many persons of rank and distinction in the country who were persecuted for their political tenets, flocked to the Federal standard, and found an asylum beneath its influence. Thus the Federal army became more formidable every day, and the knowledge of a revolution in Belgrano’s army was what saved him from an attack in his intrenchments.
Such were the prospects of the campaign, when the second in command, Don Juan Bautista, Coronel Mayor of the national forces, and General of the auxiliary army of Peru, fired with ambition, and anticipating the mutinous spirit of the soldiery, headed the revolution, and declared for the Federal army, requesting of Carrera and Ramirez to have him nominated to the government of Cordova, professing the highest veneration and attachment to his new allies, and his readiness to assist in forwarding their views, and the good of the country in general.
Ramirez was of opinion that Bustos should be sent to Entre-Rios, and the army taken by himself and Carrera, and some other person, more worthy their confidence, appointed to the government of Cordova. But the idea was too ungenerous for Carrera: he believed the professions of Bustos, and had him appointed to the government. This army consisted of about four thousand veteran soldiers, seven hundred of which were Chilenos, and to be delivered by Bustos to Carrera, clothed, armed, &c. whenever he should demand them.
The officers who had honour enough to detest the proceedings of Bustos, and did not wish to remain in that army, were permitted to retire whither they thought best: they were but few who retired. Belgrano was imprisoned by the Porteños for an event which he could not foresee or prevent. He was in his youth a lawyer, and became a soldier in the revolution. Belgrano was the most able, honourable, and meritorious officer the Porteños ever boasted; and it was certainly a pity that his exertions were not employed in a better cause than the extension and support of a tyrant’s authority.
Before we proceed, it may not be amiss to notice slightly the birth of His 386 Excellency Don Juan Bautista Bustos, governor of the province of Cordova. According to the religious institutes of Catholic countries, monks or friars are not supposed to extend their affections to any thing beneath the dignity of the church, the blessed Virgin, or some other heavenly chimera; but that they have their weaknesses, and, like other men, are sometimes led aside from the paths of virtue, we have a living and unequivocal proof in the person of Don Juan Bautista Bustos, who was the son of a friar: his mother was indeed a slave; but she was one of the prettiest Mulatas in Cordova, so famed for that cast. She was afterwards purchased by the friar by whom she had many children. As Cordova is the seat of science and literature in America, it is very natural to suppose that Bustos imbibed some tincture of both. He served in the Spanish army as cadet; and it is further said, that he particularly distinguished himself in Buenos Ayres, in 1807, against the English. However that may be, Bustos is certainly a brave man, and his military promotions have been gained in the field by his merit: nevertheless, he is ungrateful, cruel, intriguing, and perfidious.
Buenos Ayres now saw herself divested of those succours in which her confidence and security were founded. Santa Fé was lost, Cordova no longer recognised her authority; and the army of Perú, which was expected to conquer her enemies, now was foremost in asserting the rights of the provinces. The communication with the province of Cuyo was intercepted, and there were reasons to fear, that that province would follow the example of Cordova, whenever circumstances would be favourable to it. Thus deprived of all its resources, Buenos Ayres saw, in its most dreadful shape, the impending storm which was gathering over her head, and promised to crush her to the dust: the day of retribution seemed fast approaching, in which she should receive the punishment which was due to her insidious perfidy and unbounded ambition. In this lamentable dilemma, Pueyrredon and his congress turned their eyes unanimously towards their champion San Martin, the immortal and invincible hero of San Lorenzo, Chacabuco, and Maypú, as the only person who could deliver them from the hands of their enemies.
San Martin had crossed the Andes, and was with his grenadiers, dragoons, and Cazadores, in Mendoza. The army of the Andes, which San Martin commanded, belonged to Buenos Ayres. His obligations to Pueyrredon were, or ought to have been infinite, for having selected him, from amongst many who possessed greater merit, to fulfil the office which he held; but he had cunning enough to foresee that the Federal army was superior to his 387 own in every point of view: he saw the danger to which he would be exposed if he attacked them, and therefore wisely shunned it, thinking with Sir John Falstaff, (whom he also imitates in his love of the bottle,) that “discretion is the better part of valour.” The savage wished to cloke his cowardice under the mask of humanity and patriotism, and for that purpose issued a proclamation, expressing how extremely repugnant it was to his feelings to shed the blood of one single American: that it was his only wish to carry the sword of his country against its common enemies, the Godos or Spaniards:—he prepared to cross the Andes, resolved to put the army under his command at the disposition of the government of Chile. On his presenting himself in Chile, these forces underwent an alteration of titles: they were styled by Buenos Ayres, Exercito de los Andes, ó Exercito de Buenos Ayres; but were now called Exercito de la Republica de Chile. Thus did this modern hero, this Washington of South America, not only fly from the government which had elevated, distinguished, and protected him in the moment of danger; but also robbed her of those forces which some nobler spirit might have led to rally round the ruins of their falling state. A desertion, fraud, and cowardice worthy of San Martin, and of him only.
I should be extremely sorry to insinuate any thing derogatory to the character of so great and illustrious a person as San Martin; but if it is admitted that conscience sometimes damps a man’s courage,—surely no person could be more likely to fear from its accusations than His Excellency. He must have recollected how much easier it was to gratify his brutal revenge on Carrera’s brothers in a dungeon, and loaded with shackles, than it would be to meet him at the head of an army, determined to conquer.
By his orders, the most notorious infraction on the rights of war and humanity, perhaps, that is recorded of any country having pretensions to any degree of civilisation, was perpetrated in San Luis by his friend Dupuy, the lieutenant-governor of that town. After the battle of Maypú, all the officers taken prisoners in that action had been sent to San Luis, and recommended by San Martin to the particular attention of Don Vicente Dupuy, the lieutenant-governor. They were about fifty in number, including General Ordoñez, Colonels Riberos and Murgado, and other field officers. Every Sunday the general and field officers presented themselves to Dupuy, with whom they generally dined and passed the night in playing at cards, &c., &c. Dupuy, either from a malevolent and blood-thirsty inclination (as some suppose), 388 or in obedience of orders from his master (which he afterwards in his trial endeavoured to prove), conceived a horrid plan of assassinating all the prisoners in the town, with the Spanish residents and officers. Accordingly on the night of the 7th of February 1818, General Ordoñez, Colonels Riberos and Murgado, and the officers of the general’s staff, were invited to Dupuy’s, and highly entertained; the night as usual was passed over the cards, and at break of day Dupuy, impatient to commence his sanguinary undertaking, violently seized on the money which Riberos had won during the night, and which was placed on the table before him.
Dupuy knew the high and unyielding temper of that meritorious officer, and supposed he would attempt to strike him in the moment he had been guilty of that breach of decorum; he had a number of orderlies, or assassins (as we shall here consider them synonymous terms), in waiting, ready to rush forth on the first alarm. Riberos acted with a patience and sang-froid, to which he had heretofore been a stranger. He recollected that he was but a prisoner of war on parole, and the aggressor was an absolute tyrant and a governor: he therefore calmly remonstrated with him on the impropriety and baseness of the action of which he had just been guilty, telling him that if he availed himself of the authority invested in him as governor for acting in such an ungentlemanly manner, he found himself, from his circumstances, obliged to allow it to pass unnoticed; but that if it were understood in any other light, no man should insult Riberos and pass unpunished. Dupuy declared that he only availed himself of the authority of a gentleman, not that of a governor, and stood up at the same time by way of defiance. Riberos, now, not only considered himself justified in chastising his insolence, but obligated to do so; and in contempt of the intreaties of his companions he knocked down Dupuy by a vigorous blow on the face. The confederates of Dupuy, then at the table, flew with one accord to a corner of the room, in which was deposited a quantity of arms for the purpose. The officers seeing their danger, followed the same example, and in a moment every person in the room was armed.
It is not difficult to suppose that veteran officers accustomed to brave dangers, overawed these vile assassins, who were only active in their profession when secure from danger, or screened by the darkness of night. They stood motionless before the officers, who immediately secured the door, as the guards, prepared without, were entering the court yard. Dupuy and his gang being enclosed, and unable for the present to receive any assistance from his friends 389 without, thought it best to capitulate:—he pledged his word and honour to the officers, that if they would permit him to go out, he would pacify the tumult in the street, and bury in oblivion their mutual resentment. The officers acceded to this proposition. Dupuy went out, and telling the mob that he had escaped from the Godos who were in revolution against the town, he caused the drums to beat, and trumpets to sound the “General,” which, seconded by the cries of “Down with the Godos,” announced to the unfortunate officers that the fatal hour of their massacre was come.
The gallant Riberos, who considered himself the cause of that general misfortune, exhorted his companions to sell their existence at the dearest rate possible, but they saw the inutility of seven officers opposing themselves to the rage of an incensed rabble; and expected, by offering no resistance, to find mercy amongst their butchers. Riberos finding them unwilling to acquiesce in his first proposal, insinuated that each Spaniard ought to fall by his own hand, but his comrades shrunk from the idea of suicide. The assassins began to fire, and advanced on the house: Riberos bid farewell to his companions, and exclaiming, “Un Americano indecente jamas quitterá la vida de Segundo Riberos,” he finished his existence by discharging the contents of his pistol in his head: the remaining six threw down their arms, and were without resistance despatched by the ruffians, who immediately went all through the town assassinating every Spaniard individually in their houses or in the streets.
This scene of barbarity commenced about seven o’clock in the streets on the 8th of February, 1817. Only two Spaniards escaped their search, the one died insane from the terror of that day, the other still exists in the convent of San Lorenzo, province of Santa Fé.
Ordoñez, whose body was covered with wounds received in the French war in defence of his country with fifty officers, many of whom were Spanish noblemen, perished on that day by the hands of the merciless assassins: the number of residents of the town who died, is not known; twenty-seven soldiers, prisoners of the Federal army, were also suffocated in a dungeon the same day.
Thus did Dupuy gain a memorable and signal victory over these brave though unresisting officers and soldiers. Prodigies of valour and patriotism were performed by his officers on this occasion. An official letter was despatched to Buenos Ayres, stating the imminent danger of the Patria from the insurrection of fifty Godos, isolated from all intercourse with their friends 390 by a distance upwards of five hundred leagues, and surrounded by enemies on every side. The Patria, thus delivered from her enemies, could not do less than reward her sons. Pueyrredon, who never allowed this kind of merit to pass unrewarded, decreed, that each officer of Dupuy should be presented with a medal at the cost of the government of Buenos Ayres, with the date of the memorable event, and some appropriate insignia engraved on it. Dupuy was promoted to be Coronel Mayor of the national forces, and a member of the legion of merit, in recompence for his activity.
This, perhaps, is the first example of an infamous clan of ruffians being honoured with, or daring to assume a distinction only due to merit, as the demonstration of their prowess in the horrid and detestable crime of assassination!
The Federalists, who had nothing to fear from the enemies in their rear, directed their marches towards the province of Buenos Ayres, leaving Bustos (whose army was now called the third division of the Federal army), in the province of Cordova to observe the operations of the interior provinces.
The known resentment of Carrera and Ramirez to Pueyrredon made it necessary for him to retire from the government in Buenos Ayres, as the Federalists would enter into no treaty whilst Pueyrredon was director. He was obliged to resign, and was succeeded in the government by Brigadier General Don José Rondeau. This change in the administration did not satisfy the Federalists; the congress still existed, and they would listen to no terms of accommodation whilst it did.
Rondeau, who had acquired some credit in the campaigns of High Perú, availed himself of his popularity by persuading chosen detachments of civicos and country militia to accompany him with the veteran force then in Buenos Ayres, to the frontiers, to meet, and stop the progress of the Federalists, whose numbers were much reduced by having sent some of their force back to Entre-Rios, and leaving parties in several towns in their rear. The troops under Rondeau were about three thousand, those of Ramirez were at most nine hundred, including about forty northern Indians.
It was evening when the contending parties discovered each other, and as it was late, and the Federalists fatigued with marching, it was determined to defer the attack till the next morning; but soon as the night came on, the Porteños, notwithstanding the great superiority of their numbers, put themselves in march, in order to retire to San Nicolas. The Federalists pursuing them, and harassing their rear, which was much encumbered by carts and 391 baggage, they found it impossible to effect their retreat. However, they sustained their Guerillas, and continued their march, in order to possess themselves of a strong and advantageous position on the Cañada de Cepeda. On arriving there they halted. Their infantry, amounting to twelve hundred, formed a hollow square, the front of which was covered by their numerous carts, with artillery at proper intervals; the flanks, or right and left faces of the square, were strengthened by cavalry; and the rear face of the square was protected by the Cañada on which it was formed. In this position the Porteños remained till morning, when Ramirez in person reconnoitred the ground, and a little after sunrise every thing was ready for a general attack. The charge was sounded, the Federalists advanced sword in hand, with a terror-striking courage, at full speed of their horses, amidst a heavy fire of artillery and musquetry. The cavalry of the Porteños, accustomed to trust more to the fleetness of their horses, than to the keenness of their swords, could not resist the charge, but fled in disorder, leaving their infantry abandoned. Rondeau himself was one of the first to fly. The fugitive cavalry were pursued with great havoc, whilst a corps de reserve of 150 men remained in observation of the infantry.
The grass was extremely luxuriant, and rather dry by the intense heat of the season: it caught fire from the artillery, the breeze augmented the flames, and in a few minutes the camp appeared in a dreadful conflagration.
The loss of the enemy’s waggons, artillery, &c. was inevitable; they marched through the marsh in their rear, and gaining an adjacent lake, remained there during the time the fire continued to rage, which was about three hours; the breeze then lessening, and the Federalists returning from the pursuit of that part of the enemy which had fled, the fire was by their exertions almost entirely extinguished.
The situation of the enemy’s infantry was the most pitiable which can be conceived; without cavalry to sustain them, without refreshment of any kind, not knowing the moment in which they might be engaged by their victorious enemies, and at least six or seven leagues distant from San Nicolas, the only post in which they could reasonably indulge a hope of being able to defend themselves. However, they were still in number much superior to the Federalists, and the spirit and courage of the three officers who commanded them was almost equal to the difficulty and danger of their situation. Balcarse, who commanded in chief, was summoned to surrender, but refused with great resolution; he formed his men in close column, with parties of 392 light infantry on the flanks, and in that posture of defence began his march for San Nicolas. Ramirez formed his cavalry in column of divisions in order to attack him, and they must undoubtedly have perished, were it not for the interposition of Carrera, who had two objects in view, which impelled him not to concur in the attack on the column:—first, amongst the infantry of the enemy he knew there were six hundred Chilenos, who being the bravest would in all probability have been the first to perish. These soldiers he expected in a few days would be his own, and by destroying them then, he would have deprived himself of those men with whom he afterwards terrified his enemies. Secondly, he knew that veteran soldiers led by brave chiefs would dispute each yard of ground with an obstinate courage, and that many of the Federalists would necessarily fall in reducing them, which would cause a suspension of operations for some time, as the Federalists could not recruit their army without returning to Santa Fé or Entre-Rios; which would give time to the government of Buenos Ayres, to make new preparations. Such were the causes which made Carrera consider that a victory over this column of infantry would be too dearly bought.
They harassed the rear of the column for a few leagues, many soldiers from excessive fatigue were obliged to throw themselves on the ground, and give themselves up to the parties which hung on their rear.—Colonel Major Balcarse, and Colonels Rolon and Vidal commanded the infantry. Their spirited resolution and good dispositions for their defence did them as much credit, as the shameful flight of the Director, Rondeau, did him dishonour. As only nine hundred infantry entered San Nicolas, their total loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, may be computed at 300.
The Federalists continued their march towards Buenos Ayres, leaving a small force in the vicinity of San Nicolas and San Pedro to observe the operations of the enemy.
Rondeau with one of his aides-de-camp escaped from the field of battle, and arrived in Buenos Ayres about 4 o’clock the following morning. As they supposed themselves the only survivors of the expedition, they declared to the Congress the dreadful destruction which their cavalry had suffered, and which they supposed it altogether impossible their infantry could have escaped.
About 7 o’clock in the morning a proclamation was published in all the streets, announcing to the people the dismal reverse of fortune which the Patria had just sustained; and the total loss of her son’s horse and foot, in the battle of Cepeda, the governor “alone having escaped to tell them.” This 393 proclamation was more adapted to prepare the minds of the inhabitants to bear with a meek and Christian resignation the vicissitude under which they had fallen, than to rouse them to any new exertion for the defence of their capital. No immediate preparations were made by the government. Nothing but fear and consternation reigned in the town; they even had the absurdity to believe that the body of the Federal army could advance with the rapidity of a courier and enter the city that night. It is remarkable that this was the first, and almost the only occasion on which the government of Buenos Ayres acknowledged a defeat of their forces; although their arms were attended only with a series of uninterrupted misfortunes, owing to the ignorance or cowardice of the commanders of their expeditions. Although they had lost all the Banda Oriental, Entre Rios, Santa Fé, and all the towns of High Peru; yet the gazettes were filled with fictitious and imaginary details of their victories, and plausible excuses for the necessity of sending such frequent reinforcements were given to the public. This last misfortune extorted from them not only a full, but an exaggerated description of their loss.
However, two days afterwards an express arrived from San Nicolas with despatches from Balcarse. Their veteran infantry still existed! A proclamation was immediately published, in which the former report of Rondeau was flatly contradicted. It was true, indeed, that the Director and his aid-de-camp, with all the cavalry, were pursued five leagues; nevertheless the army rallied afterwards; in fine, “their fellow citizens and soldiers were covered with immortal laurels, and the enemy defeated.”
The first confession was believed by the people to be genuine; it was the only government news they had believed for a length of time. They, accustomed to hear nothing from their press but falsehood and deception, consequently found themselves under the necessity of learning to judge for themselves. It was known that the Federalists were advancing on the town; and the inhabitants could not conceive how an enemy could receive such a defeat as the Congress would fain make it appear they had, and still continue to advance.
The object of this last proclamation was to raise a contribution to pay the civicos, in order to put them between the Congress and her danger. The design did not succeed. The people had a right idea of their imbecile and corrupted governors; and looked forward with anxiety to the hour which would free them altogether of their oppressors.
394In this very unfavourable state of affairs, the government recollected the services and abilities of Don Estanislao Soler, whom they had long neglected, and discarded from their notice; and who lived on his little farm in the country, unregarded and obscure. Soler had been a brigadier-general, and had merited and received the approbation of his country, in the campaign of the Banda Oriental, and siege of Monte Video.
In times which did not promise so rich a harvest of honour, the candidates for power in Buenos Ayres were numerous; but on this occasion the fear of danger seems to have completely superseded the love of glory. There was not a man who would offer himself for his country. Soler was summoned by the Congress, on which he immediately waited, and was solicited by them to receive the command of whatever force could be raised. With this request he complied, without insinuating or perhaps recollecting their former ingratitude.
The opinion of the public in favour of Soler was so great in Buenos Ayres, that he was congratulated by every class of citizens, on his return into office. In a few days he raised about 3,000 men to accompany him to the field, and established his head-quarters at the Puente Marco, seven leagues from Buenos Ayres. The Federal army was encamped at Pilar, distant from Puente Marco eight leagues. An armistice was concluded for fourteen days; but before any further propositions should be made for peace, the Federalists required that the Congress should be dissolved; which order Soler intimated to them, and the town had the gratification to see that assembly dismissed.
The provinces of Tucuman, Salta, Santiago del Estere, Catamarca Arioja, and San Luis, encouraged by the example of Cordova, and protected by the Federalists, declared themselves independent of Buenos Ayres. Dupuy was superseded, cast into prison, and brought to trial for the massacre of the Spaniards, and various cruelties and assassinations. He was entirely void of that resolution which he so often had put to the proof in others; the crimes of which he was accused were committed under the eyes of the town, and even his judges were witnesses of his barbarity: he therefore could not do otherwise than acknowledge the crimes laid to his charge; but he alleged for his defence, that he was but a subaltern, and obliged to execute the orders of the captain-general of the province of Cuyo, Don Jose San Martin, who was his immediate chief. He produced the written orders of San Martin for the assassination of Rodriguez, Raposo, and Conde; these orders were very 395 laconic, stating nothing more than—“Don Fulano will pass through the town of San Luis on such a day: he has my passport; receive him politely; give him whatever assistance he may stand in need of,—but, take care that he pass not the wood on the other side San Luis.—Prontitud y silencio, asi conviene la bien de la Patria!” He made it appear, that previous to the departure of San Martin, he had, in conversation with him, received a verbal order for the massacre of the Spaniards, lest they should take part with Carrera.
Frivolous as this defence was, it had some weight with the pusillanimous and ignorant court by which he was judged. They were accustomed to tremble at the name of San Martin, and could not divest themselves of fear. They dreaded a vicissitude in their affairs by which San Martin might be enabled to reassume his authority; in which case they would be responsible to him if they acted by his favourite as his crimes deserved. Thus the sentiments of fear overbalanced those of justice; and the tyrant who had a thousand times forfeited his vile existence by his viler deeds, was only sentenced to be transported in irons to La Arioja; from whence he escaped, and followed his master to Lima, to inform him of the wonderful metamorphosis of America beyond the Andes. San Martin received him with the regard due to an able and faithful assistant in his iniquities, and appointed him to the command of the Castella de la Independencia in Callao.
After the dismission of the Congress in Buenos Ayres, the supreme power was invested in the Cabildo, over which presided Don Pedro Aguirre Alcalde de Primer Voto. The treaty of peace now commenced; and after a few days’ negotiation, overtures were agreed to and signed by the stipulating parties. The articles of the treaty of Pilar were as follows, viz.—
“That the war carried on by the Federalists against the government of Buenos Ayres and her allies in the United Provinces was just, in every acceptation of the word; and had for its principal object and end, the emancipation of America in general, not only from her foreign, but also from her domestic, yoke, which was still more galling and illiberal.
“That the many petty governments and independent states bordering on each other were inimical to, and incompatible with the peace, good order, and prosperity of the nation; war being inevitable whilst each petty governor had exorbitant and avaricious desires to gratify, and a military force under his command.
“That a Federal government was the most effectual preventative against 396 these disorders, by uniting all the finances and forces of the nation under one Director or President, to be elected in the most just and constitutional manner.
“That an assembly should be elected in each of the Federal provinces by the free and unbiassed votes of their constituents. From each of these assemblies, one or more deputies (according to the population of the province which they represented) should be nominated as members of a general Congress, which should meet at the convent of San Lorenzo, in the province of Santa Fé (being the most central situation), seventy days subsequent to the date of the treaty; when they were to select from amongst their own body, the President before mentioned; and enact such general laws as would be deemed most salutary for the public. That there might not remain a shadow of oppression in this convention, all military forces should be distant at least twenty leagues.
“That in consequence of the vast extension of the territories included in this treaty, local circumstances, qualities, and properties peculiar to each province, must be admitted to have a particular influence on its laws and customs; hence, it became necessary that each should be governed by laws established by its own assembly, the laws enacted by the Congress only tending to the general utility of the provinces collectively.
“That the finances, and all the forces of the nation, should be exclusively at the disposition of the President and Congress. No particular province should raise, organise, or train soldiers or militia, but by orders of the supreme government; and when such soldiers or militia were so organised or trained, they should be liable to be commanded to whatever part their presence might be most necessary.
“That Don Manuel Saratea should be nominated Governor of Buenos Ayres for the time being, and till the will of the assembly of Buenos Ayres should be further known.
“That the Federal army should retire from the province of Buenos Ayres, by divisions not exceeding two hundred men each, for the greater convenience of supplying them with provisions, &c. in their regression; the first division to march in three days from that time, and the number of days between the marches of the succeeding divisions not to exceed eight.”
Saratea quietly took possession of his office according to the treaty. Circular letters were despatched to the different provinces requesting the attendance of their deputies, at the time appointed.
397Carrera had various solicitations from the most respectable citizens of Buenos Ayres to accept of that government. Ramirez also told him that it was impossible to place any confidence in a people who were so long their enemies, whilst a Porteño ruled them; and advised him to become governor, strengthen himself with troops worthy his confidence, and revenge the indignities and wrongs he had sustained. Had Carrera directed his views to ambition, and not to the good of his country, it cannot be denied that he had then an excellent opportunity of aggrandising himself: but he aspired not to an unbounded or extensive authority over his countrymen; his exertions were directed only to Chile, and for her welfare,—he had not a wish beyond her narrow precincts.
He hoped to see established a most liberal form of representative government, and waited with impatience the assembling of the Congress at San Lorenzo, where his eloquence, his abilities, and the uprightness of his conduct, would have opened for him the most effectual and direct road to redress his wrongs, and punish those who had endeavoured to defame his character and oppress his country. Had the Congress met, it was supposed that they would have furnished Carrera with every thing necessary for his expedition to Chile, which (after its regeneration) would have been united to the confederacy.
America, thus united, under any chief capable of conducting her operations, would very soon have changed her aspect of anarchy: the political chaos would have been superseded by an organised and regular government, which (though it could not be supposed to have been perfect in the moment of its formation) would at least have had the most flattering form, and in all probability would have been the foundation of future greatness to America.
Balcarse having procured transports at San Nicolas embarked his troops, and came down the river to Buenos Ayres. It was late in the evening when he landed; and marching immediately to the Plaza he formed his corps, collecting all the field-officers and captains to the centre, where he began to harangue them on the vile submission to which their once glorious city and its territory were reduced; protesting that he was still ready to rescue them with his force from the hands of their enemies, and restore them to their former greatness.
Soler, French, Pagola, and several others of the officers of the new government, were present; but they did not consider the time or place well adapted for entering into a defence of the late measures, or discussing the merits or failings which might be attached to them: they retired as soon as 398 propriety would admit. The eloquence of General Balcarse had the wished-for effect on his military audience: they were proud of his abilities, and not entirely blind to their own merit, as they supposed there was much due to them from their conduct at Cepeda. After some specious promises of pay, &c., officers and soldiers agreed to follow him; and the next morning he was acknowledged in the Cabildo as captain-general of the province, &c. &c. The Cabildo could not with safety resist Balcarse; their votes were forced, the hall being filled with officers, and the front of the Cabildo and all parts of the Plaza lined with soldiers, who were ready to act in case of any difficulty arising to their general.
Saratea, Soler, Bellino, French, Pagola, Martinez, and all the officers of Buenos Ayres, except those of Balcarse’s two battalions, went out to Pilar, where Ramirez still remained with two hundred men: I was one amongst those officers also. We remained in Pilar two days, in which time we were joined by a vast number of citizens of Buenos Ayres, who had followed Saratea and his officers, thereby showing their attachment to his government.
With a body of two hundred soldiers, as many officers, and a motley group of citizens, we commenced our march to Buenos Ayres, and in two days we arrived in the suburbs of the town. That night, Carrera and Ramirez, with a guard of forty men, entered Buenos Ayres, and were immediately joined by the artillery, dragoon, and grenadier regiments. The civicos and the greater part of the citizens joined us in the Corrales de Miserea the same night.
Balcarse, seeing that all the citizens and soldiers (except his own two battalions) had deserted him, shut himself up in the fort: his soldiers, who a few days ago had sworn to support him, now saw it was utterly impracticable to do so, and meditated the surrender of the castle. However, the walls were manned by some parties who kept up a fire on a few soldiers who amused themselves galloping in front of them. Balcarse, Rolon, Vidal, and a few others, escaped by a private door which led to the river; where they embarked in a boat, first possessing themselves of 14,000 dollars which were in the public coffers, in order to defray their expenses at Monte Video, or wherever their adverse fortune might drive them.
Soon as the flight of the governor and his principal officers was known in the fort, a flag of truce was sent to the Federal generals, offering to surrender, and requesting pardon, which was granted: the castle gate was thrown open, the troops marched out, and formed in the line of Soler. The government 399 and all its affairs were again arranged on the plan previously described in the treaty of Pilar.
The town being perfectly tranquil, Ramirez retired to the Santos Lugares, where he encamped during six or seven days. Carrera remained in Buenos Ayres with Saratea, who permitted him to draw all the Chilian soldiers from the regiments in which they served; and of these an hussar regiment was formed by Colonel Benevente and a few officers, having for their barrack a large country seat, about a league out of town.
Alvear, who had preceded Pueyrredon in the government of Buenos Ayres, thought this a proper time to return from his banishment; and, on his arrival in Buenos Ayres, he was arrested by Soler. Alvear had served with Carrera in Europe, where they lived together on terms of intimacy; and that intimacy was again renewed in the time of Carrera’s residence in Monte Video. In consequence of which Carrera had him released and enlarged in Buenos Ayres.
As Alvear was the first who formed the corps of Buenos Ayres on a respectable footing, and the only Director who ever paid them for their services, he found little difficulty in causing a revolution amongst them. The troops all assembled at the retico in the suburbs, where they declared Alvear General, and deposed Soler.
The civicos, under their favourite Soler, took arms against Alvear and the regulars; who retired from the city, and came to our encampment, expecting that Carrera would give his sanction or assistance in favour of this revolution. Ramirez was on his march for Entre Rios; where his presence and his forces were likely to be very necessary, as Artigas was directing his marches towards the frontiers on Entre Rios. We were also about to march the day following for Santa Fé, where Carrera designed to encamp during the winter season.
Alvear requested of Carrera to return to the town, and have him recognised as General of the Portenian army: Carrera refused to take any part in his revolution; but told him that if he were obliged to fly, he might come to him, and that he would protect him. The troops of Alvear seeing that Carrera would not support them, thought of abandoning Alvear and throwing themselves on the mercy of Soler, who had marched out after them with civicos. A few subalterns headed them, and next morning on parade usurped the command; and telling the rest of the officers that it was optional with them to follow their respective battalions or remain with Alvear, they began their 400 march to return to Buenos Ayres. Alvear requested of Carrera to impede their retreat; but he repeated his determination not to compromise himself for the affairs of another, and Alvear’s corps retired unmolested.
Alvear, seven colonels, and forty-seven officers, including lieutenant-colonels and majors, followed our regiment, with their servants, and a few soldiers, who would not return to Buenos Ayres.
Ramirez continued his march to the Entre Rios, as we did ours to Santa Fé. Nothing in the march occurred worthy of notice. We encamped in the Rincon de Gorondona, an angle of land formed by the confluence of the Carcaraña and Parrana, covered with wood, and affording good pasture for our horses and cattle. Alvear’s officers, who were under our protection, formed their encampment about a league below ours, on the bank of the Parrana. Ramirez passed over to the Bajada, where he was received with every demonstration of joy by his countrymen.
In our encampment we remained two months; during which our soldiers were trained to the cavalry exercise, charge, and manœuvres. Two gun-brigs, with some gun-boats, came up the river, conveying arms, ammunition, clothing, and money, to Carrera, for our regiment: the arms, ammunition, and clothing, which were remaining, together with the gun-brigs and boats, were presented by Carrera to Ramirez, the officers and men still continuing in them to serve Ramirez in the river.
About this time a captain came to our encampment with letters from Colonel Dorego in Buenos Ayres, informing Carrera, that by a revolution of Soler, Saratea had been deposed, and the inhabitants reduced to a more miserable state than ever. Soler had declared himself captain-general of the province, marched to Luxan, with his new-organised troops, formed an encampment about one mile distant from that town, where he disciplined his corps, and obliged the Cabildo in Buenos Ayres to lay a weekly contribution on the people for the regular payment and support of his military establishment. A French officer also arrived with correspondences from Chile, soliciting the speedy assistance of Carrera in co-operation with his country, in order to sustain a revolution which had been set on foot immediately on hearing that he was at the head of a force. As it was too far advanced in the season to cross the Andes, the revolutionists were obliged to desist, and a distant relation of Carrera gave information of the plan to O’Higgins; in consequence of which several persons of the highest respectability were sent into exile in different places, and forty of the principal officers concerned were 401 sent to New Granada, in irons, with letters to Bolivar, informing him of their offence, and offering him the indemnification of the state of Chile for whatever costs might be incurred by keeping them secure in prison. These officers were attached to their country’s liberties; and though that was a crime in Chile, in Columbia it was the best recommendation they could produce. Instead of being continued in irons, they were immediately released from their tyrannical oppressors who bore them thither, supplied with every necessary in which they stood in need; and such as wished to join the service of Columbia had their appointments directly. In answer to the official letter of O’Higgins, Bolivar returned, that he would provide for the comforts and safety of the unfortunate officers remitted to him as well as lay in his power, without receiving any remuneration from the state of Chile; and also, that if meritorious Americans were found to be either a burden or a trouble in Chile, he requested they might be always sent to Columbia, where they should find a secure asylum; adding, that the blood of worthy citizens and soldiers had already sufficiently stained the United Provinces and Chile. This reply of Bolivar seems to have sounded rather harshly to the ears of a government only accustomed to hear the soft sounds of adulation. Of the many exiles that left Chile since, none have ever been sent thither, Columbia having lost all credit with Chile as a place of exile.
The regiment No. 1 de los Andes, of which Alvarado was colonel, had been left in San Juan with Don Juan Rosas, governor of that town. It consisted of 400 dragoons, and 500 light infantry. They declared themselves independent of San Martin; deposed his governor, Rosas, at the request of the town, substituting in his place Don Mariano Mendizabal, who immediately declared in favour of Carrera, sending Lieutenant-Colonel Morillo with despatches, and inviting him to take up his winter quarters in San Juan; offering him barracks, provisions, money, and auxiliary forces to cross the Andes the ensuing spring, provided such auxiliaries should be found necessary.
Ramirez also sent an aide-de-camp to our encampment, requesting Carrera to cross the Parrana, as Artigas had declared hostilities against him. Thus Carrera had in his encampment at the same time four embassies, each soliciting his attendance in a different quarter; viz. Buenos Ayres, Chile, San Juan, and Entre Rios.
To Chile he could not pass till spring; his presence was not necessary in San Juan, and it would be inglorious to go there to pass his time in ease and 402 tranquillity, leaving his friend Ramirez involved in a dangerous war; his experience taught him to expect that Buenos Ayres would he immediately reduced to their former system, as the Porteños were extremely docile when threatened by an approaching enemy: on the contrary, he anticipated a long and sanguinary war between Artigas and Ramirez. He therefore prepared to march to the aid of Buenos Ayres, where he expected to leave every thing tranquil in the course of a month at furthest, and then cross the Parrana with whatever forces he could raise, to the assistance of Ramirez. Don Estanislao Lopez, governor of the province of Santa Fé, also entered into these measures, and accompanied Carrera to Buenos Ayres with 400 men.
Previous to our march to Buenos Ayres some ammunition and other military stores were sent to the allies in San Juan, as they were liable to be attacked by a force then raising in Mendoza.
We marched from our encampment on the 14th of June, 1820, towards Buenos Ayres. Our regiment was 600; the dragoons of Lopez were 400. We were badly mounted, being obliged to ride and walk alternately, that our horses might not be too much fatigued; but after five days’ march, we arrived in the neighbourhood of San Nicolas, when we provided ourselves with some excellent horses.
Soler having drawn all his forces together, resolved to await our approach to his encampment. On our arrival at San Antonio de Areco, a squadron of 200 cavalry, which had been sent as an advance guard to observe our march, made their commander prisoner, and passed to our division: these soldiers were left in San Antonio de Areco; and the Generals Carrera and Lopez marched with an advance of about 200 men; and early next morning, 28th of June, they discovered the encampment of the enemy at the Cañada de la Cruz. They were formed in three divisions: that of the right consisted of the regiment called Colorados, and a strong detachment of Blandingos, with one piece of artillery, commanded by Colonel Pagola; the centre division was formed by all the regulars, and four pieces of artillery, commanded by Major-General French; and their left division was composed of militia and civicos commanded by regular officers. A river ran from right to left in their front. Soler, who commanded the whole, was stationed with his staff and a small corps de reserve in the rear of the centre division.
As it was not supposed that we should meet the enemy till the following day, about 300 Chilenos and Santafecinos were detached on a necessary and important service, and could not be expected to return before midnight. 403 The remainder of the Federal force was at San Antonio, five leagues distant from the Cañada de la Cruz, where Carrera and Lopez were engaged with the enemy’s guerillas. In the meantime expresses were sent to the detachments which were out, and to Colonel Benevente at Areco, desiring they would advance with all possible speed. Benevente mounted our division immediately; and about 11 or 12 o’clock we arrived on the field of battle, having galloped all the way: we changed our horses, and dispositions were given for the attack. The militia of Rosario, with a detachment of Chilenos, formed our right division, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Garcia; the Chilian hussars occupied the centre, commanded by Colonel Benevente; and the dragoons of Santa Fé, commanded by General Lopez, were opposed to the Colorados on the right of the enemy’s line. General Alvear, who acted as captain of his company of officers, bravely repulsed all the enemy’s guerillas. Our force was so very inconsiderable, that it was impossible to spare any part of it for a reserve. General Carrera commanded the whole, without assigning any particular place in the field for his station.
All being ready, the action commenced by Lopez charging the Colorados on the enemy’s right. Garcia, on the right of our line, also charged the enemy’s left. No advantage appeared on one side or the other for some time; the dragoons of Lopez were at length repulsed by the Colorados, and retired fighting, about three hundred yards. The Porteños now considering the action as gained, shouted for victory; and their centre division, commanded by French, advanced to charge our regiment, French and Benevente (who were particular friends) first saluting each other in front of the lines. As the Porteños charged they kept up a heavy fire on us: the Chilenos used not their fire-arms; but, sword in hand, moved with such celerity and courage, that the Porteños had not time to secure their carabines or draw their swords, before we were on their line, which was soon broken, and fled with precipitation and disorder. The left of the enemy’s line, seeing their centre destroyed (on which all their dependence was placed), fled also; and the Colorados on their right, who had gained much advantage over Lopez, were obliged to escape lest we should take them in the rear.
The rout was complete, the fugitives being pursued about six leagues. The Santafecinos gave no quarter: the Chilenos took 250 prisoners, not including Major-General French, Adjutant-General Montes la Rea, and 404 14 other field-officers, captains, and subalterns, with five pieces of artillery and two standards.
The Porteños lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, about 780 men. The wounded were collected in waggons that night on the field of battle, and sent to an hospital provided for them in Luxan.
In our march to Luxan, the light infantry of Vidal (who had not time to arrive on the field the day before) capitulated. They were about 500 effective men, and were given to Alvear, as were also the prisoners of the ranks taken in the action. These soldiers all took the oath of fidelity to Alvear, who summoned the alcaldes of the different towns and districts to meet in Luxan, where they declared him captain-general of the province of Buenos Ayres.
This misfortune of Soler threw a shade over his past successes. He could not brook the idea of the disgrace arising from his having been defeated by a force not amounting to more than one-fifth of that which he commanded; he determined, however, to evade it by passing to Monte Video, and thence to the United States. In the meantime, Colonel Pagola reached Buenos Ayres, where he raised himself to the dignity of captain-general of the province; and was deposed two days afterwards by Colonel Dorego.
We continued our march towards Buenos Ayres, and at the Puente Marco we were met by deputies from the town, who offered to ratify whatever conditions Carrera would please to grant. This humble strain, however, was quickly altered by the imprudence of Alvear, who was always as much hated by the citizens as he was beloved by the soldiers. Instead of endeavouring to cultivate a confidence with the citizens, he said to the deputies (when Carrera was not present), “You once dismissed me from your government, but you shall not do so again. If ever an attempt be made against me, I shall hang on the gibbet one half of Buenos Ayres.”
This harangue of the new governor caused an astonishing change on the minds of the deputies and people: they considered that if his promises were so very beneficent before he had any actual power in the town, his performance would even exceed them when invested with authority. The deputies returned to Buenos Ayres; and when the citizens knew that Alvear was appointed to be their governor, and heard his speech to their deputies, they flew to arms to prevent our entry.
The protection which Carrera dispensed to Alvear, his union with him, 405 and his march to Buenos Ayres, was much against the inclination of his officers; nay, even himself must have seen that such an union was contrary to his own interest, and to that of all who were connected with him: he lost, in a great measure, that high opinion which the respectable inhabitants of Buenos Ayres had entertained of him, by protecting their enemy. But he had seen many happy and miserable days with Alvear: they had been long intimates; and he considered himself bound by the sacred laws of friendship not only to protect, but also to aid him. His judgment was sacrificed to the sincerity of his friendship, which led him to err; and that error may be considered as the principal cause of the difficulties under which he afterwards suffered.
We marched from the Puente Marco to the suburbs of Buenos Ayres, which we besieged during eighteen or nineteen days, cutting off all communication with the country. Colonel La Madrid was in the Magdalena, raising a force, whither we went in search of him; but he left a strong division well mounted, which retreated as we pursued them, whilst he with a part of his force made a retrograde movement to the town of Moron, in which our infantry was stationed, and prevailed on the officers and soldiers to accompany him to Buenos Ayres. All which he effected with address, ingenuity, and despatch.
The whole country and all its towns were ours. Buenos Ayres alone remained firm in the resolution to act on the defensive, though yet unable to undertake any offensive operations against us. To take the town by assault with Carrera’s troops, which never exceeded 2000, was impossible; therefore, as the soldiers were much fatigued by the rigours of service and severity of the season, he raised the siege and retired to Luxan, to invigorate the troops with a few days’ rest previous to our march for Entre Rios, having determined to evacuate the province.
Whilst we were in the encampment of Luxan, a considerable force of the enemy had advanced to the towns of San Isidro and San Fernando, on the coast of the river. These were surprised and dispersed at day-break by a detachment of our regiment, and another of the Santafecinos: some escaped on board their barks, others into the country, whilst the more resolute part of them undertook to defend themselves on their asoteas, or roofs of their houses. They were, however, obliged to surrender; and as they were but civicos of the town and country militia, they were disarmed, and dismissed to their respective homes.
Two days afterwards we began our march by the way of San Pedro, from 406 whose vicinity we collected some good horses. Here a party of ours was cut off: it consisted of a serjeant and eighteen men, who were conducting a drove of horses; when, intercepted by a division of the enemy, and not considering it warrantable to give up their horses, they fell on their numerous enemies, and all except three fell in the contest. Continuing our route in a direction parallel with and close to the river, we came to the Hermanos, where we learned that a vast number of horses were guarded by regulars and militia in the islands of the Parrana. As the channels of the river could only be passed by swimming, the defenders of these islands had great advantage in the morning, as they kept up a heavy fire on the men who had volunteered for that service: however, the channels were crossed, and the enemy driven from island to island; but they still kept their horses secure in their van. About eleven o’clock a dreadful storm of thunder, lightning, and rain came on, which rendered fire-arms useless and burdensome. The fire ceased; and as the contest remained to be decided by the sword, they entirely despaired of success; and embarking on large rafts, they crossed the largest channel to an island, leaving their wives, daughters, &c., with 2000 excellent horses, in our possession. The women we left in possession of their islands, marching away with the horses. We arrived at San Nicolas, where head-quarters were established, to wait the arrival of a vessel from Buenos Ayres, which had on board military stores and money remitted by the friends of Carrera in that town. In a few days the vessel came to San Nicolas, and delivered 900 suits of uniform, shirts, and every necessary for the soldiers; together with uniform, boots, pistols, &c. for the officers, 60,000 dollars in cash, and several pieces of cloth for cloaks; which stores were deposited in the house of the commandant of San Nicolas, where the General resided.
The Santafecinos under Lopez had crossed the Arroyo del Medio, and encamped in their own province, ten leagues distant from San Nicolas; and a detachment of Chilenos was also on that side of the Arroyo, about four leagues distant from our encampment.
This great separation of our force can only be accounted for by taking into consideration the absolute security in which we supposed ourselves from any feeble efforts which our timid enemy could be supposed to make.
A great levy had been made in Buenos Ayres and its adjacent country; and on our retreat, an army of 3000 men, commanded by Dorego, Rodriguez, and La Madrid, followed the line of our march, always keeping about thirty leagues in our rear. The same captain who had been sent by Dorego to the 407 Rincon de Gorondono, to call Carrera to Buenos Ayres, and who had followed Alvear since his revolution in the army of Buenos Ayres (before mentioned), now thought it the best way to atone for his former perfidies by becoming a spy on our operations, and continually communicating with the enemy.
The situation of our camp and distribution of our men were as follows: a strong detachment was at four leagues distance, in the province of Santa Fé; other detachments were at one league from our encampment, guarding our horses; the remainder of the cavalry were encamped in fenced orchards about one league from the town, and were not allowed to have horses saddled. A company of infantry, all the officers of Alvear, and some artillery soldiers, with five pieces of cannon, occupied the town.
That the Porteños might succeed the better in taking us altogether unprepared, deputies were sent to treat with the generals; and, breaking through all the laws of war and honour (being informed of our situation by their spy), they surprised us whilst in this treaty, and they succeeded so well that it became a general stratagem of our enemies in all our future actions with them.
On the evening of the 31st July, our spies gave notice that about 150 of the enemy had entered San Pedro, about 14 leagues distant; these we supposed to be the rear-guard of the enemy, who, though numerous, did not cause preparation, vigilance, or caution, on our part; so very contemptible was the idea which we entertained of them.
Lopez had information that Dorego intended falling on us at day-break next morning, and was about to despatch an express, when Alvear, who was in his encampment, offered to carry the news. Lopez confided this commission to his care; but, owing to forgetfulness, inattention, or treachery, he supped at an intermediate house, slept there all night, and, consequently, deprived us of that information which would have secured us from so unexpected and dreadful a catastrophe.
August 1st, before day, Carrera with the deputies proceeded from San Nicolas to the encampment of Lopez. At day-break the detachments which guarded our horses were surprised, and put to the sword: a soldier, however, escaped to our encampment with the information. Such officers and soldiers as had horses in the encampment, saddled and mounted them; whilst those who had not, formed on foot, and began their retreat towards San Nicolas. The number of officers and soldiers who were mounted did not exceed 250 men, who took the field to protect the retreat of the dismounted 408 soldiers to the town. An officer was despatched to San Nicolas, to acquaint the General, and receive his orders; but as he had crossed the Arroyo del Medio, the officer had orders to proceed to the encampment of Lopez, and call him to the assistance of the town. The Porteñian army, consisting of about 3000 men, advanced (trotting) in four parallel columns, with a strong guerilla in their front.
A detachment of fifty men were sent out to entertain the enemy; and our retreat was continued in column of divisions at the regular pace of our horses. Our guerilla repulsed that of the enemy, who immediately advanced a column of 800 men to sustain the attack on our rear. Reunion was sounded; and our guerilla took its place in the column, which now began to trot. The enemy pressed close on the rear of our column, and annoyed it much by a heavy fire. A German officer, who commanded the rear division, seeing his men begin to fall, and rightly judging the fortune of the day to be desperate, preferred to die fighting his enemy, rather than fall in the retreat. He ordered his men to secure their carabines, sword in hand; and faced them about without any order from the Colonel, or even acquainting him of his design. He precipitated himself with his valiant little band of thirty on a division of the enemy consisting of 800 men, throwing them into great disorder. Another of the enemy’s columns, which was on our flank, quickly occupied the intervening space between our division and that brave officer, obliging Colonel Benevente to continue the retreat: as it was impossible to give any assistance to the men who were engaged, they all perished. Abeck, the officer who commanded that party, had served with Napoleon in Russia, and several other campaigns. He was an engineer, and possessed much professional knowledge; in his private character and domestic qualities he was as amiable and generous, as he was honourable and brave considered as a soldier. The dismounted soldiers had by this time entered the town, which was fortified by a deep dike, having only two entries, which were defended by artillery: our column began to gallop, in order to enter the town; but being closely pressed in the rear, friends and enemies entered together, thereby in a great measure rendering useless our artillery. Two columns of the enemy opened to the left, and surrounded the town by a strong line of battle, that none should escape. The brave Benevento rallied his men in the Plaza; where, with the assistance of a few infantry soldiers, he maintained the unequal conflict for upwards of two hours,—at the expiration of which time he had not more than thirty men, and a few officers on horseback: with 409 these, however, he determined to cut his way through whatever obstacles might oppose him. He put himself at the head of his party, galloped full speed through the town, and leaping the fosse, proceeded with intrepidity to break through the enemy’s line which surrounded the town. The two platoons or small divisions, to which the desperate fury of Benevento was directed, fearing to meet him, opened an avenue by wheeling on the right and left backwards, through which he passed under an oblique fire from each platoon with little loss. The greatest difficulty was now surmounted: the Porteños pursued, keeping up a heavy but ineffectual fire, and expected that, arriving at a precipice which lay in the direction, they would make an easy prey of their designed victims; however, on coming up to it, men and horses went, or rather rolled, down it without any material injury. The detachment of the Arroyo del Medio now appeared; and the Porteños retired, lest they should be chased in their turn. Of the thirty men who accompanied Benevente from San Nicolas only fourteen escaped.
Our loss in San Nicolas was 16 officers and about 470 soldiers, not including 50 officers and 200 men belonging to Alvear; 6000 horses; the General and Colonel’s tents; all our baggage and military stores; five pieces of artillery; an ammunition waggon with 12,000 rounds, and 60,000 dollars for the pay of the regiment. Madam Carrera, who had come from Rosario to see the General the day previous, shared in the general misfortune of the day, being taken prisoner in the church; however, two days afterwards Dorego sent her to the Arroyo Pabon, whither we had retired, with an escort and a polite message to the General.
The conduct of our Colonel, Benevento, on that day (as on all other such occasions) was worthy of the highest praise: the surprise was most complete; and though he had not more than 250 men (including officers) mounted, he defended himself against 3000 of the enemy from sunrise till mid-day, honourably exposing himself, and protecting the retreat of the dismounted soldiers to the town.
The Porteños were not content with the ample share of plunder which they had acquired at our cost,—they also broke open every house without exception; and in three days afterwards, upwards of 800 had deserted, loaded with booty: they returned to Buenos Ayres, resolved not to lose the honour they had gained in this by risking it in another action.
This great victory, gained by a people only accustomed to defeats, had the most flattering effects; the ancient spirit of Buenos Ayres (they supposed) 410 had reanimated her children. Not content with retaining their own province, they began to dream of conquests; and passing the Arroyo del Medio, the boundary of their territory, they entered that of Santa Fé, which they resolved to add to their jurisdiction.
Expresses were sent to all the provinces, announcing the death of Carrera, and the destruction of his division in the action of San Nicolas. The captain who had been spy in our encampment was the person who bore the welcome news to Chile; where his story seems to have been very gratifying, as he was presented with eight hundred dollars, and admitted as an honorary member of the distinguished legion of merit of Chile. Now, of what merit may have entitled him to this distinction I am still unable to form any idea: if a man who first betrays his own country, afterwards deceives and sells his friends and companions, and who is pliant to change with times, circumstances, and interests, have any merit, then that distinguished order should decorate every traitor’s breast; if riding 300 leagues with despatches in the shortest time possible recommend a man so highly, why then we may suppose that all couriers who distinguish themselves in that way, ought to be admitted into this honourable and meritorious society of Chile.
Lopez and his dragoons having united themselves to the remnant of our regiment, which was about 130 men, we retired to the Arroyo de Pabon, about nine leagues from San Nicolas. Alvear was arrested by Lopez, who insisted on shooting him, with the deputies of the enemy, as accessaries to our misfortunes; but Carrera would not permit it. He provided a boat for Alvear, and assisted him to escape from the fury of the soldiers, telling him that he could not suppose his late error to have proceeded from treachery; that as he had once been the friend of Carrera, so he should ever consider him, but never again could admit him as a partner in his operations.—Alvear took a last leave of the friend whom his indiscretion had ruined; and, passing the Parrana, travelled to Monte Video, where he was employed in his rank of brigadier-general in the service of the Portuguese.
The Porteños, following up their advantage, had approached within four leagues of our encampment at the Arroyo de Pabon. Dorego sent deputies to Lopez privately, offering him peace, and a continuation in his government in alliance with Buenos Ayres, if he would turn the arms of his province against Carrera, and deliver him prisoner with his men to him. Lopez made known these conditions to Lieutenant-Colonel Garcia, who was second in command in the province of Santa Fé, and a particular friend of Carrera. 411 Garcia heard the proposition with contempt and indignation; adverted to his officers on the baseness of their governor Lopez, in thinking of sacrificing his greatest friend to his most inveterate enemies the Porteños; and finally made Lopez understand that his own safety was in question if he did not immediately desist. The plot was made known to Carrera, who had for some days previous suspected something of that nature to be on foot. Carrera dictated a letter, which the Governor was obliged to sign and send to the enemy, renouncing all further negociation of a private or dishonourable nature.
The Porteños seeing their perfidious efforts against Carrera disconcerted, advanced to try the fortune of another action: their force consisted of 2100 men; ours was about 380, of which only 130 were Chilenos. But twelve days had elapsed since the surprise of San Nicolas, the impression of which was still fresh on the minds of the soldiers, although few of them had been there; this, together with the great disproportion of our numbers, accounts for the unaccustomed timidity of our soldiers in the action of Pabon.
The Porteños at first were charged, and obliged to retire; but renewing the attack with vigour, our line was broken, and began to retreat: we were pursued several leagues. The Chilenos and a few Santafecinos protected the retreat by keeping a constant fire on the enemy. Our men were not properly reunited before our arrival at San Lorenzo, a distance of ten leagues from the battle ground. Our loss was immaterial, not exceeding twenty men. The most remarkable occurrence of this retreat was, that a Porteñian officer who accompanied us, and had been major of the famous hussars of La Madrid in High Peru, where he was considered little less than a Mars, was horsewhipped and discarded for having too great a desire to be one of the foremost in the retreat.
Having reunited our men at San Lorenzo, we continued to retire; and passing the Carcaraña, we encamped in Las Barrancas. The Porteños occupied, and almost destroyed, the town of Rosario; where they remained, not considering it prudent to follow our flying remnant too far in a country where they were entirely destitute of friends.
Lopez, finding that nothing but war would satisfy his officers and soldiers, made a levy in the country, raising about 800 men; a few northern Indians also came to join him: our division was now augmented to about 1000 men. We returned in search of the Porteños; and when we were about to pass the Carcaraña, our advance guard fell in with that of the enemy near 412 San Lorenzo, and killed forty of them, taking nine prisoners. This was an indication to the Porteños that their former fortunes in war were about to return; they, therefore, began to retreat, but were overtaken and brought to action.
On the 10th of September, in the morning, the town of Pergamino, which was garrisoned by 350 of the enemy, was assaulted and taken; 220 were taken prisoners, and the greater part of the rest died in the attack: and on the 12th, our entire division, and that of Dorego, presented themselves for battle in the Cañada Vica, or Gamonal. The detachments destroyed in Pergamino and San Lorenzo, as well as desertion, made a considerable reduction in Dorego’s force; and this was the first action in which we were opposed by equal numbers.
Dorego, who attributed the success of the Federalists to their peculiar manner of fighting, determined to adopt the same plan, prohibiting his soldiers, on pain of death, to fire a shot. He bravely charged in front of his line against the Santafecinos, who met him with an equal contempt of danger. Dorego succeeded in breaking through the line of Lopez, when he was immediately charged by the Chilenos, led by Benevente, who stopped his progress: the fight became general and obstinate; but at length the Porteños had recourse to their long-practised expedient: they retired; and being closely pressed and broken, it was in vain that their General exposed himself by remaining in their rear, and labouring greatly to rally his flying troops: they were pursued six leagues. No quarters were given till the latter part of the chace, when 325 prisoners were taken. The number of killed were computed at 570: Dorego very narrowly escaped in the retreat.
Carrera and Lopez passed the Arroyo del Medio: it was the desire of the former to return to Buenos Ayres, and establish a government there which would be friendly to our cause; but the latter only wished for a consummation of the treaty which he had commenced at Pabon. As our principal force consisted in militia, who were eager to return to their families and houses, they contented themselves with driving off as their booty 15 or 20,000 head of cattle, and a great number of horses; and on their arrival in their own province, they were disbanded, each returning to their respective homes.
Carrera’s head-quarters were at Rosario. The dragoons of Lopez were obliged to go to Santa Fé to curb the inroads of the northern Indians, who had taken offence against Lopez because he would not deliver up to their deputies a person who had killed an individual of their nation at Santa Fé.
413Though Dorego had gained more honour for his country, and displayed more courage and ability, with a smaller force, than any former governor of Buenos Ayres; yet, the Porteños could not think of deviating from their long-received principle of deposing every Director as soon as he had been defeated, or otherwise unfortunate, without any regard to the abilities or virtues which he might possess. Hence the many mutations of government: their defeats were numerous, and each brought its political change.
Martin Rodriguez thought this the most advantageous moment to assert his claim; and his first step was to gain all the regular soldiers to espouse his pretensions. Soler (having recovered from the shame which he considered attached to himself in consequence of his defeat in the Cañada de la Cruz) came to Buenos Ayres from Monte Video to offer himself as a candidate for the government; but considering the power of Rodriguez to predominate, he united his faction with that of Dorego, that they might conjointly destroy Rodriguez, leaving futurity to decide the particular fate of each afterwards.
Every thing being thus arranged between Soler and Dorego, they assembled their factions armed in the Plaza, when they fortified themselves with artillery, &c. Rodriguez lost no time; he appointed the rendezvous for his veterans; and when he inspected them he found they would not be sufficient to attack the Plaza: he therefore went to the prisons where the officers and soldiers of our regiment made prisoners in San Nicolas were, and offered them their liberty if they would lend their assistance to him that day. They unanimously volunteered; were immediately taken out of prison and armed; and being united with Rodriguez’s troops, he advanced to the attack of the Plaza. The citizens and civicos defended themselves for some time with resolution; they were, however, obliged to yield to the superior courage of Rodriguez’s inferior force, whilst he waded through the blood of 400 citizens to seize on the supreme power of the republic, against the general consent of the town and province. This mode of election is not very uncommon amongst the South American Republics.
Rodriguez having established himself in the government of Buenos Ayres, and dispersed all the factions which had opposed him, performed his promise to the Chilenos who had aided him, by granting them passports to proceed to any of the provinces except Santa Fé, where we were: some of the officers passed over to Monte Video, from whence they united themselves again to our division.
Rodriguez sent deputies to the Indians of the South, promising them great 414 rewards if they would declare war against us, which they promised to do; and the Cacique Nicolas (the ally of Buenos Ayres) came with his tribe to Pergamino, from whence he marched with 200 Porteñian soldiers to the village of Melingue, on the confines of Santa Fé. A detachment of ours which garrisoned the town was put to the sword, and all the females and children carried away by the Indians for slaves. The Cacique Nicolas promised to put at the disposition of Rodriguez 7000 Indians; which force they considered would exterminate us without difficulty.
Buenos Ayres, with her promised Indian allies, considered herself secure. Their miserable poets all rhymed of our inevitable destruction, and ridiculed in the most reproachful manner the political ideas of Carrera; whilst those whose abilities did not reach to verse were more mischievously employed, in order to cause a dissension between Carrera and Lopez, by an extensive distribution of their pamphlets: in these pamphlets and papers, which were carefully thrown in our way, they made it appear that Lopez was but a mere cipher, subservient to all the measures of Carrera, without ideas, will, or opinion, of his own. The idea suggested in these papers did not deviate much from truth; but truth is not always pleasing. Lopez had self-love sufficient to make him feel the depth of his inferiority, which was now laid before the public: however, he concealed as much as possible the envy that gnawed his ungenerous heart.
The Porteños, rightly judging that their scheme might have had some effect on the uncultivated mind of Lopez, sent deputies to San Nicolas to resume the negociation, relative to Lopez giving up Carrera and his officers to the Porteños. Bustos, governor of Cordova, seeing Carrera without force, and forgetting all his obligations, refused to deliver to him 700 Chilenos which existed in his army, and which were to be delivered whenever Carrera would demand them. He also sent deputies to San Nicolas, to co-operate with those of Buenos Ayres in our destruction, having previously had his government acknowledged as legal by Buenos Ayres.
The regiment No. 1. in San Juan, which had been given to Carrera by Mendizabal, governor of that province, had been led by its colonel to attack Mendoza without any orders from Carrera, who had only directed that they should act on the defensive in San Juan in case of being attacked. Corro, who commanded that regiment, knew them to be as good soldiers as any in America, and put all his confidence in their courage, without consulting his own capacity for conducting such an enterprise. He marched with his infantry 415 and dragoons to the Positos, and from thence sent an advanced guard of 48 dragoons to Jocoli, a small village eight leagues distant from Mendoza. This guard was surprised and attacked by Caxaravillo, the celebrated Porteño, with 200 cavalry and 400 infantry. The guard charged, and routed the 200 cavalry with considerable loss to the enemy; and, on their return from the pursuit, had the audacity to attack the infantry, in which more than three-fourths of the guard perished: a remnant, however, returned to Corro. This victory of 600 men over 48, was not owing to their courage, or to the courage or dispositions of Caxaravillo, but to their impossibility of running away; for if the infantry could have followed the example of their cavalry, they certainly would have done so: if they could have run, they would never have stood to conquer. This dear-bought victory of the enemy was celebrated in Mendoza with much pomp and ceremony.
The officers and soldiers unanimously requested of Corro to lead them to the town, as the defeat which the guard had suffered only seemed to establish on firmer grounds the high opinion of their own superiority. But Corro saw it in another light. He was a most consummate coward; void of ideas, disposition, or any sense of honour or shame. He put his troops in retreat to return to San Juan; whilst the Mendocinos, informed of his timidity, pursued him with 2000 men, causing him to redouble his marches: however, he arrived without any loss in San Juan, where his soldiers expected he might pluck up a little courage amongst the ladies, as he was a great gallant. On the approach of the Mendocinos (who had the promise of co-operation from a faction in the town) Corro marched out, and was eagerly followed by his soldiers, who expected he was going to give the enemy battle on the Legua (a small plain outside San Juan); but their indignation was raised to the highest, when they were ordered to leave the ground they had devoted to the fortune of war, in order to retreat to La Arioja. The soldiers, seeing that Corro was only determined to run (as his name foretold for him), denied all further obedience to the coward, and dispersed to the different towns. About 200 soldiers, natives of Salta, still followed him, as he was going to that town. Mendizabal, governor of San Juan, was superseded by Don Antonio Sanchez in the government, and carried to Mendoza, where he was confined in a dungeon till after the death of Carrera, whose faithful friend he was; and at the time of our passing the cordillera, he also was sent to Chile at the disposition of O’Higgins, who, either from a desire to be considered magnanimous, or from real principles of humanity and justice, desisted from 416 taking his life in Chile, but did not scruple prolonging his tortures in irons and in a dungeon; and afterwards sent him to Lima, where his blood flowed to quench the insatiable thirst of the tyrant San Martin. Mendizabal was generous, brave, and disinterested; faithful to his friends, and rather implacable with his enemies: no superstition tainted his mind; and his resignation and courage in his last moments were worthy his former character.
Shortly after the dispersion of our men in San Juan, a revolution took place in Mendoza, in which Godoy Cruz succeeded Cruz Vargas; in consequence of which change, Colonel Aldao and his principal officers became obnoxious to the existing government. These were the officers who had commanded the expedition against our troops in San Juan; and though they were the inveterate enemies of Carrera, they were now obliged to throw themselves on his clemency. He did not consider them worthy of resentment: their wants were relieved, and they participated the generosity and protection of him whom they had so materially injured.
Lopez still carried on his private treaty with the deputies of Rodriguez and Bustos in San Nicolas.
The Indians who were invited by Rodriguez to join in the war against us had an unconquerable hatred to the Porteños; and at the period in which we expected them every day to fall upon us, a deputation of fourteen captains arrived in Rosario, sent by the principal cacique to treat with Carrera. They told him, in the names of their respective chiefs, of the very great rewards which Rodriguez had offered them for their services; but declared they could never take part with their insidious enemies the Porteños; and as to the rewards offered them, that they would sooner fight in company with brave men, independent of emolument, than they would in favour of such cowards as they knew the Porteños to be, notwithstanding any gifts they might offer. They made known to Carrera that their chiefs would be extremely ambitious of his alliance and protection; and that they were authorised to grant him any number of Indians he would require.
The conduct of the Indians, and their unasked assistance, seemed very mysterious, and made us suspect some treachery; but on minute investigation it appeared that Don —— Guelmo, who had been a captain, and commandant of a town on the Indian frontiers in Chile, in the time of Carrera, had preferred living amongst the Indians to suffering the indignation which O’Higgins and San Martin heaped on the officers and friends of the former government in Chile. This Guelmo, though above eighty years old, wished still to make 417 himself useful to his general, by engaging the Indians in his favour. Surrounded by enemies, and, what was worse, by false friends, the ray of hope which this unexpected intelligence communicated to each breast was far from disagreeable. Carrera knew the plot of the deputies in San Nicolas, and was aware that such an opportunity of extricating himself from their net was not to be rejected. He despatched five of the Indian deputies to the caciques, returning them thanks for the offer of their disinterested friendship, of which he accepted, and offered to become their protector against the Porteños; at the same time requesting them to send six or seven hundred men into the Pampas, which were there to wait his orders, without showing themselves on the frontier. The other nine deputies were provided for in our encampment, where they remained to act as guides to us, in case of being obliged to escape precipitately; and forty Indians, the guard of these deputies, were encamped in a village in the frontier, where we provided for them provisions, tobacco, &c.
Carrera wrote to the deputies in San Nicolas, informing them that he was perfectly acquainted with the nature of their dishonourable and perfidious plot; that he even comprehended its most abstruse conditions and ramifications, as they respected the provinces of Santa Fé, Buenos Ayres, and Cordova. He demanded them immediately to desist from the measures in contemplation, and to allow him an uninterrupted march to Chile; to which, if they did not accede, they should consider themselves responsible to their provinces for the consequences which would follow.
This letter of Carrera appeared to the deputies as an enigma which they could by no means solve. It was indeed very extraordinary how he could be acquainted with their private proceedings; but it was still more so, that, not having more than 150 men at his disposal, he would dare to demand of the representatives of these powerful provinces a suspension of their designs, point out a line of conduct which they should pursue, and throw out such menacing insinuations in case they did not allow him to march to Chile. His union with his friend Ramirez appeared impossible; and they could not conceive any other resource which was left him, or by which he could escape from their hands.
The abilities of Carrera were acknowledged by all parties, and his enterprising spirit was feared, as it was always known to be capable of some resource when danger threatened: they therefore resolved to put immediately in execution their plans, lest he should counteract their scheme.
418The treaty was signed by the parties on the following conditions: viz. that the government of Buenos Ayres should pay to Governor Lopez at Santa Fé the sum of 12,000 dollars, together with 30,000 head of cattle, on his delivery of Carrera and his officers to the Buenos Ayrian troops in San Nicolas; that Lopez should continue in the government of Santa Fé, and Bustos in that of Cordova; that the three states, Buenos Ayres, Santa Fé, and Cordova, should act defensively and offensively against Ramirez, or any other friend of Carrera who should resent or oppose their present undertaking. Lopez had sent to Santa Fé for his dragoons, who came down the river, and were disembarking at San Lorenzo in order to surprise us, and give us up to the enemy before we were apprised of our danger. Having received information of the meditated surprise, we put ourselves in a posture for defence, and at the same time began our retreat, conducted by our Indian guides. We marched all that evening and night at an accelerated pace, and at twelve o’clock next day we united ourselves to the forty Indians who awaited us on the frontier. The dragoons of Santa Fé were unacquainted with the service on which they were about to be employed, till they were ordered to take horses in San Lorenzo, and then informed of the duty they had to perform. The soldiers unanimously refused to take arms against the Chilenos, as they called them their companions and defenders in their past campaigns. Hence it is that we were not interrupted in our retreat. We continued our march three days into the Pampas, not having any other food than the eggs of ostriches and other wild fowls, which were for the most part addled; the soldiers, however, selected the best of them for us. We almost despaired of meeting the Indians in these Pampas, where they had promised to wait our orders: the Indians who accompanied us were also impatient, and on that night the divines or necromancers began their sacred ceremonies; and after four hours’ consultation, it was revealed to these prophets, that the next day, before noon, we should discover the Indians of whom we were in search.
Cacique meeting Carrera’s Troops.
Next day, about ten o’clock, we discovered the van of the Indians (thereby fulfilling the prophecy of their priests), who sent out a party to reconnoitre; we followed the like example, sending a party of the Indians who were with us: these parties quickly recognised each other for friends, and returned to their particular corps. Soon after the main body of the Indians appeared, rising on the horizon, and continued to advance in line. A deputation of Indians (with interpreters) was despatched to wait on the General, and to request that the ceremonies of our meeting should be conducted in the same 419 manner as practised amongst them, and not in any other way customary among Christian armies. All their formalities being agreed to, one of the deputies was sent to announce to the Indians that we had acquiesced in their desire, and that they might advance; whilst the rest remained with us, to assist us in going through the manœuvres.
Our men were formed in one rank, officers to the front, with an equal distance between them. On our left flank were about sixty Indians, formed in the same manner. Our Indian allies were about 900 in number, not including those which accompanied us from Rosario. They were formed in line, with an interval of about three yards between each troop; the captain of each troop in front of its centre, and the caciques, at equal distances, in front of the whole. The Indians were naked, with exception of the waist, to which was suspended a small triangular piece of tanned sheep-skin, ornamented on the border by a silver fringe; their long black hair (which they wore all alike), after coming down over the ears and forehead, was again turned upwards, wound round the head, and tied at the extremity by a riband used amongst them for that purpose; their lances were about 14 feet long, and were held perpendicular in their right hands; their horses (which were covered with many fantastic trappings) were excellent; and their line was actually the best formed I ever saw.
All being ready, the ceremony began by each line advancing at a trot; and on approaching each other at a full gallop, as in a charge, the Indians brought their lances to the position of attack, and whilst they advanced with the greatest fury raised a hideous yell, which (as we were little acquainted with our new allies) made us doubt very much whether this were a real or mock charge. However, on coming within forty yards of us, the Indians halted on a sudden, their formation not having suffered the smallest alteration or confusion in their rapid advance. We wheeled to our left, and continued to gallop round them (according to our instructions) till we had encircled them three times, keeping up a fire during the whole, which very much gratified them. We then halted, and they returned us the same compliment by galloping round us three times in the same manner.
The honours being over, they halted in front of our line; and the principal cacique, with his subaltern caciques and captains, marched out in front of theirs, where they were joined by Carrera and his officers. After a long, but (I may say) unintelligible conversation, they offered us their hands, which we accepted, in token of our mutual attachment and promise to defend 420 each other. We encamped; and were invited by the caciques to their quarters, where we feasted sumptuously on some good roast horses. The Indians took the same care that our soldiers should want for nothing which it was in their power to bestow. They made us many presents of horses, ornaments, ponchos, &c. in proof of the sincerity of their protestations; and showed the greatest solicitude and attention to please, and make us consider ourselves among friends.
Having assuaged our hunger, the caciques rose in council, and requested the General would be present also. The subject in discussion was, whether the town of Salta (which was about three days’ march from us), on the frontier of Buenos Ayres, should or should not be attacked.
We had a long march to encounter, and it became necessary that we should enter the province of Buenos Ayres to furnish ourselves with cattle for our transit to the country of the Indians; and also make some provision for the time of our residence there, that we might not be burthensome to our friends, having the opportunity of being independent at the expense of our enemies.
La Madrid, whom we expected to attack, had retired towards Pergamino. The town of Salta was garrisoned by a detachment of forty men; its own inhabitants capable of carrying arms might be from 150 to 200 men. Carrera knew too well the disposition of the Indians, and their mode of warfare, to give his assent to the assault of the town. He therefore used every expedient exertion to prevent and dissuade them from it, by showing the impossibility of succeeding in, and danger of attempting, any attack against the town; in contrast with the exaggerated advantages of passing into the country, from whence they might drive to their habitations vast droves of horses, cattle, &c. He expatiated much on the destruction of the Indians, if they should have the temerity to advance against the musquetry and artillery of the town. But they were not to be deterred by words only. They protested that nothing should hinder them of destroying the Porteños; and requested he would give them thirty of his men to accompany them. Carrera finding them so importunate and unchangeable in their resolution, conceived the idea of counteracting their inhuman designs and saving the inhabitants, whilst he seemed to accede to their request. He called a captain, and gave him instructions to march with thirty men as vanguard to the Indians towards the town, and immediately on receiving the fire of the enemy to put his men in retreat, and use all possible means to inspire the Indians with a sense of 421 imminent danger if they advanced, that they might be induced thereby to abandon their project. It was rather a hard injunction to lay on a brave old officer, that he should show himself as a coward in front of his soldiers and the enemy. However it was complied with. Soon as the enemy in the town opened their fire from the church and batteries, Carrera put himself at the head of his picket, exchanged fire a few times with the enemy, and then ordered a retreat. The soldiers, little accustomed to shrink from apparent danger, were incensed against their captain for the cowardice he showed, refused to obey him, and even threatened to shoot him if he dared to give them any order. They called on the cornet to lead them on, and fearlessly advanced under the enemy’s fire, followed by 900 Indians. The Captain accompanied the detachment as a soldier in order to redeem his lost reputation; but all was vain: the impression on their minds against him ever after was indelible. The soldiers and Indians entering the Plaza, the Porteños were panic-struck: they capitulated, on condition of being left unmolested in the fort and tower of the church, leaving their property, wives, children, and relatives, at the mercy of the unfeeling Indians. The scene which ensued was the most affecting and pitiable: the women (as is customary on such occasions) had run to the church to implore the protection of their patron saints; but the Indians were ignorant of the existence of such patronage or protection. They broke open the door of the church, possessed themselves of all the females, old and young, children, sacred utensils, &c.; even the images of the saints did not escape the general calamity. As that of the Virgin was magnificently decorated, it caught the fancy of a cacique, who dragged her away in the greatest precipitation: nor did he discover his prize to be inanimate till he had her in the street; when, finding that he had been deceived by her very brilliant appearance, and lost the opportunity of making a more desirable booty, he undressed her, and carrying with him all the ornaments and clothing, he left the unfledged image with disgust and contempt in the street. Whilst all the time of the Indians was absorbed in search of the unfortunate women and children, our detachment employed themselves in plundering the town; in which they found a considerable quantity of specie and valuable articles. Soon as the General was acquainted with the occurrences he hastened to the town; but as he was two leagues distant, he could not arrive in time to prevent the excesses. The Indians were about to reduce the town to ashes, when the General arrived, and persuaded them to desist and abandon the town; which they did, conveying the 422 women on old horses, and such as were not able to travel otherwise were carried in the arms of the Indians. It is unnecessary to attempt a description of the cries and agonies of these wretched creatures in the power of their savage masters,—it is easily conceived. Carrera claimed many of the most respectable amongst them as his relations; and some of them, who were in possession of the caciques, were quietly delivered; but such as had the misfortune of falling into the hands of the Indians were retained, as the authority of their chiefs did not extend so far as to command them to relinquish what they considered honourably gained in war. However, we employed every means of extricating several young women from the power of their cruel masters. We got some in exchange for our scarlet cloaks, caps, jackets, &c.; others we stole, and disguised in the uniform of soldiers; whilst we seized on others by force, alleging that they were our sisters, wives, or relations.
The Indians were so irritated at our contempt of their sacred rights and customs respecting prisoners and war, that they prepared twice to sacrifice us as the victims of our insolence; but the interposition of Guelmo and their caciques, our prompt dispositions to resist them, the high idea they had formed of our prowess from the example of those who accompanied them in Salta, and a respect or timidity (which they had not yet lost) for fire-arms, all concurred in inducing them to desist, and become our friends again.
That night thirty women, whom we had rescued or ransomed, were sent back to Salta under the care of a guard, and unknown to the Indians. The greater part of the remainder were afterwards ransomed; many of whom chose to remain in the division, and accompanied to the last. The number of women taken in Salta was about 250, and a great number of children.
The very unfortunate catastrophe of Salta furnished our enemy’s commentators with ample grounds for a liberal display of their encomiums on Carrera, and those who accompanied him. That the affair in itself was undoubtedly barbarous, and will admit of little apology, is but too evident; but any person curious enough to investigate the causes which led to the desolation of that town, will be convinced that it was not caused by Carrera, was not abetted by him, nor was it in his power to have prevented it. Seven thousand Indians had been called by Martin Rodriguez in order to extirpate us; and he also showed the inhuman example of Indian warfare by sending 200 of his soldiers with the cacique Nicolas, who surprised Melingue (a town on the frontiers of Santa Fé, then our ally), carrying away all its inhabitants captives. This, Rodriguez observed to the cacique, was but 423 a foretaste of future plunder, as he would give them every assistance to destroy the whole of the province of Santa Fé when their force would arrive. Lopez, intimidated at this threat, and envious of Carrera, made a dishonourable peace with his enemy,—selling us, as has been before stated. Carrera was accidentally enabled to defend himself from the machinations of his insidious enemies, by uniting himself with those very Indians who had been called for his destruction; and necessity obliged him to scourge his enemies with the same lash under which they had deliberately doomed him to suffer.
Carrera did in no way encourage the Indians in their attack on Salta: on the contrary, he did every thing in his power, and perhaps more than was consistent with his safety, to dissuade them from it; and though he permitted a detachment of soldiers to accompany them, it was for the express purpose of more effectually deterring them by showing an example of fear, that he might thereby prevent the disorders necessarily emanating from the surrender of the town.
Unless by some such stratagem as that tried by Carrera, the destruction of Salta could not possibly have been prevented by us. The Indians are naturally jealous and distrustful; and it cannot be supposed that Carrera could have such an unbounded ascendancy over their minds in the first days of our union with them, as he afterwards acquired by a longer acquaintance with them. There was no province that would receive us; and Carrera, by restraining them from their project, would have shut the last and only avenue which was left us for retreat. If we absolutely refused to allow the assault, they would in the same moment mistrust us of being attached to the enemy, and as enemies they would proceed against us. Their force was upwards of 900, and our squadron about 140. However, Rodriguez in his proclamation hinted that we were more barbarous than the Indians themselves, for not having opposed them. If Rodriguez judged of the Indians from his knowledge of the Porteños, there is some excuse for him; for our 140 men were more than sufficient to control and drive 1000 Porteños without difficulty; but with that disparity of numbers, against the Indians, we could indulge no rational hopes of success. Hence our open and active mediation in favour of the town would have been as useless towards its safety, as it would have been impolitic, injurious, and destructive, with regard to our interests. We had indeed an excellent opportunity of dying in defence of our most implacable enemies, one of whom would not have been 424 grateful enough to acknowledge the merit of such a sacrifice. But even that could not have saved them; their destiny was inevitable!
In Rodriguez’s very eloquent proclamation, particular descriptions of our imputed cruelties in Salta were given to the public: Carrera was accused of sacrilege; and Rodriguez, as champion of the church, bound himself under a most solemn vow to the saints and Virgin who had been so vilely treated, to avenge their indignities on the head of the impious barbarian who had inflicted them. He called on the citizens and soldiers to aid him in the performance of his sacred promise; and hoped the matrons, virgins, and holy people would fast and pray for the success of his most laudable enterprise.
He had little difficulty in raising a strong expedition; for as the honour of their saints and their religion had suffered in Salta, their votaries flew to their banners, confident of success from the holiness of their cause.
Rodriguez is no doubt a very good Christian whilst there are no motives to be otherwise; but, whether his piety and veneration for the saints would be sufficient to triumph over the temptation held out by the appearance of the glittering chalices, vases, and candlesticks consecrated to them, or not, the inhabitants of Chuguisaca and their churches could determine without much hesitation.
As Rodriguez was familiarised with sacrilege, it is not strange that it should be the uppermost of his inflammatory inventions against his enemies: men frequently judge of the vices and weaknesses of others by a knowledge of their own, but he fabricated his charges against Carrera merely to answer his own purposes; and by a retrospect over his own former actions, he was furnished with all those crimes which he wished to attribute to us: and from the same source, so long as his memory aids him, he can always draw an abundant fund of invectives.
We continued our march into the interior; and Rodriguez followed us, but at a very respectful distance, not less than fifty leagues in our rear. The Porteños saw that it was inconsistent with their safety to march too far into the Pampas, as (in case of being attacked) their flight would avail them nothing, when at such an immense distance from their own province. They therefore encamped at the Laguna de Floras, and Rodriguez, leaving La Madrid in command of the army, returned to Buenos Ayres; from whence he sent to the encampment a quantity of cloth, beads, bridles, toys, &c. as presents for the Indians of Nicolas (who were in their favour), or any others who might become proselytes to the interests of Buenos Ayres.
425After thirty-two days’ march we arrived at the toldos, or habitations of the Indians; and chose for our encampment a situation at the base of a hill, about one mile distant from the dwelling of one of the caciques. A deep river and two smaller streams ran parallel with our front, which they covered securely; our left flank was defended by a branch of the same river; and our right was protected by an advanced post. Our position was the most eligible in the country, as it would be impossible to surprise us; however the Indians requested we would decamp, as they had serious doubts for our safety if we persisted in our desire to hold this ground. It was supposed among them (from some tradition or prophecy) that that hill was the habitation and resort of an infinite number of gualichi or evil spirits, who punished with death or disease the temerity of all such as dared to intrude on the confines of this enchanted ground. Our first idea on receiving this information of the Indians was, that as the grass was luxuriant and of excellent quality, they wished by this artifice to preserve it for themselves, and induce us to remove to some other part; but on consulting with Guelmo, the General was convinced that they spoke the sentiments of their minds, without any intention to deceive us, and that their importunity in urging us to decamp was owing to their solicitude for our safety. The spot was most desirable, yet there was no vestige of habitation; and the untrodden appearance of the ground, and their little knowledge of the passes of the river in that place, indicated that it was little frequented by the Indians. Carrera quieted their fears, assuring them that those gualichi had no power against his soldiers, and that in a very few days he did not doubt but they would be entirely expelled from the hill. The Indians retired from the unhallowed ground, filled with hope and fear for our fate. Very early next morning they came to visit us, and hear what adventures we might have had in the course of the night; and expressed the greatest joy and astonishment, at hearing that the evil genii of the mountain had no power when they were opposed by us. They gradually lost their fears of the place, and in a few days their visits became so frequent and of such duration as to be a test to our patience.
Their attachment to Carrera daily increased. All the neighbouring caciques came to congratulate and welcome him to their country; offering at the same time to serve with him in any part against his enemies. Deputies were sent to Chile and the more distant nations, requiring the attendance of their caciques in the encampment of the Pichi Rey, or little king (as such 426 was the name they had given Carrera), naming a certain day for the assembly or junta of caciques to meet.
The Porteños having used every method to alienate the confidence of the Indians from us, and finding them inflexible in their attachment to us, conceived the following scheme:—they circulated a report amongst the Indians that we were their friends, and that our object was to gain the rear of the Indians, and then attack them; whilst they would meet them, and by this combination of operations they expected to annihilate the whole race. This ingenious intelligence was industriously circulated by the cacique Nicolas (their ally) and his captains amongst the other tribes, and did not fail to rouse the distrust and jealousy of the Indians towards us.
Carrera heard their complaints against us with much patience and attention, and succeeded in appeasing them, by making it appear that it was but a stratagem of the enemy, to cause a dissension between him and the Indians, that they might come afterwards and drive them entirely out of their country; and to show them that he was not the friend of Buenos Ayres, he determined to march in a few days to attack them, desiring some Indians to be immediately sent out to discover their position. The Indians sent out to explore the enemy’s camp advanced with an incredible rapidity, and reconnoitred their encampment; but in lieu of returning to report what they had seen, as had been ordered, they fell on the enemy by surprise, and again renewed their offence against the Virgin, by putting to death all the soldiers who were under her protection: the soldiers no doubt had ready passports to heaven; but the crime against their Holy Lady was aggravated by this defeat of her avengers. La Madrid, with his usual good fortune, escaped with a few officers, to give an account to Rodriguez of the success of the expedition, and its negotiation; which account was so satisfactory, that he was induced to discontinue any further efforts towards the accomplishment of his holy vow.
The appointed time for the meeting of the caciques being come, they attended with punctuality; each bringing with him a guard of Indians, to give an idea of strength and quality of his tribe. All being assembled, they sacrificed to their great patron and preserver the Sun, previous to opening their council.
For this sacrifice a colt “without blemish” was chosen by the priests, and tied by their own hands. The principal priest then by an orifice in the side introduced his arm into the body of the victim, and tore out the heart, 427 liver, &c. whilst the animal was yet alive; the blood from the heart he sprinkled upwards towards the sun, the other priests doing the same with the blood from the body. They (the priests) then devoured the heart, liver, lights, and entrails, reeking with blood; whilst the caciques were permitted to eat the body of the sacrifice.*
* It is curious that the account given here by Mr. Yates, of the sacrifice of the colt, agrees with what we are told of the ceremonies practised by the ancient Mexicans at a human offering. It should seem, therefore, that the horse is only a substitute for a man. The way is now open, and I do not doubt that an intelligent observer might find among the Araucanians much to throw light on the history of the more polished ancient American states.
The sacrifice being finished, they proceeded to their divination or prophecies; and as their revelations were of the most flattering nature, the council was permitted to be opened under the auspices of the Sun. The Indians were naked, as they are in all functions of war, council, religion, or athletic exercises. Their long hair was more than usually ornamented by white, red, blue, or yellow plumes; and their faces frightfully painted with black, red, and white earths.
The oldest cacique sitting cross-legged on a cloth prepared for that purpose, the next in seniority sat in the same manner on his left, and so in succession, till the junior cacique came to close the circle on the right of the senior. The General and his interpreters were seated in the centre of this circle. Our officers and the Indian captains formed a second and third rank round the circle; where we stood, to hear these turbulent sons of liberty represent their constituents in the open air, exposed to the rays of a scorching sun. All being seated, a profound silence reigned, which was at length interrupted by the principal or oldest cacique, in a short speech directed to the members, intimating the object of their union, &c. He then addressed himself to Carrera, saying, that having assembled —— tribe of Indians in council, he was authorized and required by their authority, and in their name, to congratulate and welcome the Pichi Rey to their country; to enquire respecting his health, and the difficulties he might have met in his march hither; the state of the country from whence he came; the strength of the military establishment there, and how employed, or likely to be employed; a particular relation of the wrongs which he had suffered from his enemies, &c. &c.; and to inform him, that as they were convinced that he was the true friend to the Indians, he had only to command their tribe, and they 428 would fly to any part to revenge his injuries, and embrue their hands in the blood of his enemies. Guelmo, the interpreter, noted all the principal heads of the cacique’s discourse; and Carrera, after examining it particularly, answered in a formal speech, which was interpreted to the Indians by Guelmo. They spoke each in the same simple form, and to the same effect; and when they had all delivered the messages of their respective tribes, Carrera delivered to them a speech, in which he returned them thanks for the confidence which they placed in him, and the force which they had put at his disposition, declaring to become their protector; enumerating the advantages which would arise to them from this union with him, &c. &c. When this oration of Carrera was interpreted to them, they offered him their hands, which he cordially accepted one by one.
As all they had hitherto spoken was not of or for themselves, but for the tribes which they represented, they now ventured to express their personal attachment to the Pichi Rey, whom they presented with various gifts, &c. Wine was served to this august assembly; but as they were on important business, they observed perhaps as much moderation as might be expected in a more civilised society. Each dipping the middle finger of the right hand thrice in the cup, sprinkled the wine upwards as an offering, before they would taste it (a ceremony which is invariably observed before they eat or drink); they then merely tasted the wine, and ordering it away, resumed the business of the day. Each cacique gave in a report of the force which he could bring into the field, which collectively amounted to 10,000 warriors: they then proceeded to give their ideas on the mode of attack against the Christians; and their horrid plans of bloodshed and desolation argued as much sagacity and penetration, as they did of ruthless barbarity and cruel inhumanity. Carrera used every argument to convince them of the evil of their method of carrying on war; but no eloquence could prevail against the impropriety of a custom which long usage had rendered sacred. As the Indian maxim is, “Spare an enemy to-day, and to-morrow he will cut your throat,” they cannot conceive either propriety, policy, or humanity, in allowing their victims to live, except women and children, who serve them as slaves.
However Carrera made appear to them, that amongst those whom they considered as their enemies, they and he had many friends; and that it would be preposterous to inflict on them the same chastisement as on their oppressors; of which being convinced, they promised to respect all such as he would call his or their friends. Carrera then asserted, that as women or children 429 did not carry arms or go to war, it was unbecoming a brave and warlike people to kill or carry them away captives. They could not listen to this tenet, as it struck at the very foundations of their customs respecting war; and even their honour was implicated. The honour of an Indian is computed by his train of captives: they destroy all their enemies of the male kind; and if they took no women or children prisoners, they should have no captives, and consequently no honour. Such is the reasoning of the Indians on the subject; and if any chief, however popular he might be, would undertake an expedition, and deny that right to the Indians, he would not have one solitary follower: Carrera seeing he could not prevail, waived all further conversation on the subject. The assembly was prorogued, and we retired with the caciques to dine on some bullocks, which had been roasted for the occasion; and after dinner, a bacchanalian revel succeeded, in which they gave themselves up to the uncontrolled enjoyment of their favourite excess,—drunkenness: we continued the revel all night, amidst the prophecies and songs of priests and bards. It is an abomination to an Indian to eat, drink, or sleep, with a woman; however, the principal or favourite women of some of the caciques had their meetings apart; they were unnoticed by the Indians, but had some attention paid them by us: they were, if possible, more intoxicated than the men. Their songs seemed to take much effect on them, as they sometimes laughed, and sometimes wept, at the ideas which they expressed. The airs were wild, sweet, irregular, and plaintive; rather pleasing, and not void of harmony.
The repetitions of these fetes were numerous; but it would be tiresome and unnecessary to enter into a particular detail of them, as what I have mentioned may serve to give a general idea of their sacrifices, councils, and revels.
These inhospitable regions of America, where water is extremely scarce, and wood in most places not to be found, were but little inhabited before the conquest by the Spaniards; and were first peopled by refugees from the south of Chile, who came hither for the exercise of that liberty which they feared it would have been impossible for them to enjoy there. Various other causes since that time, such as wars with each other, &c., have driven various tribes and remnants of tribes to settle there, that they might escape the vengeance of their more powerful rivals.
Amongst the various tribes there is no union of government: they are frequently at war with each other; and only act in concert with each other, and under one chief, when threatened by some real or imaginary danger; and 430 even then, there are no laws to compel them: the service of each tribe is voluntary, and during its own pleasure.
Each tribe is governed by a cacique or chief, who is elected from amongst themselves. The qualifications necessary for him who would aspire to that honour are, acknowledged superiority of wisdom in council, courage and stratagem in war, and zeal for the tribe which he governs: the power of a cacique is so exceedingly limited, as to leave him merely the name of it. It is his province to assemble his tribe, and explain to them the advantages arising from a war, or the necessity of surprising or annihilating a rival nation; but it is theirs to ratify or deny it. However, when they do ratify the proposition of their cacique on any occasion whatsoever, they adhere to it ever afterwards with a religious veneration; and it is to them as laws are to other countries. When the chief and a majority of his tribe are for war, they cannot use any compulsory means to force those to take a part in it who might have been against it in council; each being absolutely master of his own actions, so long as he does not injure the person or property of any individual of the society: but the soothsayers and bards begin their functions; and by their prophecies and songs so elevate the minds of their martial audience, that few are so cold to fame as to stay behind, when honour and victory await them in the field. The war-cry being given, the Indians relinquish that turbulent and independent spirit which animates them in domestic life: they become tractable and subordinate to their captains and caciques, obeying them in every respect with the same punctuality which is expected from regular soldiers to their superiors, during the expedition. Nor can they recover their liberties before they return to their habitations; when they are dismissed, again assume their arrogance, and have a power to bring to trial their chief, or enquire into his conduct in the time of his absolute authority, and punish him if he were obnoxious to them.—From what has been said of the government of Indian tribes, it is evident that the influence of a chief with his own tribe, or among the chiefs of neighbouring nations, depends in a great measure on his eloquence. The only privilege which they possess in time of peace is that of giving their advice; and he who can express himself best, and touch the passions of his audience most forcibly, will be heard most attentively, and obeyed with least reluctance. The Indians pay a religious adoration to the sun, as the author of light, life, vegetation, &c.; and also a kind of secondary veneration to the moon. Whenever they eat or drink, the three first morsels or drops are consecrated to the sun, by throwing them upwards: 431 the priests, on occasions of danger, emergency, doubt, suspicion, &c., sacrifice to the sun, previous to their soothsaying, that the genius of truth may direct their prophecies; at the return of each full moon, they perform some inferior ceremonies to that luminary. The eclipse of either sun or moon is looked on as a presage of some dire calamity, which they try to avert by sacrifice, or flight from the dwelling from whence they had seen it. That they have an idea of a state beyond the grave, appears from their having their horses, arms, and sometimes their favourite wives, buried with them, to accompany them to that unknown world; but such an idea must indeed be very imperfect and undefinable, in an Indian mind!
Their language is very imperfect, wanting a great number of nouns to express the names of many virtues, vices, ideas, arts, &c. Male and female are sometimes expressed by the same name, without any modification or difference of termination by which the gender might be known; thus, Pichiboton is the name for boy or girl, young man or young woman, but an additional number of qualifying epithets is necessary before we know in which of its meanings to consider it. Their verbs are also defective in the tenses, expressing an action or passion without any direct idea of time, but in an indefinite manner: labouring under these difficulties, it must take many words to express the most simple idea. The manner in which the caciques speak in council is entirely different from that of common conversation. The harangues are given with astonishing fluency and rapidity: they seem never at a loss to express any word; their sentences are equally divided by pauses of equal length, and they give an idea of blank verse, read without observing any pause but the final at the end of each line. They use neither action nor gestures; but affect a most visible variation of the tone in which they deliver their sentiments.
Agriculture is entirely unknown amongst them. They subsist altogether on their flocks, and remove from one part to another to accommodate them with pasture: when the society is small their stock is kept together, without distinction of property, except the horses, which in the way of stock are the only personal property of the Indians; the cows, sheep, mares, and colts, are the common property of the tribe. Their flocks are entirely managed by their women and slaves (Christian women), who watch alternately during the night, mounted on horseback, and going the rounds among the cattle: if a sheep or any animal should be missing, the unfortunate woman is stripped and flogged in a most barbarous manner. The occupation of the women during the day is to catch and saddle the horses of the Indians, and cook 432 their food. From day-break till dark, the women are busily employed in this last occupation. Soon as a boiler of the horse-flesh is cooked, it is taken from the fire and served to the Indians, sitting on their beds: every one has his earthen dish, out of which he eats and drinks; and if there should be any left after the men have done eating, the women make a repast in a separate corner of the toldo. The boiler is again put over the fire and filled,—cooked, and eaten; and the repetition of the same continues so long as they have light. The Indians in their toldos are very hospitable: always when we visited the toldos they took care to have beef and mutton for us; which food they eat only in time of famine, or when they can procure no other.
The toldo of an Indian is a species of tent formed by a few stakes made fast in the ground, and covered with skins. The fire is in the centre; and at one side of the toldo the Indians sleep in little stalls on beds of sheep-skins, whilst their women occupy the other side in a similar manner. The Indians are as silent and pensive in their toldos, as they are noisy and turbulent in their public meetings and councils. They will sit on their beds for an hour without uttering a syllable, wrapt in some profound meditation, or plucking the beard from their faces with silver tweesers which they carry for that purpose, never permitting any hair to grow on their faces or bodies. Every Indian has absolute power over the lives and actions of his women and slaves; his daughters are also at his disposition; but they are accountable for their conduct towards their sons, soon as they have passed the state of childhood. If a woman is unfaithful to her owner, or even mistrusted by him of having other attachments, he is generally her executioner, ending her life with his own hand. When an Indian is first married, he gives a feast to the relations of the bride and his own friends; but all the after-marriages are considered merely as commercial transactions. Polygamy is allowed amongst them, each being permitted as many wives as he can purchase.
The Indians, owing to the simplicity of their lives, enjoy excellent health; diseases are so unfrequent amongst them that they do not acknowledge the existence of any natural distemper. Whenever an Indian is afflicted with any sickness at a premature age and dies, the soothsayers, who are also their physicians, impute the malady to some enemy of the deceased, who is supposed to have the power of magic or witchcraft; and if their science of prophecy should enable them to discover who the wizard is, he suffers an immediate death. When an Indian dies, his best horse, saddle, spurs, sword, and lance, are buried with him in a pit; and if he should have a wife more dearly beloved than the rest, she accompanies him in his transit to a 433 more happy world, where her office is still to wait on him as a servant. Immediately after the interment the tents are struck, and the tribe marches in search of a more hospitable habitation.
Among the Indian tribes, crimes are not very frequent. They adhere strictly to what they consider justice; and any great innovation on, or violation of, their established customs is punished with death. A man who kills any member of the society is given up to the friends of the deceased, and expiates his crime with his blood. This is the right of revenge, which is the unquestionable privilege of every Indian; and should it be denied him, a civil war is generally the result, and the tribe becomes extinct. Though they suppress theft, murder, &c. in their own tribes, he who commits the most barbarous outrages on his enemies is considered most worthy of the respect and applause of every member of his own society.
There may be considered four orders of Indian society; the caciques, priesthood, captains, and people. They live together in the most perfect equality and enjoyment of their customs. Their occupations are nearly the same, except the priests’; who at different times, and under different circumstances, exercise the various functions of priest, prophet, physician, bard, &c.
They compute their time by the lunar revolutions, and their distances by days; thus, two moons mean two months; and the number of days between one place and another, means the time in which an Indian can gallop from one to the other, and gives them a tolerably exact idea of distance. Their way of counting is complex and fatiguing. They begin by counting up to ten (which they cannot exceed); then making a mark on their beads, or with a piece of stick, they count other ten, which they mark in the same way, and so continue to proceed to ten tens or 100, which is marked apart; a fresh score is begun, and continued to ten hundred or 1000, known by a different mark. Their numeration seldom goes beyond 1000, and cannot exceed 10,000. A number of men or objects passing 10,000 is expressed amongst them by the word Many.
Their exercise or diversions are performed on horseback with their lances, and are adapted to improve their strength and make them fit for war. They have also an exercise which they perform on foot with a ball, not unlike cricket. In all their exercises, diversions, and fetes, of whatever kind, they are invariably naked.
The dress of an Indian in winter is a poncho, a piece of rug wound round his waist, like the chiripa of the peasants in this country, (i.e. Chile, 434 where waistbands are generally used,) and a pair of horse-skin boots, all manufactured by their women. In summer the poncho is but little worn, as the weather is sufficiently warm without it. The women wear a cloth round the waist, which reaches to the knees: a square piece of cloth is passed underneath the right arm-pit, the corners of which are made fast over, and in front of, the left shoulder, by a large silver skewer about 12 or 14 inches in length. Their breasts, which in general are immoderately large, and the greater part of the body, are entirely exposed to view. Their hair forms two long queues; which, being bound in selvages, covered with beads of divers colours, are brought round the forehead and temples like a band, the ends tying over the forehead. Their ear-rings are large square pieces of silver, rather thin, and hang down on the shoulders. They wear broad necklaces of various coloured beads, and bracelets of the same. Some of them also wear broad girdles round the waist, which are covered with gold and silver coins, beads, &c. The unmarried women are known by wearing bracelets on their legs, and their dresses are generally comparatively richer than those of the married women: by this superiority in dress, their fathers expect them to attract the attention of some rich warriors, who, to possess the fair, must give to her father some horses, money, ponchos, or an equivalent of some description, in exchange for his bride, who then becomes his slave, and whose life is from that moment at the disposition of her purchaser. Nor are females allowed any choice in the election of their conjugal masters. The avarice of the father is only consulted; and when a marriage or exchange of masters takes place, all the father’s authority ceases, and the daughter looks on him only as a stranger, her filial love and obedience having been transferred with her person to her buyer.
The women are affable, generous, and attentive to strangers. Their features are by no means displeasing: there are some among them whose countenances are indicative of innate goodness; and, though their costumes are not calculated to make the most advantageous display of their charms, there are many of them pretty, and exceedingly interesting.
Many authors have supposed (and perhaps have had strong reasons for the supposition) that Patagonia was inhabited by a gigantic race of Indians: a contradiction from me would be as impertinent as unavailing against the torrent of opinion; but I will say, that I have not seen any of that race, nor could I learn from any information of the natives that such a people do or did exist.
They are of good stature, well made; and if compared with the diminutive 435 race of Peru, they will certainly appear to be large men; but are by no means larger than the generality of English and Germans. They live in a continual state of war, or preparation for war, among their own tribes, and against the Christians. Carrera succeeded in reconciling to each other all the rival chiefs; but such reconciliation cannot be of long duration.
The Indians are imperious and resentful; vehement in all their passions; jealous of their freedom and rights, and bold in maintaining them: they are exceedingly brave, but extremely cruel and fond of revenge; distrustful of those whom they know not; hospitable and faithful to those whom they recognise as friends; inveterate to their foes, neither forgiving an enemy or forgetting an injury.
During our residence in the country of the Indians various causes combined to render our soldiers insubordinate and mutinous; viz. their inactivity, want of pay, &c.; however we continued to punish them severely for every fault or disrespect, not overlooking the most trivial. In consequence of this, they projected a most villainous mutiny against the General and officers, and only waited the arrival of a party which was out on duty to effect their designs.—A soldier named San Martin was appointed general by the soldiers; the other officers necessary for the squadron were all selected from among themselves. Our division was formed of the prisoners taken in the battle of Maypu; and as they had all served under the Spanish government, they still retained an occult allegiance to Fernando. Their plan was, that after putting to death the General and officers, they would pass to the south of Chile, conducted by an Indian, and there join Benevides, who was fighting for the Spaniards.
Fortunately our soldiers were not all unfaithful. There were some of them who gave us exact information of the revolution, and swore to stand or fall with their officers; these were in the quickest time possible formed into one troop, and amounted to 40. With this troop and the officers we did not despair of suppressing the conspirators. The General affected to be ignorant of the conspiracy. The ammunition was secured by us, and the principal leaders of the conspirators were sent on duty to the toldos of different caciques who lived distant, and who had orders not to permit the soldiers to return without a second order from the General.
Having secured the ammunition, separated the conspirators and their principal leaders, and prepared ourselves to oppose whatever resistance might be offered, the General called the sergeants to his quarters, and made known to 436 them that he was well acquainted with their base plot, and prepared to punish them as they deserved. The sergeants retired; and soon as the soldiers were acquainted with the conference which had been held between them and the General, they began to regret having lost the confidence of their General, and laid all the blame to the chief of the conspirators, San Martin. They requested that the General would visit them, that they might personally beg his forgiveness. In consequence of which an order was read to the soldiers, intimating that the General would speak with them that evening, on the summit of the hill which overlooked the encampment.
On the evening parade the line was formed on the summit of the hill before mentioned. Soon as the General came in front they saluted, afterwards carried arms, and wheeled to the right and left on their centre to form a circle, in which the General stood, and from whence he harangued them for about an hour. He painted in such colours the enormity of their meditated crime, as caused several of the wretches to weep; they prayed to be forgiven and received into the General’s favour, promising that the general tenor of their future conduct would be only calculated to bury in oblivion the remembrance of their past ingratitude and offences.
Having promised unconditional obedience, the General told them that (unless for some very flagrant offence) he would not permit the officers to punish them till such time as he would have it in his power to pay and clothe them regularly. He also told them to prepare immediately for marching to Chile, where each would be rewarded according to his services, and retired.
The soldiers, ashamed of their ingratitude, seemed now more than ever determined to support their General, and cut their way through whatever obstacles would oppose our march to Chile; and to keep them in this mood of mind, the General resolved not to allow them a moment’s inactivity in future. General orders were issued, specifying the conduct which the General expected from the soldiers towards their officers, and also intimating that the latter should not wantonly or without good cause chastise or suppress the former. The day of our march was named, and emissaries were despatched to the surrounding caciques, to inform them that an imperious necessity impelled us to march immediately; and to return them our thanks for the hospitality which we had received in their country. The General also made known to them, that for the present he had no necessity of their aid, but would accept it in the first case of contingency which would occur. However, he offered to admit of a captain of each tribe accompanying him, that 437 he might have guides, in case it were necessary to retire to their country again, and also to show that he would not absolutely refuse the assistance they had offered him. Forty Indian captains accompanied us in our march from the toldos, and formed the escort of the General.
A few days after the commencement of our march, we were lost in an hitherto unexplored desert; and none of the Indians knowing whither to proceed, the General undertook to guide us by a pocket-compass and small map which he had in his possession. We were reduced to the most miserable condition; our provisions were entirely expended, in a country where water was extremely scarce, and in which no living creature was to be found, except serpents and other venomous reptiles. However, we continued our march, satisfying our hunger by killing and eating such horses as were unable to proceed farther; and after two days we came to a lake, the water of which was salt as that of the sea. Neither our men or horses were able to proceed on the march, so much had they suffered from the heat of the weather and want of water. The General gave orders that each troop should be divided into parties of five soldiers, and each party dig a well at a considerable distance from the brink of the lake, which was effected with much labour; and when they were sunk about five feet deep, the water began to spring: it was nauseous, and very brackish. However, it was a luxury; and we indulged ourselves so much with it, that we became very ill, and passed a most miserable night. From these wells fifteen hundred horses were also supplied, but many of them died that night. Next morning we took a quantity of water in barrels for our own use, and giving our horses again to drink, we continued our course by the compass. As there are no rivers in that part of the country, the lakes at an immense distance from each other, and almost universally of salt water, our fatigues were the same during our march as what have been already described, unless that use made our hardships more familiar to us, and consequently more supportable. At length, after a march of thirty-three days, we arrived on the frontier, some leagues farther northward than we had expected. We came to a farm-house on the frontiers of Cordova, where we found abundance of cattle, and a chacra well stocked with every kind of vegetables; which relief was most timely, as we should not have been able to continue our march two days longer, so much had we suffered from hunger and fatigue.
We had scarcely dined, when a guerilla of Cordoveses presented themselves; and as our horses were unfit for service, we waited their near approach. 438 A troop then mounted, and, accompanied by some Indians, went out to meet the enemy’s guerilla, which they routed; and eight Indians, who were foremost in the pursuit, succeeded in taking a prisoner, whose life they spared in consequence of having received the General’s order to kill no person, but bring as many to him as they could take alive. This prisoner was of great importance to us: he not only gave us all the necessary information relative to the country in which we were (and of which we were entirely ignorant), but also became our guide, and conducted us to the parts in which the enemy’s horses were concealed, thereby affording us an opportunity to have our men remounted.
O’Higgins had sent money, arms, and ammunition to the governors of San Juan, Mendoza, San Luis, and Cordova, to engage these provinces as mercenaries to make war against us, and to oppose our march to Chile. The regiment called the Guardia de Honor, with such other detachments and officers as the Supreme Director thought worthy of his confidence from the other regiments, were also ordered to march out of Santiago de Chile, in order to cross the Andes, and assist the mercenaries in exterminating us: but these troops had only reached Chacabuco, when they were countermanded by O’Higgins, as, on second consideration, he was aware that no Chileno would fight against us; that, on the contrary, they would all pass to us and strengthen our lines. As Chilenos could not be trusted to oppose the man who had first led them against their oppressors, liberated their country, and expended his fortune in support of their independence; against the man whose rank, character, and benignity gained him the love and respect of his countrymen, whilst he was feared but by a few tyrants and usurpers, who were loathed by the country over which they had assumed an arbitrary authority;—it was thought that Chilian gold would have a better effect against him. A fresh supply of money was sent to the provinces, that they might raise a competent force to supply the place of the Chilians, who had been recalled: of that money Mendoza received 30,000 dollars, San Juan and Cordova the same sum each, and San Luis 12,000.
Our squadron consisted of 140 men, which, with forty Indians, the escort of the General, composed an entire force of 180 men, not including officers; and for the destruction of that small but much-feared band thousands took the field.
The privations and dangers over which we had from time to time triumphed, made us look with a degree of indifference on any misfortunes which could 439 possibly happen to us. Our soldiers were well mounted, and conscious of their own superiority over any troops which could be brought into the field against them. Carrera, with his few enthusiastic followers, continued his march, notwithstanding many divisions of the enemy had marched to intercept us. He despatched letters to the governors of Cordova and San Luis, informing them that it was his resolution to follow his route to Chile, with their consent, or by open force. That in case they gave their consent, every thing his soldiers received in their march should be paid for; and that, on his part, he would take care that no cause for hostility should be given. We continued to march without receiving any answer from these governments; and in Chajan, whilst we were unconscious of our danger, and unprepared to meet it, we were surprised by Bustos, governor of Cordova, at the head of 600 of his veterans, having previously placed 200 militia in ambuscade in our rear. Our encampment was in a small vale, surrounded by hills on every side. The sun being extremely hot, three sentries, who were posted on commanding eminences for the security of the camp, had lain down in shade of their horses, and there gone to sleep; hence we had no notice of the advance of the enemy until we saw them on the summit of the hill coming to the charge in two lines. Our soldiers were astonished at this unexpected surprise. Such as had horses saddled mounted them; and those who had not, caught their horses, bridled, and mounted them without saddles. The General had only time to take his sword and mount the horse of a woman, leaving his coat and hat behind: all was disorder and confusion,—no formation or time to form. Our men began to disperse and retire through a defile in our rear, in which Bustos’ ambuscade was stationed; but about fourteen soldiers, with seven or eight Indians, stood firm to their ground, and resolved to sell their lives as dearly as possible. They raised a terrific shout, and precipitated themselves on the enemy, regardless of their danger. The flying soldiers, looking behind and seeing their few companions engaged with the enemy, were ashamed of their momentary fear; and without any command, but as with one common impulse, they wheeled about, and, without waiting to form, rushed on the enemy with redoubled fury. The enemy could not withstand the impetuosity of the onset: their second in command, and the principal officers who commanded the first line, were killed; in consequence of which their first line gave way, and, falling back on the second, began to rally. But the fury of our soldiers and chosen band of Indians they could not withstand; they were broken, and obliged to trust to their horses 440 for safety. They were pursued six leagues, and received very little mercy from the enraged soldiers. The Indians, with their long lances, gratified themselves exceedingly on their enemies. Late in the evening the carnage abated; and fifty-four soldiers, with seven officers, were taken prisoners. We were employed that night in gathering those who were badly wounded on the field, and conducting them to our encampment, where they received every attention in our power to bestow; and next morning the field was again inspected, the arms gathered, and such wretches as were languishing under the pain of incurable wounds were shot from principles of humanity. The wounded who were dreadfully carved, but still curable, were sent under the charge of a guard of peasants to San Luis, with a letter from Carrera to the governor Ortiz, recommending them to his humanity. Ortiz, though he did not answer Carrera’s first letter, answered the latter in such a polite manner as induced us to believe that he would sooner allow us to pass through his province unmolested than run the risk of opposing us.
We continued our route towards San Luis, and discovered on our right a faint glimmering light, which appeared and disappeared alternately. A party was sent to reconnoitre, and found an advanced guard, which they pursued. As the enemy’s guard reached the line and gave the alarm, they supposed themselves attacked, and made several discharges. The flash from their arms, in a night extremely dark, showed their position and the extent of their line perfectly; but as the ground was covered with wood, and little known by us, we resolved to hold the position in which we were for that night, and attack them at day-break. Our party returned, having lost a few men; and the enemy effected a retreat, notwithstanding the darkness of the night. One of the enemy’s guides deserted, and came to join us early next morning; from whom we learned, that the force which we had seen that night belonged to San Luis, consisted of 800 men, and was commanded by Colonel Videla and Lieutenant-Colonel Suasti, who were expecting large reinforcements every hour from San Juan, Mendoza, and Arioja, besides infantry which they expected from San Luis. Soon as daylight appeared we pursued the enemy; but could not overtake him, as he had had considerable advantage of us in the time of starting. However, after marching fifteen leagues, we arrived on the banks of the Rio Quinto, in whose thick impenetrable woods the Puntanos had taken up a position, in order to hinder us from obtaining water for ourselves and horses. They sent out a flag of truce, to inform the General that they had orders from their governor not to attack him, as Ortiz was coming out 441 to negotiate with him personally; and required that we should advance no farther. Carrera told them that he was willing to suspend hostilities for twenty-four hours, but that they should give up their position on the bank of the river and retire elsewhere. Suasti, who was the deputy of the enemy, refused to give up the ground which Carrera had required of him, and which (on account of the water) was absolutely necessary for us. Carrera desired he would immediately return to his troops, and, at the same time, gave orders that Colonel Benevente should prepare to carry the enemy’s position by force. Suasti, seeing the General resolute, requested a few minutes to deliberate with his officers, which was granted him; and sooner than fight they consented to retire, and allowed us to take possession of the ground in dispute. We heard the enemy sound their march with a number of trumpets and bugles, but neither saw their force nor knew whither they retired. Suasti accompanied us to the place where we were to encamp for the night, when he had an opportunity of estimating our effective force. An officer arrived late in the evening with a letter from Governor Ortiz to General Carrera, which was to be answered next morning.
The ground which we occupied was a square of about 150 yards each way; one side was formed by the broad sandy beach of that part of the river; the opposite side by houses, corrales, gardens, and paling; and the other two sides by thick woods.
Early in the morn, when the General was in the act of answering the letter of Ortiz, the enemy’s trumpets sounded in the woods in every direction, and soon after our advanced posts reported the advance of the enemy in several different quarters. The General could not suppose that this attack had the sanction of Ortiz, but rather supposed it to have originated in some mistake, and therefore sent an officer with a flag of truce to enquire into the cause of such dishonourable proceedings. The enemy received our flag of truce with fire, which sufficiently proved the baseness of their design: our outposts retired into the square, when we prepared for action. Some officers requested the General would give up to them the officer of the enemy who had brought Ortiz’s despatches, and who was nothing less than a spy, that they might have him shot in front of our line, and in sight of his own, by way of commencement; but he appeared so very sad, and protested so earnestly that he was ignorant of the treachery of his countrymen, that the General, so far from giving him up to be shot, as was solicited, sent an officer with him to put him out of the reach of danger from our troops, that he might with safety 442 return to his army. The enemy now appeared, surrounding us completely, and began to pour in their guerillas, which were quickly repulsed by ours. On the opposite shore of the river their strongest parties appeared; and we expected that an attack would be made from that quarter, as many of their parties were seen uniting themselves there. They were charged by about 100 men, and completely routed.
During this time, the General had received information from one of the guides, that at about one league’s distance, in the middle of the wood, there was a spacious opening entirely clear of trees, where we might charge the enemy to some advantage. The General formed our men in column, and we began our march for the plain. The enemy did not interrupt us in our march through the woods (probably because they found it impracticable to bring their whole force to act against us); but they anticipated our design, and were in the plain of the Pulgar before us, where they waited our arrival, and presented us battle in the border of the wood. The General ordered our men to wheel about and retire, in order to draw them into the centre of the plain, that they might not be able to shelter themselves in their native shades; but they understood it in another light. Owing to the superiority of their numbers, they supposed that we were deterred, and determined to fly from their vengeance. They pursued us, and promised themselves as easy a victory as that which they had obtained over the Spaniards, whom they massacred in San Luis; but when they came into the centre of the plain, we wheeled about and offered them battle. They immediately halted, and seemed quite astonished at an unexpected change of front. Confusion now seemed to take pace in their formation; they saw that our retreat was but to draw them out of the woods, and no doubt began to recollect the fate of the Cordoveses in Chajan, which made a great impression on them, as they had seen the wounded which we sent to San Luis, and heard their description of that action. But their superiority in numbers, still left them room to hope. Their line was handsomely formed. The right flank consisted of 200 cavalry, formed in line of battle, and supported by a column of reserve of 200 men, at about 50 yards in their rear; their left flank was exactly of the same strength and formation. Their centre was occupied by 100 infantry, covered from our view by a single rank of cavalry, which defiled to the right and left, and uncovered them as soon as we charged them. About 100 yards to the right of their line was a guerilla, which seemed destined to attack us in flank soon as the attack would commence. Opposed 443 to this guerilla, on the enemy’s right, an officer was stationed with 20 men. Opposed to their right flank were 50 soldiers and 10 Indians, formed in a single line, with about three yards between every two soldiers, in the manner of skirmishers or tiradores. We opposed to their left flank the same number of men, in the same weak formation. Their infantry, in the centre, remained without any antagonists in our line; yet with all our economy we could not cover the front of their cavalry. The number of our effective men who entered in action was 140; the enemy’s force exceeded 1000. But if the line of battle which we presented to the enemy was contemptible, our reserve made amends for it, as it was rather numerous, and commanded much respect from the Puntanos. It consisted of 80 women, whom we had bought of the Indians; about 15 or 20 Chilian women, wives of the soldiers; 54 Cordoveses, prisoners taken in Chajan; and a number of our own wounded men. This reserve was commanded by seven of the Cordovese officers, prisoners of war, and held a position about 50 yards in our rear, in a well-formed and formidable-looking line.
All being ready on both sides, our soldiers and Indians advanced to the charge with their usual intrepidity. The enemy’s cavalry, though about eight or nine to one, despaired of success and fled. They were pursued with a degree of zeal, and the field left pretty well strewn with them; and arriving on the banks of the Rio Quinto, several of them threw themselves headlong down the precipice sooner than meet the rage of the soldiers. In the meantime, the infantry, who remained in the centre of the plain, kept up a fire on our reserve of women; who stood it astonishingly well, without ever betraying a feminine fear or a desire to retreat. A few soldiers, who had remained to observe the infantry, returned their fire, and kept them engaged till the rest of our men returned from the chace of the cavalry, when they were formed in order to charge the infantry, who were first summoned to surrender; but either from actual bravery, or owing to an expectation of the reunion and assistance of their dispersed cavalry, they declined to surrender.
The order was given to charge; and notwithstanding their heavy fire, our men rushed on at full speed of their horses, overran and broke their square: the fire ceased; and in a few minutes this brave band of assassins lay dreadfully mangled in a heap, not one officer or soldier escaping.
Thus died the chief supporters of Dupuy, the murderers of the Spaniards in San Luis; they were the bravest men we had seen among our enemies, and fought to the very last man. The officer who commanded them bore an 444 excellent character, and deserved a better fate. This action was directed in chief by Colonel Don Luis Videla, and the second in command was Lieutenant-Colonel Suasti, both famous officers of San Martin; and the latter was a member of the Legion of Merit of Chile, and his character was such as is generally necessary for the members of that institution.
We had now acquired more arms, ammunition, and horses, than we had any necessity for: the surplus was destroyed. The 54 Cordovese prisoners were, at their own request, admitted to take arms in our line; and the seven officers who were chiefs of the reserve got their liberty, and passports to return to Cordova, after having been five days prisoners.
From the field of battle we began our march, in order to make the most of our advantage by entering the town of San Luis, and organising a government which would be favourable to our views. We encamped in the Chorillas, one league from the town; and an officer’s guard was immediately sent to the town to prevent disorders of any kind.
Here Carrera received despatches from Ramirez, informing him that he was about to cross the Parrana with 4000 men, reminding him of his danger in exposing himself to his numerous enemies with so small a force, and inviting him to accompany him in his operations against Buenos Ayres and Santa Fé; and also telling him, that at the conclusion of the campaign he would give him as many squadrons of horse as might be thought necessary to accompany him to Chile.
We had notice from our spies and correspondents that Bustos was again marching with a fresh army to incorporate himself with the Mendocinos, Sanjuanos, and Puntanos, in the province of San Luis; that in a few days this junction of forces would be effected, and would amount to 5000 men. The spirit of our soldiers was still unbroken; nay, they almost fancied themselves invincible; but their number was considerably decreased by the losses of the two latter actions in killed and wounded. Our men who were fit for service did not exceed 100; with which number it would have been preposterous to hope for success against our numerous enemies. Under these circumstances, Carrera called a council of his officers, who were unanimously of opinion that the best means of securing the advantages which we had gained, and of ensuring our future success, was to begin our retreat to the frontier of Santa Fé, or Buenos Ayres, and there to wait the arrival of Ramirez. We began our retreat accordingly; and next day we took the officer who had been liberated by Carrera the morning of the action with the Puntanos prisoner: 445 he was accompanied by an Alcalde, Ortiz, and both were spies; however, Carrera again liberated him, and recommended him to the attention of the officers.
From the neighbourhood of Lobay the General took an escort, and proceeded to Melingue, to reconnoitre the frontier, and hear if Ramirez had crossed the Parrana. In the meantime we dispersed a division of Bustos which came to surprise us near the Tunas. From thence Bustos retired to the Punta Sause, a town on the Riotercero; where he shut himself up, and fortified the place.
The Indians having had no intelligence of us from the time of our departure from the toldos, had sent 400 men in search of us, as they were anxious to hear what had become of us. These Indians came up with us on the frontier of Buenos Ayres, when we were endeavouring to surprise La Madrid. As the General wished rather to interest the peasants in his favour than deter them by the presence of the Indians, he took a great quantity of mares, and giving them to the Indians, dismissed them to their country, assuring them that they should frequently hear from him, and that he would call on them for assistance whenever he found it necessary. Three of the Indian captains remained with us as guides, in case we should be obliged at any time to return to the country of the Indians, or call on them for any force.
As Ramirez could not for the present cross the Parrana, owing to the superiority of the Porteñian squadron on the river, Carrera determined to go into the province of Cordova in search of Bustos, who had so diligently followed us. Bustos’ experience had taught him not to wish to meet us in the field; he therefore determined to fight us only under the protection of his batteries or entrenchments. He remained in his fortifications in Sause with 500 men; and we besieged him there fourteen days with 200 men, including his own soldiers who were taken in Chajan: we encamped close by the town; and our guerillas kept the enemy always annoyed in the trenches, notwithstanding the advantage of their artillery, which was sometimes used but to very little purpose. Finding it impossible to draw Bustos from his fortifications, or to assault him in them, we left him in possession of his town, and proceeded through all the other towns of the province, which we reduced, with the exception of the city of Cordova.
We began to recruit our regiment, which soon augmented to 500, all of 446 which were regular soldiers; and besides these, we had 800 militia, under the command of Colonel Don Felipe Alvarez.
The sierras or mountains of Cordova were considered impenetrable to an army, particularly of cavalry; but as Bustos’ chief force was cantoned in different parts of the mountains, we attempted to search them out. The country people assisted us as guides, and we marched for Salta; where we were surprised whilst at dinner in a wood: the guard kept the enemy employed whilst the squadron formed; the enemy was then charged and routed, a considerable number killed, and some prisoners taken. The Cordoveses retired to the mountains, whither we followed them closely; many skirmishes ensued, but all ended in the destruction and dispersion of the enemy, without any considerable loss on our side. The last of the regulars of Bustos in these mountains having long witnessed our success, and formed an adequate idea of their danger in opposing us, passed to us under the orders of their sergeants and corporals, permitting their officers to escape. The sierras being entirely subdued, Don Manuel Arrias was appointed commandant of the district, and raised 300 militia to remain there; whilst we returned to the Villa de Concepcion, and thence marched to the city of Cordova, to form a junction with the division of Colonel Pintos, who was then encamped on the north side of the city.
We had Cordova besieged for some days by the militia of Colonel Pintos on the north, and by our division and that of Colonel Alvarez, on the south. The enemy’s guerillas and outposts being beaten into the city, Bedoya, who was governador intendente, and now commanded in chief in Cordova, drew all his forces to occupy the plaza, leaving all the rest of the city unprotected. The citizens of every rank were in our favour; and were it not for an accident which happened to Ramirez, who had just crossed the Parrana, we should have taken the city: an express arrived from him, stating that he was closely pursued by his enemies, and requesting Carrera to march immediately to his assistance. Carrera could not hear of the danger of his friend without flying to his succour. He left Colonel Pintos, with other officers of practical knowledge, to carry on the siege; but as their force only consisted of militia, they were surprised by a sally of the besieged, and entirely defeated.
Ramirez had sent 1000 infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Mansilla, to attack Santa Fé, whilst he passed the river near Coronda with 700 cavalry, leaving in the Bajada 2700 ready for embarkation. Mansilla 447 disembarked under the fire of the forts and gun-boats of Santa Fé, and took the batteries and plaza by assault. Ramirez having landed at the Barrancas near Corronda, sent out 100 men towards Rosario to collect horses; who, when returning, were pursued by 700 men of the division of La Madrid. Perez, the officer who commanded this small party of Ramirez, drove all his horses in the van, and fought in retreat against the sevenfold force of the Porteños from Rosario to San Lorenzo, a distance of five leagues, without losing any of the horses which he had taken. In San Lorenzo Perez was reinforced by 100 men more; he then charged the Porteños, and drove them back to Rosario. La Madrid put his whole division in march, in order to form a junction with Lopez, governor of Santa Fé, that their united forces might oppose Ramirez, who still remained encamped in the Barrancas waiting the arrival of his troops. La Madrid had marched all night; and early in the morning coming to the Barrancas, where he expected Lopez to meet him, he found the weather so extremely hazy, that an object could not be discerned at thirty yards’ distance. He therefore fired a piece of artillery, as a signal to Lopez to repair to the place appointed for their union.
Ramirez, who was but a few hundred yards distant, conceived that the enemy was at hand, and with great silence prepared for action. Some officers of the enemy, who were riding in front of their column with the guides, perceived Ramirez’s line at a few yards’ distance, and returning immediately to La Madrid, reported the same; and Ramirez found himself in a few minutes surrounded completely. Ramirez’s force consisted of 700 men; they were formed on the bank of the river, with a small interval between each troop. The force of La Madrid was about 2840 men; his line formed a crescent, the extremities of which were placed on the bank of the river. Ramirez, though a brave soldier, had little eloquence to harangue his men on this occasion: he merely pointed to the river in their rear; and then showing them their flanks and front covered by the enemy, he exclaimed, “Muchachos, de aqui no hay retirada!” The charge was sounded, and the orientals obeyed it with their usual promptitude. The Porteños waited them pie firme; and when but a few yards distant made a general discharge of artillery and small arms, by which upwards of ninety of Ramirez’s men fell; however, the remainder intermingled with the enemy, and soon put them in disorder. The Porteños, long accustomed to be conquered by these troops, were again obliged to yield, and were pursued with great slaughter, the whole division being entirely dispersed or destroyed. The soldiers of Ramirez were well 448 rewarded for their exertions. The military chest of the Porteños contained 30,000 dollars, part of which belonged to Lopez and the Santafecinos. These were equally divided amongst the soldiers, together with carts of baggage, &c.: four pieces of artillery, with an ammunition waggon, remained on the field; and the most valuable prize of all was a large bag of official letters from all the united provinces, which was taken in the baggage of La Madrid. By these letters we were made acquainted with the very minutiæ of our enemy’s circumstances, and their united efforts against us, from Buenos Ayres to Chile.
This success was of short duration; for Ramirez, proud of the victory which he had gained, and intoxicated with the congratulations of a fair amazon who accompanied him to the war, attacked at nightfall the division of Santafecinos under Lopez, against the wish of his officers; who urged the darkness of the night, and the fatigue of the soldiers since the action of the morning, as sufficient reasons for deferring the action till the morning. Ramirez would admit of no delay: his plan was, that his whole force, formed in columns, should charge by divisions successively, when and where their exertions would be most necessary. After explaining this new plan of attack to his officers, he ordered the first division to charge, which was done: the first division being warmly received by the Santafecinos, he ordered the second to reinforce them. Lopez’s line was broken; and, owing to the darkness of the night, similarity of uniform and language, a dreadful confusion ensued: they could not distinguish whether their blows were directed against friends or enemies; but, overheated by passion and animosity, they continued to fight with each other. The Santafecinos, aided by the general confusion and darkness of the night, escaped from the field unperceived, and continued to retreat, supposing themselves pursued by the orientals. The fight still continued between Ramirez’s first and second divisions. Ramirez, thinking that the Santafecinos still maintained the conflict, ordered the third and fourth divisions to the assistance of the first and second, and afterwards went himself with the reserve; when, observing the men closely, he distinguished by their caps that they were all his own men: but, even after the discovery of the fatal mistake, it was with much difficulty that the soldiers could be separated, as the clamour was so great, that Ramirez, or those who assisted him, could scarcely be heard. By this imprudence of Ramirez nearly one half his men fell by the hands of their own comrades. Lopez had not suffered much in the fray, as he retired early; but being informed next day of the misfortune of Ramirez, he prepared to attack him. Ramirez was 449 obliged to retreat, and seek our protection in the province of Cordova, leaving the artillery, &c. which he had acquired behind him. Mansilla, who had taken Santa Fé, not having positive orders how to act, and hearing of Ramirez’s loss, evacuated the town, and embarking his troops crossed the Parrana, to wait further orders in the Bajada. Thus all communication was cut off between Ramirez and his province. We met Ramirez at the Passo de Ferreira, on the Rio Tercero. He still had nearly 400 men.
Bustos all this time remained shut up in his fortifications at Sause, and we marched, together with Ramirez, to assault him in his trenches; but having had notice of our movement, he quitted his strong hold in order to unite himself with Lopez and La Madrid, then in the Posta del Esquina, near the line of demarkation between Cordova and Santa Fé. There was a great number of carts in Sause, which he brought with him to fortify himself if attacked on his march. We arrived at Sause, and found that he had retreated two days before; we therefore left all our heavy baggage in that town with a detachment, and redoubled our marches in pursuit of him.
Doña Delfina, the lady who accompanied Ramirez, was a fair Porteña, who “loved him for the battles he had fought” against her countrymen, and the victories he had gained over them; and his love for her was unfortunately the cause of his present errors, and afterwards of his death.—As this lady’s frame was too delicate long to endure the fatigues of a forced march, several halts were made on her account. When close by Bustos, at least within eight leagues of him, we were obliged to halt the whole night, that she might, by reposing, recover some strength with which she might support the toils which were anticipated for the next day. But Bustos, during our halts, reached the Cruzo Alta, where he fortified himself. Next morning we arrived before the town; and, forming our divisions, an aid-de-camp was sent to Bustos to intimate his unconditional surrender, and threaten him with the consequences of an assault, if he should refuse. Fifteen minutes were allowed Bustos for the return of his answer; but he did not hesitate a moment: he replied to the officer, that the “Federal arms were never to be surrendered, nor could be obtained, but at the expense of the blood of those who carried them.” The officer returned with this answer, and we prepared to assault the town. (Bustos here calls his the Federal army. At the time when he was first put in possession of the government of the province of Cordova by Carrera and Ramirez, his army was called The Third Division of the Federal Army; and now, though an apostate from the political tenets 450 which he then professed, though an ally of Buenos Ayres, and a mercenary of Chile, he had either ignorance or impudence enough to assume the name of Federalist.)
The Cruz Alta is a village which has been for some time fortified against the incursions of the Northern Indians. There are three small forts at right angles, formed by palisades, earth, &c., besides many impenetrable corrales de tunas*: one side of the triangle was protected by a line of carts made fast to each other; the other two were formed by cheveaux-de-frise, houses, yards, &c. These small forts were well manned, and a piece of artillery in each: the intervals between each of the forts were occupied by light infantry behind their works. The cavalry of the enemy were few, and had been beaten by our guerillas into the plaza on our first arrival in the morning. Bustos’ whole force was about 580 men; our division, with that of Ramirez, was more than 1200.
* Enclosures, the hedges of which were made of the Cactus opuntia.
Three hundred of our men dismounted, to act against the forts as infantry, and were to have been protected by the whole of the cavalry. All being ready for the attack, our infantry, sustained by the cavalry, advanced on the right and left flanks of the town: a heavy fire commenced. Our men continued to advance, and dislodged the enemy from an outpost, and afterwards took the fort to which it belonged: in that moment Ramirez rode up and ordered the cavalry to charge. We then galloped close in front of the enemy’s line under a heavy fire, and entered the plaza; where we found nothing but horses, Bustos’ cavalry having abandoned them, and escaped into the forts. We remained in the plaza for some minutes covered with dust and smoke, and exposed to the enemy’s fire in every direction. Our infantry were aware that their fire crossed the plaza, and would be as offensive to us as to the enemy; they therefore ceased firing. After being some time in the plaza without being able to do any thing against the enemy, we retired with a degree of confusion; and our infantry (seeing so much disorder prevail among us) also retired, abandoning the advantageous posts they had gained, which were quickly re-occupied by the enemy. We again formed our infantry and cavalry before the town, and, on inspection, it appeared that all the ammunition was very nearly expended; we could not replace it till our return to Sause, where we had left our ammunition and baggage: it was, therefore, out of our power to renew the action, which the indiscretion of Ramirez had lost by his deviation 451 from the plan previously understood by the officers, and by his unaccountably exposing the cavalry in a place where they ought not to have been employed, as they could be of no service. We remained before the town two days, and then returned to Sause, leaving Bustos unmolested to effect his junction with his allies, Lopez and La Madrid. We lost between forty and fifty men in the assault; the enemy’s loss could not be so little: Bustos, however, gratified his allies by reporting that he knew from good authority that our loss in killed and wounded was not less than 300 men, and even gave them a description of the manner in which we buried our soldiers to keep our loss unknown, &c. On our arrival in Sause, we were informed by our spies of the operations of our enemies. Buenos Ayres, Santa Fé, Cordova, San Juan, San Luis, and Mendoza, had sent out divisions against us.
The Padre Guiraldes was sent as a deputy from Mendoza, under pretence of negotiating a peace or neutrality on the part of that province, whilst his real object was to cause a revolution amongst the officers of Carrera. Don Juan Jose Benevente, a resident of Mendoza, and brother to our colonel, was obliged by the government to give a private letter to Guiraldes by way of recommendation to the Colonel; and in which he conjured his brother to accede to the propositions which the holy father would make him, as the good of the country and his own safety and welfare depended on them. The conditions were to be privately made known to the Colonel, who was expected to disseminate the seeds of sedition among the officers. The following are the ideas which were conveyed to us in Father Guiraldes’ mission.—That Carrera and his division had done the greatest injuries to the nation; nevertheless, there was yet an opportunity for the officers to make reparation for the evils to which they had been accessaries, by abandoning the standard of anarchy and enrolling themselves under that of the Patria, leaving Carrera alone with his soldiers, to receive the just punishment which the nation would think proper to inflict. Some compliments were paid to the understanding of the officers, and the Patria anticipated that these propositions would be joyfully received by us; for though we had the misfortune to have been misguided, they flattered themselves we were still zealous for the public good, and would avail ourselves of this opportunity of showing it. In return for this important service, the Colonel was to be promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, and every officer receive a rank above that which he held in the service of Carrera; our commissions were to be, not from any particular province or government, but from the nation, which are considered the most honourable. There was nothing 452 in these stipulations relative to the legion of merit; but had we performed the service required of us, no doubt we should have been admitted into that meritorious and worthy fraternity.
When Guiraldes’ secret commission was made known by the Colonel, it was looked on and treated with the contempt and ridicule which it merited. He was seized and brought before the General, who became his confessor, to whom he disclosed his secrets, and was then given up a prisoner to the guard; from whence he escaped in the confusion of an action, a few days after. From Sause, we marched towards Frayle Muerto, when a misunderstanding taking place between the generals, they parted. Our division took the route for the frontiers of the province of San Luis, in order to surprise the Mendocinos, who were encamped in Las Barranquitas: the division of Ramirez marched in a northerly direction, to return to Entre Rios by the way of Las Charcas. The causes whence this separation originated were various; the following were the principal ones:—Ramirez had for his secretary the celebrated priest Montarosa, who had been principal secretary to Artigas, and director of all his proceedings. He was much attached to his old master (Artigas), and consequently an enemy to Carrera and Ramirez. Carrera expostulated with Ramirez on the impropriety of having admitted such a person to accompany him, and desired that he would be sent back to Entre Rios; where, if he wished to show him any kindness, he could easily do it, without exposing himself to the consequences of having a person in his army likely to prove a traitor; but Ramirez had much confidence in this warlike priest, and could not think of discharging him. Our soldiers began to express their disgust towards those of Ramirez, imputing to them and their general the ill success of our attack on Cruz Alta, and the raising the siege of Cordova. Ramirez, though he had given himself up to pleasure in this more than in any former campaign, did not allow the smallest relaxation in the rigid discipline of his soldiers. In the midst of abundance they were stinted of meat, and severely punished for every trivial offence: this they considered rather hard; for as their general indulged all his appetites, they who ventured their lives in his defence thought themselves at least worthy of a sufficiency of food in an enemy’s country, where it cost him nothing.
In consideration of these circumstances, Carrera thought it best to part with his friend before grievances would become more serious; and as it seemed to be of necessity, their separation caused no abatement in their friendship. The day subsequent to our separation, an aide-de-camp of Ramirez came up 453 with us, bearing a letter from his general to Carrera; in which Ramirez solicited the re-union of their forces, the guidance of every thing to be left to Carrera, and Montarosa to remain merely in the character of a priest, who, he again assured him, was no longer the friend of Artigas, but faithful to their interests.
Carrera answered this letter by assuring his friend, that where the insidious friar Montarosa existed, he would never expose himself or his soldiers. But, even independent of that objection, he told him, that the only means of escaping the vigilance of our numerous enemies was by separating, that we might thereby draw their attention in different quarters, and so by dividing them conquer them separately. He concluded by giving him his opinion on the line of conduct which he supposed would be most eligible for him to follow in his march, and assuring him of his unchanging friendship.
Besides the official correspondence, the aide-de-camp was the bearer of a private proposition from the officers of Ramirez, offering to leave their general, and pass with all the soldiers to Carrera, if he would receive or admit them to do so. This proposition Carrera heard with horror and astonishment. He told the aide-de-camp that he was sorry the officers had formed so very illiberal an opinion of him as to have supposed him capable of treating his friend in that manner. He also told the aide-de-camp, that he would not inform Ramirez, as he hoped they would never again think of committing so heinous a crime; that if their general had been led into error, he stood in the greater need of their firm support; that whatever his weaknesses might be, they never could efface his glories; that he never expected to hear of such brave officers as those of Ramirez staining their dear-bought honours by the base crime of abandoning the general who so often had led them to conquer, &c.
The aide-de-camp returned with the letter of Carrera to his general, and with the above-cited reproofs to the officers. Several of Ramirez’s soldiers and sergeants deserted, and some of them followed our division.
As we were about to leave the province of Cordova our division was much reduced by desertion, as many soldiers whom we had recruited in that province, and nearly all the militia, returned to their homes.
The enemy trusting to his numbers came out in search of us; and succeeded in intercepting our rear-guard, which had under its care a great number of waggons, baggage, sick and wounded men, prisoners, women, &c. The Mendocinos fell on them at day-break, and put all to the sword, not 454 excepting the sick and wounded who were festering in their sores. In these waggons the General’s papers were taken, and despatched to Mendoza as the most authentic and unequivocal proof of the important victory they had gained. We marched from the Arroyo on which we were encamped, immediately on hearing of the massacre of the guard and wounded men; and in two days we fell in with the enemy, who was also in search of us. ’Twas early, and the morning was extremely dark and foggy, when the flankers of our left discovered the Mendocinos’ encampment in the woods, on the banks of the Rio Quarto; and as they knew we were encamped close to them that night, they were prepared, and came out to meet us. The ground being woody and uneven we retreated, leaving a strong guerilla to protect our retreat, during which it was engaged with the enemy’s van. We at length arrived on a fine plain near the Villa de Concepcion, where we halted and gave front to the enemy. General Morou, who commanded the Mendocinos, from his success over the wounded and the small guard which escorted them, supposed he would have little difficulty in defeating us. He formed his men in two divisions, with a strong guerilla on their right, which advanced to attack us. Our squadrons were formed in line of battle, with a reserve in the rear of only 40 men; the women, who generally augmented that corps, having been taken with our baggage two days previous. A guerilla of our lancers charged and repulsed that of the enemy; which being reinforced, our party were obliged to retire, and were pursued in their retreat. The whole line of the Mendocinos now advanced to the charge, as did ours to meet them. At a few yards’ distance from each other both lines made an involuntary halt: an awful pause ensued, till Colonel Benevente peremptorily ordered the line to advance; the same expedient was used by General Morou, who came in front of the Mendocinos’ line and led them on. The lines closed, the action commenced; and General Morou, after exchanging a few blows, was the first who fell beneath the superior arm of one of our soldiers. The fight between their second division and our whole line was obstinate; but their first division and the guerilla of their right out-flanked us, so that we were then charged in flank, front and rear, or completely surrounded. The action now presented very little hope to us; our line was broken and obliged to fly, but was at length rallied again by Colonel Benevente and the officers. The charge was renewed with vigour, and the Mendocinos were beat back several hundred yards beyond the ground where the action began; when they were reinforced by 200 men, who awaited our arrival in formation and 455 charged us. They easily succeeded in routing us, as we were not more than 50, and not in formation. The day was extremely dark; and not being able to see any of our men, we considered the action lost, and ourselves the only remnant of the fugitives. We were chased by the enemy a considerable distance; when falling in with a large party in our front, which we supposed to be enemies, and which proved to be Colonel Benevente with all the force he could collect, we again charged the Mendocinos, routed and entirely dispersed them, which terminated the action. There was not a shot fired except by the guerillas in the commencement of the action. We lost 80 men, and a few officers; the enemy lost their general and all their best officers: their loss in killed we never ascertained, as we marched immediately off the field in pursuit of those who had escaped. We retook our waggons, and the women who were prisoners with them. In this action our effective force did not exceed 300, the Mendocinos’ were 1400.
We marched directly to Concepcion, which was the point of re-union for the enemy, where we found 150 men, who abandoned the town, and retreated precipitately for the sierra; but as their horses were all fatigued in the action, and without any others to replace them, we came up with them at nightfall, and summoned them to surrender; but whilst their commanding officer, Colonel Quiroga, was treating with Carrera, the soldiers passed the river in their rear unnoticed in the night, and dispersed, every one pursuing a different route: this was all Carrera wished—their total dispersion.
We continued our route for San Luis, taking many of the dispersed officers and soldiers prisoners in our march. This late action (in the idea of the peasants) established our good fortune on supernatural principles. They had an opportunity of seeing the enemy’s troops and ours, and could not conceive how the few soldiers of Carrera could be so frequently victorious over the numerous divisions of their enemies; however, they attributed the cause to a communication with dæmons or familiar spirits which were subservient to Carrera, as the most easy way of accounting for the effect. Carrera being advanced with a party a few days subsequent to the action, entered a cottage, where he passed himself on the people for an officer of Mendoza coming with reinforcements against Carrera, and made many enquiries relative to the situation and operations of the Carrerinos, or people of Carrera. The old woman told him, that all his countrymen had been killed by Carrera a few day ago, in the action of Concepcion or Rio Quarto; and conjured him by all the saints to make his escape as quick as possible to Mendoza, 456 as Carrera could not be far distant: that he had not many men with him; but when it was necessary to fight, he only took a piece of white paper from his pocket, muttered a curse, and threw it in the air, when troops sprung up from the ground, sent to him by the devil, with whom he was in league: hence he was always victorious.
Carrera was infinitely pleased with his excursion, and retired with every mark of conviction relative to the truth of the old woman’s doctrine.
We continued to march towards San Luis, and met no difficulties on our route. The town had been abandoned by Ortiz the governor, and we encamped in Las Chorillas, one league from the town: the General, with a guard, lived in the town, the more effectually to prevent excesses on the part of the soldiers. In a few days, —— Ximenes was elected governor for the time being, by the cabildo; and San Luis declared in our favour. The lady of Ortiz was sent to him under the care of an escort, carrying with her every thing she thought necessary: a guard was placed in Ortiz’s house, to take care that nothing should be injured which belonged to him. The General also sent him a letter by his lady, inviting him to return to San Luis, and continue in the exercise of his government; but Ortiz (though not averse to Carrera’s political ideas) was overawed by the many enemies who were determined to effect our destruction, and would not return, or accept his government from Carrera.
In San Luis we had information of the death of General Ramirez, in an action (if it may be so called) against the Santafecinos and Cordoveses. The circumstances of his death are the following:—He had reached the frontiers of Santiago del Estero; and being advanced with a guard of thirty men at a considerable distance from his division, he was suddenly surprised at the Rio Seco, and charged by 400 men. The guard could not resist such a force, but was soon beaten and put to the route. Ramirez, who had his fair charge (Doña Delfina) by his side, disdained to abandon her or shrink from danger, though he must have been aware that his single exertions could not suffice to rescue her from the enemy. He fought desperately by her side, and despatched several of his foes, but at length fell beneath the swords of the merciless multitude that assailed him.
Ramirez was of a low stature, very dark complexion, and disagreeable countenance. He seems to have had a strong capacious mind, and possessed natural abilities; but they were entirely uncultivated by education. He was a poor politician; but the best qualities of a soldier were concentred in him in 457 a high degree: he was open and frank, a stranger to dissimulation, true to his friend, and in point of personal bravery was exceeded by none.
During our stay in San Luis, two revolutions were set on foot against us: the one by four officers of our own division; the other by Aldao, and some officers of the enemy who had been prisoners with us, and who having received their liberty from the General, still chose to follow our division and remain under our protection, probably to embrace the first opportunity of betraying us.
The cause of this division among our own officers may be accounted for by observing, that three of them, who had commanded parties in the country, and acted in a way highly derogatory to the character which they represented (by not only allowing their soldiers to plunder several villages, but actually receiving their proportion of the booty, thereby injuring the general character of the officers, as well as the cause in which we were engaged), were impeached by the other officers, who requested of the General that they might be brought to trial, and dismissed for their ill conduct. As these officers were much beloved by the men, on account of the many liberties which they allowed them, the General did not at that time think it prudent to bring them to punishment, as it might cause a desertion among the soldiers; but he named a military tribunal, over which the Colonel was to preside; and which on our arrival at San Juan was to be invested with full power to take cognisance of, and enquire into, the conduct of every officer in the past campaigns; bring all such as were obnoxious to trial, and subject them (according to the nature of their crimes) to such punishment as a court-martial might think fit to impose. This determination of the General, though it was intended to have been kept unknown to the greater part of the officers, came to the knowledge of some of those whose characters would not bear scrutiny, and therefore they began to exert all their influence with the soldiers to induce them to desert and follow them. At the head of this mutiny was Don Manuel Arias, who has been mentioned before as appointed commandant of the Sierra de Cordova. Arias was aged about forty-five; and though not a soldier, as he was the richest and most respectable gentleman who resided in the sierra, where his influence with the inhabitants was considerable, Carrera thought him the fittest person to nominate to the command of that district. He had 300 militia left him when we raised the siege of Cordova, and in our absence he was attacked and easily defeated; from which time he followed 458 our division for protection, and merely as an individual without authority or occupation.
On our arrival in San Luis he was appointed to act as commissary, in which his conduct was not altogether unexceptionable: he was superseded by another civilian follower in that office; and then having the entire disposal of his own time, he employed it in successfully addressing a young lady of the town, whom he induced to elope with him; but as he was married and had a large family, the General took the lady from him, and made known to her who and what Arias was. Arias addressed this young woman under the character of a single man and an officer of Carrera, without being either; but so great an ascendancy had he gained over her affection, that though undeceived, she was willing to sacrifice all other feelings to her love and follow him. Carrera delivered her to her relations, who kept her as a prisoner as long as we remained in the town. Such were the grievances which induced Arias to take a part in the mutiny. One of the officers of the mutiny (Moya) was to receive the sister of Arias in marriage on their return to the sierra; but how they intended to employ the troops we have never been able to learn.
The loyalty of our soldiers disconcerted both the one and the other of these revolutions. The plans of the conspirators never came to the knowledge of the General till after his imprisonment by them, having been conducted with admirable secrecy; and it is remarkable, that the parties which conspired were ignorant of each other’s views and motives for mutinying.
The General was not well acquainted with the nature of the country through which we had to pass; and all his officers being equally ignorant of it, he was obliged to consult with guides who were traitors, and who had nothing in view but our destruction: amongst these Aldao was the principal; and he was sufficiently skilled in dissimulation to make the General believe that he was sincerely attached to his interests. The guides highly recommended the route to San Juan, which coincided with the ideas of Carrera, as his plan was, to remain in San Juan till the passage of the cordillera would open, organise an army of two or three thousand men, and pass into Coquimbo, where he would have received the capitulation of O’Higgins without any hostilities in Chile.
The General having determined on the route of San Juan, sent out parties in the road of Mendoza, which attacked and routed the advanced posts of the Mendocinos: by this he expected to impress on the minds of our enemies 459 the idea that our march would be in that direction, and thereby distract their attention; but the enemy received correct information from our guides, and made the necessary preparations to meet us.
On the 21st of August, 1821, we marched from San Luis towards San Juan. Ximenes, who acted as governor of San Luis, accompanied us with eighty Puntanos; the greater part of whom deserted when we approached the enemy.
Our horses were miserably reduced in our encampments at San Luis, as there was no grass but what was artificially produced, and it had been destroyed by the enemy’s horses previous to our arrival. On our march to San Juan we too late discovered the country to be an uninhabited and sandy desert, scarce of water, and producing no kind of vegetation, except some copses of stunted brushwood; the decayed branches of which were the only food of our horses in the march of eighty leagues. The guides every day promised that the next we might expect to meet pasture for the horses; and so brought us on insensibly, till at length we had advanced too far to think of receding. A division of the enemy had occupied San Luis a few days after we evacuated it; and if we retreated, the enemy would have an opportunity of uniting their forces.
We had an expectation of receiving horses in San Juan; on the realisation of which depended all our hopes. We still continued to advance; and on the 29th of August we met a strong detachment of the enemy on the banks of the river of San Juan prepared to dispute the passage. The river was wide, deep, and difficult to ford: the pass was, however, carried with little loss, and the enemy dispersed. We continued our march towards San Juan, the principal force of which was encamped in the Ligua, a plain some distance from the town; and we encamped close to them that night, and expected to attack them in the morning.
In our division there were not twenty horses fit for service; and by a prisoner who had been taken that day, the General was informed that in Guanacacho (about eight leagues distant, on the road to Mendoza), there were horses; and also, that the Mendocinos were in march, and hourly expected to join the San-Juaninos. This intelligence made Carrera alter his plan of attacking the San-Juaninos at day-break; instead of which we marched towards Guanacacho, in order to possess ourselves of the horses which were there, and intercept the Mendocinos in their march before they should form a junction with the force of San Juan.
460Experience had taught our soldiers that their success and safety depended not less on the quality of their horses, than on the superiority of their courage; and though they did not murmur, they universally desponded of success, and considered themselves as marching to deliver themselves into the hands of their enemies,—victims, without the means of offering any resistance.
A friend of Carrera’s in San Juan had sent 400 horses to a potrera in the vicinity of Pie de Palo, and a letter to Carrera, directing him where he should march to take those horses; and also informing him, that the town was entirely in our favour; and that 300 of the veteran infantry, which had belonged to No. 1. regiment, were ready to pass to us soon as we should attack the plaza. This letter was unfortunately intercepted by the enemy, who took the necessary measures for their security, possessed themselves of the horses alluded to, and put into prison all suspected persons.
A party of thirty men, the best mounted of our division, were advanced to Guanacacho, to take whatever horses they might find there and observe the Mendocinos. Another party marched a considerable distance in our rear, to ascertain if the San-Juaninos retired to San Juan or followed our march. We marched but a few leagues that day, and were obliged to halt in a medano, or soft sandy ground, without either grass or water; the incapacity of our horses not admitting our farther advance to a more desirable situation.
Our advanced party met a strong detachment of the enemy in Guanacacho; they were in a potrera, and, not being able to escape out it, they were nearly all cut off:—a few escaped to Mendoza with the news.
By a priest whom we had taken, and who was a scout of the enemy, we knew that the Mendocinos were near at hand. An express was sent to Guanacacho, requiring the party to fall back rapidly with whatever horses they had taken, that they might unite themselves with us; and orders of a similar nature were sent to the rear-guard; but in the next moment we discovered the enemy, who had taken up a strong position between us and our advanced party, thereby cutting off all communications.
Thus we found ourselves in front of the enemy, our best mounted and bravest soldiers absent, and our men entirely destitute of that animation and desire for combat which they so strongly manifested on all former occasions; some soldiers mounted on worthless horses, more on mules, and others leading their horses after them on foot. Such were our dreary prospects on the morning of the 31st August, 1821.
Under these disadvantages the General did not despair, but made immediate 461 dispositions for the action. Our whole force was but 470 men, of which 150 men and officers were taken out, and given to the Colonel to charge the enemy’s line. Our horses were of very bad service, but all the others were entirely unfit for any service. We advanced in line towards the enemy; whilst the remainder of the force, including women, prisoners, muleteers, and baggage, marched in column at a very slow pace.
The enemy occupied a strong position: his right and left flanks were composed of cavalry; the one protected by the Laguna de Guanacacho, the other by a neighbouring wood against which they were formed. The centre was occupied by 600 infantry, and a fosse extended along their front; which was easily formed in the sandy ground, and was almost impossible to pass with our weak horses. A guerilla from the enemy’s left annoyed us much; however, it retired as we advanced, and at last took place in their line. Our horses were too weak to reconnoitre their line closely, or ascertain the strength of their position. Having came within pistol-shot of the enemy, they opened a fire on us. Benevente halted, formed his few men for the charge; and seeing the soldiers rather dispirited, he began to encourage them by reminding them of former difficulties out of which they had extricated themselves by their exertions; comparing the present with former dangers, and assuring them that their future welfare entirely depended on their conduct in this action: but seeing them still irresolute, he asked peremptorily, and with a stern countenance, if they would or would not fight. The soldiers, more from a fear of the imputation of cowardice than from any hope of success, answered unanimously, that they would follow and die with their colonel. The charge was sounded; and we advanced under the fire of the enemy as rapidly as our horses’ strength would admit. We soon got on a soft sandy ground; when many of our horses sinking, and not being able to disengage themselves, lay there; others advanced, whilst some were obliged to remain behind: thus, by the nature of the ground and incapacity of our horses, our line was broken before we reached that of the enemy. On coming up to the enemy’s line we could not charge them, nor cross the trench which protected their front. The Colonel and officers made every exertion to pass it; but the men being under the galling fire of the enemy but at a few yards’ distance, and thinking it impracticable to pass the fosse, retired in disorder. We were pursued by the enemy’s cavalry about 300 yards; when, meeting the General, the soldiers rallied, and drove the enemy back to their trenches. The air was filled with a subtile dust, with which we were almost suffocated, 462 and prevented us seeing or preventing any attempt which the enemy might make to surround us; hence we could not with propriety follow up the advantage we had gained.
Re-union was sounded, and we formed close to the enemy’s position; where we waited, expecting to be attacked: the cloud of dust gradually disappeared, and we saw the Mendocinos in their ground seemingly in the same uncertainty as ourselves; however, they immediately sent out guerillas to renew the attack.
In this skirmish our horses were completely fagged. Forty or fifty soldiers were, however, fortunate enough to catch the horses of the enemy’s soldiers who had been killed or unhorsed in the attack; and with these we dispersed their guerillas. The Colonel resolved, whilst the soldiers were in the heat of passion, to renew the charge, without giving them time for the consideration of their danger. We were about 100: and with that number Benevento charged the cavalry on their left flank, leaving all the rest of their line uncovered and unheeded. On our approach to their line, Albin Gutierres, who was their general, abandoned his horse and took refuge in the infantry’s square. The commandant of the cavalry on that flank followed the same example, but on pretence that his horse had become unmanageable from the noise of the musquetry: the soldiers and inferior officers of the cavalry, abandoned by their chiefs, could not be much blamed for a change of position which brought them in rear of the infantry, who kept up such a heavy oblique fire on us as obliged us to retire once more; but in good order, and not pursued. We halted, and gave front to the enemy again; when, as the Colonel was exclaiming against the soldiers for their cowardice in having twice retreated without orders, we perceived a large cloud of dust, which indicated the march of the army of San Juan, and consummated the terror of our men. It was with difficulty we could hinder the soldiers from manifesting their fear to the enemy, who were close in front: each seemed eager to seek his own safety in flight; and the officers were obliged to form in their rear, with orders to strike dead the first man who would show any disorder or cowardice in sight of his enemy. The General plainly saw that these men would not charge, and that, if they did, it would be only uselessly sacrificing the lives of soldiers who might be useful on another occasion; he therefore gave orders for a retreat, which we commenced in good order. The soldiers whose horses were bad mounted behind others, or were taken prisoners. The enemy harassed our rear about three leagues; in which distance, out of 463 470 men, which we brought into the field, we lost all except about 20 officers and 80 soldiers: in action we could not have lost 30 men; the rest remained on the field, as their horses could not march.
We had gained eighteen leagues a-head of the enemy; and were about to surprise a squadron which guarded a great number of excellent horses in the potreras of Jocoli, when a catastrophe the most fatal, horrid, and criminal, put us in power of our oppressors.
The officers who had planned the revolution in San Luis supposed this to be the most favourable moment for executing their villanous undertaking. They reported to the soldiers, that soon as Carrera should surprise the enemy’s squadron in Jocoli, and possess himself of the horses, he and his favourite officers would abandon them and the soldiers, by escaping to Buenos Ayres disguised; from whence they would embark for England, or the United States: and that to avert the vengeance which awaited them (the soldiers), it was necessary that they would take him and his officers, and give them up in Mendoza. The soldiers believed this ingenious fabrication of the mutineers, and entered unanimously into the design of seizing the General and officers; which they soon after effected.
It was very dark, about two o’clock in the morning, when we were surprised by the word “Halt” being given vehemently by many voices. We halted, supposing the enemy were on us. The conspirators (Arias, Moya, Fuenta, and Inchouti) rushed forward with a chosen escort to the head of the column, exclaiming “Seize the General and Colonel! Tie all the officers!” In the same moment some shots were fired at the Colonel and Ansorens (a guide), who, having good horses, escaped. The General made some efforts to defend himself,—his pistols missed fire, and he was in a moment overpowered and disarmed. He attempted to speak to the soldiers, but they would not hear him; and Arias ordered him and the rest of the officers not to speak to the soldiers on pain of death.
A letter was immediately sent back to the army of the enemy by the conspirators, and another to Godoy Cruz, governor of Mendoza, informing them of what they had done: they then continued their march towards Mendoza, till we arrived at Jocoli; when we halted, and had some refreshment, for the first time in the forty-eight hours antecedent.
Here Moya, one of the conspirators, seemed to have repented of his treachery: he acknowledged that nothing could efface the stain which his character had sustained; but he was over-awed, and persuaded by his companions 464 to adhere strictly to what they had commenced. However, by his intercession on our behalf, he obtained from the other three permission to write, in their names, an official letter to the governor of Mendoza; in which he requested that the lives of the officers whom they had taken would be held sacred, and that they should be allowed to retire to any of the provinces as destierrados, without suffering other punishment or imprisonment. This letter was answered by Godoy Cruz, the governor, in the affirmative.
We continued to march towards Mendoza; and when we were about two leagues from the town, several squadrons came out to receive us. Moya and Arias, who had assumed the command, ordered the soldiers to surrender their arms; which they did with reluctance.
We halted at a large country-house, which served as a barrack for the enemy’s troops: there the soldiers were placed in a yard, with double guards over them; and Colonel Garcia, commandant of the barracks, sent to invite us to sup with him, in order to separate us from our soldiers; whom they still feared, though unarmed. After the Colonel had entertained us about two hours in his quarters, an adjutant came with a strong guard and conducted us to the barrack of San Domingo in Mendoza; where we were thrown into a large dark room, without any kind of defence against the cold, and obliged to lie on a damp brick floor. After a few days’ residence there, we became inmates of the capilla (a room dedicated to persons under sentence of death, and stocked with images, &c. for religious purposes), in the gaol; when we were loaded with irons, &c. &c.
The officers who had conducted the revolution were received with much magnificence at the Governor’s, and next morning were billeted in the most respectable houses of the friends of Godoy Cruz. A small pension was allowed them for private expenses.
In the meantime Carrera was lodged in the dungeon with Colonel Benevente (who was taken the morning after the revolution), and bound with irons and cords in the most brutal manner: he knew that he should in a few days suffer the same fate as his brothers, but bore his misfortune with the same serenity of mind for which he was always distinguished. He seemed to have no concern for himself; but spoke of the misfortunes of his wife, and the friends who were partakers of his hardships, with the greatest regret.
Albin Gutierres, who commanded the force of Mendoza, desisted from his cruelties whilst he supposed that Carrera had escaped; but when he received the letters of the conspirators relative to the revolution they had made, he 465 gave a loose to his infernal rage: at every halt his army made in their return to Mendoza, parties of prisoners were brought out and shot; for which cruelty he accounted to the provinces, by saying that all those soldiers had fallen on the field of battle fighting: he did us much more honour than we merited, in order to add to his own, and cover his wanton barbarity.
It would be doing an injustice to Albin Gutierres to neglect noticing his family, and the earlier occupations of his youth, &c. Like most of the people in power in America, he started up from the dregs of society. The most that is known of him is, that his first employment in active life was that of picador; i.e. a person whose duty it is to sit in front of a cart with a long cane or pole, pointed with a nail or spike, in order to prevent the bullocks from going to sleep, and make them quicken their pace occasionally. The carts in which he served as peon were employed in the commerce between Buenos Ayres and Mendoza; hence he imbibed his love for traffic. His first promotion was from picador to the rank of arriero, or muleteer, in the wine trade. He, with his savings, purchased a mule; and was allowed by his employers to take with him in every journey to Buenos Ayres one cargo or two barrels of wine, there to sell for his account and risk; the return of which he always employed in buying up something proper for the market of Mendoza. Having saved some money in this trade, he left it off, and became pulpero, or wine retailer; in which he was so fortunate as to amass a considerable quantity of money, and soon established himself as wine-merchant on a pretty large scale. As he was acquainted with every branch of the business, from gathering the grapes to driving the mules with the produce, and was uncommonly industrious, it is not surprising that in a few years he became one of the richest men in Mendoza. When San Martin was captain-general of the province of Aryo, he conferred on him the rank of colonel of militia for some services which are not ascertained.
Such was the general who had the credit of humbling us, after our having defeated the best and bravest generals of the country! He was an arrant coward, and as cruel as he was timid. But he was successful, and crowned with honours.
As to Carrera, he showed the greatest resignation to his fate, from the moment he was made prisoner; he was aware that his longest respite would not exceed four or five days, yet he conversed, ate, drank, and slept, as if nothing were to happen to him.
466On the third day after our arrival in Mendoza, the ringing of bells and firing of the artillery announced the arrival of Gutierres, who immediately ordered that the sentence of death should be read to General Carrera and Colonels Benevente and Alvarez in the dungeon; and 11 o’clock next day was appointed for their execution. There was no formality of a trial, because they could not be tried by officers of inferior rank; and as all in town were inferior, there could be no court-martial: the sentence was therefore given in the name of the general and officers of the army of Mendoza. Godoy Cruz, the governor, denied having any part in the death of Carrera, and said he was obliged to comply with the will of the town.
Priests were sent to the dungeon to prepare the souls of the condemned for the other world. Carrera would allow no priest to speak with him, unless he were allowed the confessor of Madame Fuentacilla, his mother-in-law, who had been banished Chile and resided in the town. This was denied him. He then requested of the government permission to have a short interview with his mother-in-law, which the Governor was pleased to grant; but she found herself too weak for so affecting a scene, and declined coming to see him: however she procured him permission to write to his wife, and to deposit the letter in her hands.
The morning appointed for his execution (Sept. 5th) had come; and Carrera was busily employed writing his last letter to his wife, when an adjutant of the plaza came into the dungeon, and informed him that he was reprieved by the government, and that his only punishment would be banishment. Carrera did not appear elated at this news, but threw aside the letter he was writing, and commenced a new one on another sheet; but in about fifteen minutes afterwards the guards came to take them out to be shot. He requested of the officer but a few moments before he would accompany him; and laying aside the letter he had before him, he took the first he had been writing, and finished it by informing her, that in that moment he was about to accompany his executioners to the banco. He requested that whatever love she had for him would henceforward be directed to their children, and particularly to his son; whom he ordered to be sent to England or the United States, when he should have attained his seventh year, that he might in one of those countries receive his education.
The reason of the government for reprieving (or pretending to reprieve) the life of Carrera a few minutes previous to his execution was, that these sudden changes in his hopes might enervate him in sight of the populace, by whom 467 he was venerated. But the stratagem caused no alteration in Carrera; he showed neither terror nor anxiety at meeting death. He heartily despised all friars; however they thronged round him in his last moments, in order to re-convert him, that he might die a good Christian. Passing through the plaza, they employed all their logic in proving the existence of hell, and the torments of the damned. He reprimanded them for their insolence in offering and imposing their unasked advice; and continued steadfastly to view the troops, and make his observations on the strength of the town to the officer who guarded him.
Coming up to the seat on which he was to be shot, and hearing his name softly pronounced, he raised his eyes, and saw on the house-top some ladies who had come to see him and were about to retire: supposing that some of them knew him, he saluted them; they returned his bow, and retired much affected.
Carrera, still unchanged, stood by his seat on the same ground on which his brothers had bravely died. The padres renewed their suit for the safety of his soul, which he told them was his care, not theirs. Finding all their remonstrances useless, they requested he would forgive the town for the injuries which himself and family had received in it; and also to ask forgiveness for the injuries which he had caused it. He replied, that if his forgiveness could mitigate the wrongs, or make less glaring the injustices, which his family had sustained, he freely granted it; but that he, conscious of the rectitude and honour of his actions through life, could never think of soliciting the forgiveness of any of his most ungenerous enemies, of whom he considered the Mendocinos the most barbarous and illiberal.
He then took off a valuable poncho, which he delivered, with his watch, to be deposited by the father confessor of Madame Fuentacilla in her hands, to be delivered as the only legacy and remembrancer of the unfortunate father to his son. He then sat down on the seat; and when the executioner came to tie his arms, he stood up rather indignantly, and ordered him to retire; asking the officer who stood by to have him shot, when he had seen an honourable officer tied by a ruffian? He also refused to have his eyes covered; and sitting down calmly, he placed his right-hand on his breast, and requested the soldiers to despatch him. They fired,—he received two balls in the forehead,—two passed through his hand and entered his heart: he fell, and expired almost without a pang; and, after decapitating him and cutting off his right arm, his body was given to his mother-in-law, and interred in the 468 tomb of his brothers. His head was placed on the cabildo, and his arm close under the clock which belonged to that building.
Carrera was aged 35 years: his person was tall and graceful. He had dark hair, a high forehead, dark piercing eyes, and aquiline nose: his countenance was serene, and extorted respect even from his enemies. He was enterprising, honourable, and brave; unreserved with his friends; free from dissimulation or envy; compassionate and generous to a fault. His temper was mild and even; neither adversity nor good fortune having the power to make any evident suppression or elevation on his mind. His humanity was such as did not deserve the name of virtue; for, passing the bounds which prudence would have prescribed to it, it degenerated into an unaccountable failing or weakness. An enemy, however criminal he might be, was treated with generosity and compassion by Carrera; even assassins, who had murdered our soldiers, were frequently taken and brought before him:—he always protected their lives at the expense of justice itself, and not unfrequently made opportunities for them to escape himself, when he could not trust to another to do it; thus affording them the means of a farther exercise of their depredations.
From Pueyrredon down to the most insignificant of Carrera’s enemies, there were few whose persons or property did not at some time fall into his hands; the former were always protected by him, the latter ever scrupulously respected.
This strange passion of Carrera, this mercy where it ought not to be exercised, can only be accounted for by supposing it to have for its origin and basis a species of ambition or self-love. Perhaps he believed that by treating his enemies with kindness, and loading them with obligations, they would become his friends; if that were his idea he was miserably deceived, and proved himself in a great measure ignorant of the character of his country.
That magnanimity which would have immortalized Carrera in any other country was but lost in America, where such a virtue is little acknowledged and less practised. His generosity was attributed by his enemies to fear; and in some of their public papers they had the impudence to call the man a coward who, with 140 men and the resources of his great mind, made every government and governor totter, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Had Carrera given every traitor the punishment which justice would dictate when they fell in his power, and shown his generosity and greatness of mind only to such as could comprehend and appreciate them, he would 469 never have died under their hands, nor his friends have suffered for the imaginary crimes which were attributed to them by his enemies.
If his ambition was to live without any imputation of blood, cruelty, or injustice on his character, he perfectly succeeded in his desire of deserving such a character; but ’tis more than probable that his enemies will deny that he possessed any good quality. During three years of his government in Chile, and in all his campaigns, he never had the life of a man taken away. The only person Carrera sentenced to death in Chile was a near relation of his own, whose crime in any other person would have been overlooked and forgiven. His life was begged by the Congress of Chile; and he was transported to the Brazils, and is now an officer of much merit in the Portuguese service.
Colonel Alvarez, who was executed with Carrera, died a penitent Catholic, and evinced resignation and character in his last moments: he was also beheaded, and the head sent to Bustos; that by exposing it he might destroy the hopes and repel the exertions of the Cordoveses, who so much venerated the old man Alvarez, and called him their father and protector.
Colonel Benevente, who expected to have been shot with General Carrera, was surprised, on the morning appointed for their execution, to find himself left behind in the dungeon. His brother, Don Juan Jose Benevente, merchant of Mendoza, with all the principal men of Mendoza, waited on the governor, Cruz, and begged the life of the Colonel; which was granted, in case Gutierres the general would ratify it. They immediately waited on Gutierres; but the old muleteer was inexorable, and resolved to have his vengeance on a man whom he would tremble to behold in other circumstances. The citizens retired disgusted with their new-created general, and without further hopes of obtaining the life of Benevente. However, another experiment was tried by the ladies of the town, and succeeded. The wife of Don Juan Jose Benevente, accompanied by all the matrons and young women of the town, in mourning, waited on Gutierres, at his house; and after flattering the old wretch, by persuading him that he was brave, generous, &c., he became flexible, and granted to them in writing the life they solicited. The fair deputation immediately proceeded to the dungeon, and informed Benevente that they had procured his life from Gutierres, and would alleviate the inconvenience of his prison by all means in their power. The Colonel was so struck with their humanity and generosity, that he was for some time 470 unable to reply. Thus receiving his life affected him more than he could have been affected by losing it on the banco.
We were all closely confined, and expected to be shot or privately assassinated every day; nevertheless we were not dispirited, but were determined to emulate each other in dying with resolution. We were all resolved to imitate the noble example of our chief, who viewed death without terror, and met him rather as a friend who was to release him from the insolence and ingratitude of an ungrateful country.—But no! Chile was not, nor ever can be, ungrateful to Carrera! Oppression may shackle her, and tyranny break the spirit of her inhabitants; yet her best sons, to the latest posterity, will venerate his name who first drew the sword in defence of her rights.
The government at Buenos Ayres sent a reprimand to Mendoza for their barbarous conduct towards us; saying, that no such power existed in the government of Mendoza as to authorise them in such an absolute manner to dispose of the lives of Americans; and that in the numerous revolutions of Buenos Ayres, there could not be produced, to degrade the Porteñian character, a single circumstance similar to the death of Carrera.
A large proportion of the inhabitants of Mendoza were in our favour, and openly declared we should not be put to death. The Indians also (who had been in search of us) came to the frontier near San Carlos, and sent a deputation into Mendoza to demand our liberty. The government had the head and arm of Carrera taken down immediately, and delivered to Madame Fuentacilla, who had them interred with his body, lest the Indians should see them. They succeeded in deceiving the Indian deputies, by assuring them that we were not in the town, and telling them that we were all in Chile.
Five of our officers had been taken by the San Juaninos on the field of battle at Punto del Medano. The governor of San Juan was enraged with his officers for sparing their lives, and knew not how he could with an appearance of justice put them to death. He, however, soon found a plan which answered his purpose: he sent for them to the barrack, where they were prisoners, to wait on him at his house; and coming there, he gave them billets to certain houses, where they might live at their liberty. The officers were grateful for the favour which they received, and retired; but two days after were taken up, brought to the plaza, and shot, for having formed a revolution to depose Governor Sanches, their liberator!
471Similar fabrications were forged against us; but they meditated a revolution in Mendoza, and the fear of retribution prevented them from assassinating us.
Albin Gutierres received from the government of Chile, in consequence of having defeated us, the rank and pay of brigadier-general, and member of the legion of merit. Doctor Godoy Cruz, governor of Mendoza, a superstitious motilon (the lowest rank of friar), who never wore a sword, or saw an enemy, was also initiated into the legion, and honoured with the rank and pay of brigadier-general of the army of Chile.—How happy the country which can without resentment behold such honours conferred on the very persons who assisted in riveting her chains!
In the Chilian gazette there was published a large but false account of our last action, in which it appeared that the General and all the officers had been taken by the Mendocinos on the field of battle; and that the assassination of our soldiers, and many of our officers, was merely in self-defence, &c.
P. S.—I believe in the account of our last action with the Mendocinos in the Punto del Medano, I omitted to insert the number of their force,—they had 600 infantry, and between 5 and 600 cavalry.
The above paper was written at my request by Mr. Yates, a young Irish gentleman, who, with his friend Mr. Doolet, was engaged in the service of Carrera. After the death of their chief, they were sent as prisoners to San Martin in Peru; and there, after suffering great hardships on board the prison-ship in which they were transported from Chile, they were imprisoned in the castle of Callao. Their wretched situation moved the Honourable Captain F. Spencer to apply to San Martin for their release; who gave an order to that effect, on condition that they should not land again in Spanish South America. Accordingly, they both remained on board of one or other of the British ships of war on the station, until the Doris conveyed them to Brazil; where they are now both in the service of His Imperial Majesty Don Pedro.
The paper is printed without any kind of alteration.
The author of this first Appendix is William Yates . . . and that’s all I know. Maria Graham tells us that he is “a young Irish gentleman”, while Spanish-language sources refer to him as “militar irlandés”. A footnote in es.wikipedia refers to him discouragingly as “William Yates, que ha demostrado ser una fuente poco confiable”.
The word guerilla means a group or band, not an individual soldier. Mendoza is in what is now Argentina, just over the Andes from Santiago. Yates prefers the spelling “Concepcion” where Maria Graham has “Conception”. It must be conceded that, at least in this case, he is right and she is wrong.
The oldest and youngest Carrera brothers, Juan José (b. 1782) and Luis (b. 1791), had been executed in 1818. The middle brother, José Miguel (b. 1785), would follow in 1821, near the end of Yates’s narrative.
APPENDIX I.
text has APPENDIX. without number
[All the other Appendixes, II through VI, will be numbered.]
[374] Carasco, the Spanish President, had been deposed, on a pretence of his incapacity to serve the Spanish monarch
[I think the word “pretend” or “pretence” was then in transition, from its earlier sense of “the stated reason” (neutral) to its current sense of “the falsely stated reason”. Maybe Carasco really was incapable of serving the king of Spain; maybe something else was going on.]
[376] His father was a native of Ireland
text has native of / of Ireland at line break
[382] Doña Jabiera, his sister
[Today I Learned . . . that the name “Xavier” derives ultimately from the Basque place name Etxeberria (Anglicized as “Etcheverry”). So the b really is etymological. Jabiera, or Xaviera, was the oldest Carrera sibling, born in 1781.]
the immediate execution of the Carreras . . . put into execution the mandate of his fell master
[Careless editing, or is the author intentionally being nasty?]
[386] San Martin, the immortal and invincible hero of San Lorenzo, Chacabuco, and Maypú
[Is this the 1824 equivalent of sarcastic quotation marks?]
[387] so great and illustrious a person as San Martin
[Yup. Sarcastic italics.]
[389] Un Americano indecente jamas quitterá la vida de Segundo Riberos
text unchanged: expected innocente
[An English typesetter runs into Maria Graham’s handwriting. Or possibly Yates’s own handwriting; she doesn’t explain exactly how—mechanically—this Appendix became part of her book.]
[392] the governor “alone having escaped to tell them”
[Today I Learned . . . that the locus classicus for “I alone am escaped to tell you” is the Book of Job.]
[394] he alleged for his defence, that he was but a subaltern, and obliged to execute the orders of the captain-general
[Known in my youth as the Lt. Calley defense.]
[398] I was one amongst those officers
[This is the first time William Yates puts himself into the narrative.]
[401] four embassies, each soliciting his attendance
third “i” in “soliciting” invisible
[402] Don Estanislao Lopez, governor of the province of Santa Fé
text has Sante Fé
[418] on his delivery of Carréra and his officers
text unchanged
[There’s nothing actually wrong with the acute accent—it can’t possibly affect pronunciation—but, for the same reason, it’s entirely superfluous.]
not having any other food than the eggs of ostriches and other wild fowls
[At some point when I wasn’t looking, rheas were upgraded to an order of their own, Rheiformes. (Given ornithologists’ well-attested passion for defining new orders, this should not have surprised me.) Set them alongside emus—order Casuariiformes—and ostriches—order Struthioniformes—and you have an impressive case of convergent evolution.]
[421] Soon as the enemy in the town opened their fire from the church and batteries, Carrera put himself at the head of his picket
[This is confusing. Did the author mean to say the Captain (the one acting on Carrera’s inexplicable orders) put himself at the head?]
our detachment employed themselves in plundering the town
text has themseves
[424] As Rodriguez was familiarised with sacrilege, it is not strange that it should be the uppermost of his inflammatory inventions against his enemies: men frequently judge of the vices and weaknesses of others by a knowledge of their own
[Today known as “projection”.]
[430] Each tribe is governed by a cacique or chief
[Though the spelling is Spanish, the word came originally from Taino kasike. The Spanish seem to have made a habit of picking up vocabulary in the first place they landed—generally the Caribbean—and then applying those words throughout the Americas.]
[431] labouring under these difficulties, it must take many words to express the most simple idea
[I imagine the indigenous people thought the same about the Spanish language, with its own inexplicable deficits.]
[432] The toldo of an Indian is a species of tent
[For variety’s sake, toldo is not an indigenous American word. It is Spanish, believed to be of Germanic origin.]
[438] eight Indians, who were foremost in the pursuit
text has Indians who, with misplaced comma
[439] The General had only time to take his sword and mount the horse of a woman
[If this means the General had to ride sidesaddle, we have a pretty entertaining mental picture.]
[443] our reserve . . . was rather numerous, and commanded much respect from the Puntanos
[I can’t tell if he is, or is not, being satirical in this description of a “reserve” made up of women and prisoners.]
[444] to incorporate himself with the Mendocinos, Sanjuanos, and Puntanos
comma after “Mendocinos” missing
[446] Bedoya, who was governador intendente, and now commanded in chief in Cordova
[“Commanded in chief” sounds odd, but the construction will recur in a later Appendix—as well as in the Brazil journal.]
[448] from Buenos Ayres to Chile
text has Chili
[The spelling “Chili” is by no means unusual elsewhere, but this book always spells it “Chile”.]
[449] this lady’s frame was too delicate long to endure the fatigues of a forced march
[On the previous page she was an Amazon. Make up your mind, William.]
[450 Footnote] Enclosures, the hedges of which were made of the Cactus opuntia.
[Now Opuntia ficus-indica (by way of Linnaeus’s Cactus ficus-indica), having racked up several dozen binomials before botanists figured out it is all the same plant. In English it is the Barbary fig—or Indian fig, mission cactus, prickly pear, tuna cactus and so on.]
[451] the ideas which were conveyed to us in Father Guiraldes’ mission
text has Guiraldis’
[Although the author despises Guiraldes, I don’t think he misspelled his name on purpose.]
[456] but was soon beaten and put to the route
spelling unchanged: expected rout
[460] had sent 400 horses to a potrera
[A paddock, it turns out.]
[461] Having came within pistol-shot of the enemy
text unchanged: expected Having come
the men being under the galling fire of the enemy but at a few yards’ distance
text unchanged: expected at but
[466] particularly to his son; whom he ordered to be sent to England or the United States, when he should have attained his seventh year
[Didn’t happen. The son in question, José Miguel Carrera Fontecilla (1821–1860) was educated at the Chilean military academy. Following family tradition, he eventually found himself on the wrong side of a civil war, and was sentenced to death. Instead he escaped to Peru, where he died of natural causes.]
EXTRACTS
from the
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN VICE-ADMIRAL LORD COCHRANE AND THE VICEROY PEZUELA.
(Referred to in p. 46. of the Introduction.)
This correspondence began March 4th, 1819, on account of the prisoners of Chile detained in Peru, who were extremely ill used. In the first letter are the following expressions, used by Lord C. in his remonstrance to the Viceroy:—
“The undersigned, neither according to the orders of the supreme government of Chile, whose cause he prides himself on having adopted and supported, nor according to his own principles, can ever permit himself to make war otherwise than in that liberal manner prescribed by the enlightened manners of the age, and consecrated by the practice of civilised nations. But at the same time, he thinks it a duty to declare, that if the irregular conduct of the enemies of his government should force him to adopt a principle of retaliation, he will not hesitate to impose silence on the best sentiments of our nature, and to follow with firmness those measures which have taught even barbarians to respect the rights of humanity.”
The Viceroy’s answer to the letter, from which the above extract is made, defends himself, from the charge of any unusual severity to the prisoners; and justifies severity, if such were employed, on the ground that the Spanish government treated as rebels and pirates all persons taken in arms against the King, and under banners not recognised by regular governments. He then proceeds:—
473“The regulating principles of the proceedings of the Viceroy shall always be those of such gentleness and condescension, as shall not derogate from the dignity of his official situation; and he will not now comment on the occupation of a nobleman of Great Britain, a country in alliance with the Spanish people, employing himself in commanding the naval forces of a government hitherto unacknowledged by any nation on the globe.”
The Admiral’s second letter, dated the 7th March, begins by proving the truth of the accusations against the Peruvian government of cruel treatment to the prisoners; and then proceeds to quote the different codes of maritime laws, from that of Rhodes downwards, to show that the subjects of a regular government independent de facto, are not to be treated as pirates, notwithstanding that the mother country may not have recognised its legitimacy, and giving as instances the conduct of the various nations of Europe at the time of the emancipation of North America. He then refers to his own proceedings on the coast of Peru, leaving to time the manifestation of their result.
“Meantime,” he says, “His Excellency the Viceroy does well not to make any comment on the employment of a British nobleman in the great cause of Southern America. A British nobleman is a free man, capable of judging between right and wrong, and at liberty to adopt a country and a cause which aim at restoring the rights of oppressed human nature. Without failing in any duty, and without incurring any species of responsibility, Lord Cochrane was honourably competent to adopt the cause of Chile with the same freedom with which he refused the offered station of high admiral of Spain, which was made to him by the Spanish ambassador in London.”
His Lordship then anew proposes the exchange of the prisoners of the brig Maypu for those he has on board the squadron.
The Viceroy’s reply evades present compliance with the proposed exchange of prisoners, and artfully endeavours to convince Lord Cochrane, that the British government, so far from being favourable to the cause of South American emancipation, is inimical to it; and points his attention to the proclamations forbidding the enlistment of soldiers and sailors in foreign services, and to the conduct of the French government on the occasion. He says, that 474 though the neutrality of the British commanders in the Pacific, may be in obedience to their government, &c. &c.; yet,
“To suppose that because a few provinces, legitimately belonging to a monarchy, find themselves independent de facto, that they have a right to nationize (nacionalizer) as if they had arrived at the rank of acknowledged governments, is a frenzy offensive to the moral sense of all society, and a conclusion as equivocal as unjust.”
And then goes on to maintain that the Chilian and Buenos Ayrian ships of war are pirates, &c.
Lord Cochrane writes his last letter on this subject, on the 17th March, 1819. In it he returns to the subject of the prisoners, and regrets the rejection of his terms by the Viceroy, no less than the mistaken views which cause the desolation of South America; insists on the real nature of the neutrality of his own country, and tells him that nothing but an act of parliament could legally prevent his countrymen from embracing any cause they pleased to support.
I had intended to have given literal translations of the greater part of these letters; but on more mature thought, it appears to me that the above abstract and extracts are sufficient in this place. If, hereafter, a more detailed history of this part of the Great South American struggle should be necessary, the correspondence will then serve as an illustration of the principles and ideas which were entertained by the contending parties, and will account for much that would otherwise appear either improbable or impossible.
that liberal manner prescribed by the enlightened manners of the age, and consecrated by the practice of civilised nations
[. . . but not codified as the Geneva Convention(s) until various dates between 1864 and 1949.]
The following proclamation I print, partly because it shows the views held out by the revolutionary chiefs to the natives, partly because there are few printed specimens of the ancient language of the Incas:—
Brothers and Countrymen! The day of the freedom of America is arrived; and from the Mississippi to Cape Horn, comprehending nearly half the globe, the independence of the New World is proclaimed. Mexico is in arms; Caraccas triumphs; Santa Fé is organising and receiving large armies; Chile and Buenos Ayres have reached the goal of their career,—they enjoy the fruits of their liberty; and are considered by the nations of the universe, who emulously bring to them the products of their industry, their improvements, their weapons, and even their hands; giving worth to our fruits, and developing our talents. Employments, honours, and riches, are already distributed among ourselves, and are no longer the patrimony of our oppressors.
Meanwhile, though sweet liberty marches either in peace or in victory through the regions of the South, she is obliged to suspend her beneficent and majestic steps from the plains of Quito to Potosi, and to change her double influence for the affliction and the grief occasioned by the ravages of the Spaniards in Cochabamba, Puno, La Paz, Cuzco, Guamanga, Quito, and other provinces of our delicious country. There remain the tombs and the illustrious manes of Pumacagua, Angulo, Camargo, Cabezas, and so many other heroes, who now, as tutelary angels, solicit your happiness and independence before the throne of the Most High:—there offer up your 476 vows with ours against the impious policy with which the Spaniard, after murdering you, drags away your sons to fight against their brethren, who are struggling for the liberty of their country; and oblige us to destroy one another in order to rivet our chains.
But the hour destined by the God of justice and mercy for the happiness of Peru is arrived, and your brethren in Chile have hastened to make their utmost sacrifices in order to protect you by a respectable squadron; which, guarding your coasts, will present aid to you wherever it is called for by your necessities or by the sacred voice of liberty. A large army, composed of the brave soldiers of Chacabuco and Maypu, destined to secure the possession of your right, will also occupy your territory.
Peruvians! These are the pacts and conditions on which Chile, in presence of the Supreme Being, and calling on all nations to witness, and to revenge their violation, will front death and toil to save you.—You shall be free and independent: you shall frame your government and your laws by the sole and spontaneous will of your representatives. No influence, civil or military, direct or indirect, shall be exercised by these your brothers over your social institutions. You shall dismiss the armed force which is going to protect you the moment you wish it; and no pretext of your peril or your safety shall serve to keep it there without your will. No military division shall ever occupy a free town, unless called for by its magistrates; and those peninsular opinions and parties which may have existed before your liberation, shall neither be punished by us nor by our help; and, ready to destroy the armed force which resists your rights, we pray that you will forget all offences before the day of your glory, and reserve severer justice for obstinacy and future insult.
Sons of Manco Capac, Yupanqui, and Pachacutec! These venerable shades are the witnesses of the conditions which the people of Chile offer you by my voice, and of the alliance and fraternity we seek, in order to consolidate our independence, and to defend our rights in the day of peril.
Bernardo O’Higgins.
Hermanos y compatriotas: ha llegado el dia de la libertad de América, y desde el Misisipí hasta el Cabo de Hornos en una zona que casi ocupa la mitad de la tierra se proclama la independencia del Nuevo mundo. Mégico 477 lucha; Caracas triunfa; Santa Fé organiza y recibe considerables egércitos, Chile y Buenos Ayres tocan el término de su carrera, gozan los frutos de su libertad, y considerados por las Naciones del Universo, se presentan éstas á porfia conduciendoles el producto de su industria, sus luces, sus armas, y aun sus brazos; dando nuevo valor à nuestros frutos, y desarrollando nuestros talentos. Ya los empleos, el honor y las riquezas se distribuyen entre nosotros, y no son el patrimonio de nuestros opresores.
Entretanto, y cuando la dulce libertad marcha, ó tranquila ó victoriosa por las regiones del Sud, se vé precisada a suspender sus beneficos y magestuosos pasos, desde las campañas de Quito á Potosí; y á trocar su doble influjo por la afliccion y el dolor que le ocasionan los destrozos de los españoles, en Cochabamba, Puno, la Paz, Cuzco, Guamanga, Quito, y demás Provincias de nuestro delicioso suelo. Alli divisa las tumbas y los ilustres manes de Pumacagua, Angulo, Camargo, Cabezas, y otros tantos héroes, que hoy son los genios protectores, que ante el trono del Altisimo reclaman vuestra felicidad é independencia: alli presentan vuestros votos y los nuestros contra la impia politica con que el español, despues de degollaros, arrancan vuestros hijos para pelear con sus hermanos, que luchan por la libertad de estos paises, obligandonos á destruirnos mutuamente para remachar nuestras cadenas.
Pero llegó la época destinada por el Dios de la justicia y las misericordias á la felicidad del Perú, y vuestros hermanos de Chile han apurado sus últimos sacrificios para protegeros con una escuadra respetable, que asegurando estas costas, os presente recursos en todos los puntos donde escuche vuestras necesidades, y el sagrado clamor de la libertad. Inmediatamente ocupará tambien vuestro suelo un respetable egército de los valientes de Maypú y Chacabuco, destinado á consolidar el goce de vuestros derechos.
Peruanos, hé aqui los pactos y condiciones con que Chile, delante del Ser Supremo, y poniendo á todas las Naciones por testigos, y vengadores de su violacion, arrostra la muerte y las fatigas para salvaros. Sereis libres é independientes, constituireis vuestro gobierno y vuestras leyes por la única, y espontanea voluntad de vuestros representantes: ninguna influencia militar ó civil, directa ó indirecta, tendran estos hermanos en vuestras disposiciones sociales: despedireis la fuerza armada que pasa á protegeros, en el momento que dispongais, sin que vuestro peligro, ó vuestra seguridad sirva de pretesto, sino lo hallais por conveniente: jamás alguna division militar ocupará un pueblo libre, sino es llamada por sus legítimos Magistrados; ni por nosostros, ni con nuestro auxilio, se castigarán las opiniones ó partidos peninsulares, que 478 hayan precedido á vuestra libertad: y prontos á destrozar la fuerza armada que resista vuestros derechos, os rogaremos, que olvideis todo agravio anterior al dia de vuestra gloria, y reserveis la mas severa justicia para la obstinacion y los futures insultos.
Hijos de Manca Capac, Yupanqui, y Pachacutec: estas sombras respetables serán los garantes de las condiciones que por mi voz os propone el Pueblo de Chile; asi como de la alianza y fraternidad, que os pedimos para consolidar nuestra mutua independencia, y defender nuestros derechos el dia del peligro.
Bernardo O’Higgins.
Llacctamasíy, Gauqueicuna: Chayamunñan punchau allpanchis cunapi samarispa guequenchis tucucunanpac. Tucuimi yachanchis Llactanchiscunaca ashuan atunmin uc Llactacunamanta Mamacochac ccallariscanmanta puchucanancama. Chayraycutacmi áshuan hatun ñocanchispa allpanchis. Hinatacmi ari llapallan samariyta munaspa Llacctanchiscunamanta aucanchis pucacuncacunata carconopac, Mexicollacctapi macanacuscancu; Caracasllacctapi, ña atipancuna; Santa Féllacctapi guatecmanta ccallarinanpac, hagua llactacunamanta ppuyo hina huñunacuscancu. Cay Chile llacctayquichispi, Buenos Ayres piguan, guauquentin urpi munanaccoc hina, atipasccanmanta samarispa, sumac causaita, ña ñucchuscaycuña. Chayta yachaspa asguan carullacctacunamanta, mamacochata chimpaspa, iman munascaicuta apamuancu, Amauttancunatapas pusamuspán, mana imatapas pacaspa, ama astaguan auccanchiscuna cutimunampac yanapahuancu. Hina tacmi apancu, caé Llacctamanta tarpuscaicuta, uíhuascaycuta, aguascaicuta, hampi coracunatapas cusicuspatacmi llacctancuman apancu. Ñan ñocaycoca manapimampas hullpuycuspa tiaícuchicuyco Apucunata, Cuscachaccunata, Quippocamayoccunata, tucuy cargoyoccunata Llacctamasinchiscunallamantatac. Chairaicun, ccollqueyco, corrííco, ñocaico uccupi cutí ticraspa manaña lloccincho España llacctaman.
Hinam ari, cay misqui cusicausaita auccanchiscunata, allpac sonccompi chincarichispa, ña samarispana, ña cusicuspaña, chay manchay llactayquichispi guequencuanmi pampata chaschuscan guauqueiquicuna, ñicta uyarispa, cusi 479 causaita saquespa, ña ñacarec ña maccanacoc, Quitollactamanta, Potosíilactacama cai munacc sonccoycu aisariguaycuña. Ymamantac rinqui mosocmanta ñaccarcc ñispa tapuiycunacuicu. Piñacuspan cutichihuancu, guauquenchiscuñan manchay, manchayta, manan yanapacninta tariita atispa, guañuyllahuañan ampinacuncu Cochabampi, Punopi, Chuquiagopi, Coscopi, Chuquisacapi, Quitopi, Guamangapi llapan ucchuy llacctacunapihuampas: Chay yaguargueque ccochapin tuituscan Pumaccaguac tullun, Angulocpa, Camargocpa, Cabezaspa, José Gabriel Tupamarucpa; manan yuyaí canchu chaícchica manchaypuitu Apucunac sutimpac. Caicunac muchaínintacmi Pachaccamácpa ccayllampi cutichimuanchis aucanchiscunamanta quesppinanchispac. Cutirisun ari, muchaicusun ari imainan Apunchiscunata uyarin, hinatacc ari ñocanchistapachas nyarihuasun. Hina ari tucucunca putinanchis, hanchinanchis, mana astaguan naccahuasunchisñachu, manaña guauquenchista guaguanchista soncconchismanta quechuspa, ñoccanchis ucullapitac macanacunampac fiierro guascacunahuan guatahuasunchu; manchay mana sacsac pucacuncacunari mana astaguan camachihuasunñachu.
Chayamusunquichisñan Diosninchispa ccuyayninhuan camasoan mitta, paipa Justiciamraycu cusi causacunayquichispac Peruanocuna; ñocaicu guauqueyqui Chilenocunari, ñatacmin camaricuscaicuña, mana guañuytapas ñahuicupi cascactin manchaspa, cancunata yanapanaycuraycu, uccuicumanta horcorcocuspa Mamacochapi pahuac guasicunata hascata churaicu, sinchi atuchac hillapayocmi sapa guasi, atunmanta huchuicama. Cai guasicunan auccanchiscuna amocta chincarichispa, íman mnnascanchista maipi ccactinchispas, hagua llacctamanta aparcamonca. Paycunaraicutacmin cusi causaininchis mana tucucuncachu. Ñatacmi Chacabucopi, Maypopi auccanchiscunata ccosñita hina chincaricheccuna, chay llactaiquicunaman cachamusaccuña, chay mana casocniyquicunata ullppuycuchinampac.
Perú llacctayoccuna: Suttillantan cai quellcaipi, cai Chile llaccta rimaicusunqui, Imainan Pachacamac Diosñinchispa ccaíllampipas rimascaicuman hina: Chairaicu paipa ccaillampitacmi, tucuy hatun hagua llaccta cunac Apuncunata churaicu, mana chaina cactin, nocaicuman llapallancu cutirinancupac. Atariy ari, mana ñaccariyta, ni guañuytapas manchaspa: quespispa, cusi causaita yachaspa, samarinaiquichispac: chaipachamari cancunallamantatac Apuyquichispac accllaricunqui, ccapac Diosninchispa camachiscan simita hunttaspa; cancuna uccupi pampachanapac quellcata churanqui Amauttaiquicúnahuan: cay guauqueiquicunari cancunahuan cascaspapas maccanacoccuna, manan macanaccocunapas, manan hayccaspas allintan ruranqui, 480 manan allintachu ruranqui ñisunquichu acllacunaiqui punchaupi, ni ñaupacpi, ni quepapi, tucuy ccochuylla canca. Ripuichisña nihuactiquihis cay hatun callpanhuan maccanascupa yanapacñiíquicunata, ima punchaucha munanqui hina ripusaccu; manatacmin nocaicuri callpayocmin canqui, ú manan callpayocmin canqui ñispa cutichiscayquicuchu: manataccmin huchuy callpa, ú hatun callpapas mayquen llactayquichispipas, ña cusi tiacoctiyquichis caypi queparicusun ñiscaiquitacchu; cancunac Apuyquichis guacyactinri yuyaí chincaihuan chaipi casaccu: manatacmi ari, ñoccaicuchu, ni ñocayccoc ccallpaicuhuanchu cuscachanquichis ó manapas cusccachanquichu ñaccarichecniyquicuna pucacuncacunata, ú anansaya, ú urinsaya llaccta masiyquicunatapas: ñocaicuri yuyaiñinchis hinan camaricusaccu cunaiñiiquita suyaspa, picunapas mana hullpuycuspa camachis caiquichista ruractin huanachinaycupac, chayhuau mana ñaupa hinachu pipacpas, ni pimanpas ccumuycunquichischu: hinatac muchaicuiquichis ñaupac ñaccariscaiquichispi huchayoccunata pampachanaiquipac chay samariy punchaupi; quepaman huchallicuccunata manaña pampachaspa, asguan hatun huchata hina ucchuyllacactimpas, sinchita huanachinanchispac.
Mancoccapacpa, Tuppa-Yupanquecpa, Pachacutecpa Guaguancuna: chay manchay Apu-Yncacunac llantuntaracmi yuyaíniyman apamuni caí quellcayta hunttanaipac: cay Chilellacta runacunari simiyhuanmin rimaicusunqui, imainan llampusonco Taytacunapas ñucñu guaguancunata mascan; hinatac ari mañaichis cai cusi causai punchay ninchis chayamuspa, ama hayccacpas tutucunanpac; guequepunchau chayamoctinri, sinchi puyuan, hatun puyuhuan huñuicucuspa hina macanacunanchispac. Esccon Quilla Guarancca pusacc pachag chunca escconñioc Guata.
Bernardo O’Higgins.
“Countrymen! I do not now address you solely by the right that every free man possesses of comforting the oppressed. The events which have crowded on each other for the last nine years have conferred the solemn title by which the independent states of Chile, and the United Provinces of South America, now order me to enter your territory in defence of the cause of your independence: it is identified with their own, and with the cause of human nature; and the means entrusted to me, in order to save you, are as efficacious as appropriate to this most sacred object.
“As soon as the will to be free declared itself in any part of South America, the agents of Spanish power exerted themselves to smother the lights by which the Americans might perceive their chains. The beginning of the revolution presented a monstrous assemblage of good with evil; and in consequence of its advance, the Viceroy of Peru endeavoured to persuade you that he had been able to annihilate, in the inhabitants of Lima and its dependencies, even the soul to feel the weight and the ignominy of the yoke. The earth was shocked to see American blood shed by Americans: it doubted if the slaves were as culpable as the tyrants; or if freedom had to complain most of those whose barbarous daring invaded it, or of the slaves who had the stupid folly not to defend it. War followed, destroying the innocent country; but in spite of all the combinations of despotism, the gospel of the rights of man was preached in the midst of the confusion. Hundreds of Americans have fallen in the field of honour, or by the hands of unnatural executioners; but opinion, fortified by noble passions, must always cause its triumphs to be felt. And thus, Time, the regenerator of political societies, has brought about the great moment which must decide the problem of Peruvian sentiment and the fate of South America.
“My proclamation is not that of a conqueror, who would systematise a new slavery: the force of things has prepared this great day of your political emancipation; and I can be no other than a casual instrument of justice and an agent of destiny. Sensible of the horrors which war inflicts on humanity, I have always endeavoured to accomplish my ends in the manner most reconcileable with the true interest of the Peruvians. After a complete victory 482 on the plains of Maypu, without attending to the feelings of a most righteous vengeance on a barbarous aggressor, or the right of reprisal for the evils caused in Chile, as a complete proof of my pacific wishes I wrote to your Viceroy on the 11th of April of this year—that I felt for the situation in which he was placed; wished him to consider the extent of the resources of two states intimately united, and the superior amount of their armies; and, in a word, the inequality of the struggle which threatened him. I made him responsible to the inhabitants of the land for the effects of the war; and in order to avert them, I entreated him to call together the illustrious neighbourhood of Lima, to represent the sincere wishes of the governments of Chile and the United States; to hear their complaints and the exposition of their rights; and that the people should be freely permitted to adopt what form of government they wished; and that the spontaneous expression of the will of such an assembly should be the supreme law of my actions, &c. This liberal proposal was answered by insults and threats; and thus the order of justice as well as common safety forced me to adopt the last rational resource,—the use of a protecting force. The blood, therefore, that may be shed will rest solely on the heads of the tyrants and their proud satellites. Nor were my intentions less apparent after the day of Chacabuco. The Spanish army was entirely routed: Chile became completely an independent state; and its inhabitants began to enjoy the security of their property and the fruits of liberty. This example of itself is the surest warrant for my conduct. Tyrants accustomed to disfigure facts, in order to kindle the torch of discord, have not been ashamed to say, that the moderation observed by the victorious army in Chile was for its own interest. In God’s name, let it be so! For what is that but to say, that our interest is one with that of the people? Is not this a fresh guarantee, and a new reason for confidence? Doubtless this army will root out the tyrants of Lima; and the result of its victory will be, that the capital of Peru will, for the first time, see her sons united, freely electing their government, and appearing on the face of the globe in the rank of nations. The union of the three states will teach Spain to feel her weakness, and all other powers to esteem and respect us. The first steps of your political existence being secured, a central congress, composed of the representatives of the three states, will give to the organisation of each new stability; and the constitution of each, as well as its perpetual alliance and federacy, will be established in the midst of universal harmony, intelligence, and hope. The annals of the world do not record any revolution more holy in its end, more 483 necessary to man, and more august on account of the union of hearts and hands.
“Then let us proceed, confident in the destiny that Heaven has prepared for us. Under the empire of new laws and new powers, the very activity of the revolution will be converted into the wholesomest engagement to undertake every kind of toil that may maintain and multiply the products and benefits of society. On the first return of peace, those very ravages that spring from the great political convulsion of this continent will be like the lavas of the volcano, which become a principle of fecundity in the very fields which they have overwhelmed. So your plains will be covered with all the riches of nature; your multiplied cities will adorn themselves with the splendour of science and the magnificence of art; and commerce will freely spread its movements over the immense space that nature has assigned to us.
“Americans! The victorious army of an insolent tyrant can only cast terror over the people subject to his triumphs; but the legions I have the honour to command, forced to make war against the tyrants they combat, can only promise friendship and protection to brethren whom victory is about to free from tyranny. I engage my most sacred honour, that this promise shall be scrupulously fulfilled. I have declared to you my duties and designs: your conduct will tell us if you will fulfil yours, and deserve the illustrious name of true sons of your country.
“European Spaniards! My proclamation is not that of your ruin: I come not into this land to destroy it. The object of the war is to preserve and facilitate the increase of the fortune of every peaceable and honest man. Your good fortune is bound up with the prosperity and independence of America; your misfortunes will be the effect of your own obstinacy: you know it. Spain now finds herself reduced to the last degree of imbecility and corruption: the resources of that kingdom are dilapidated; the state is charged with a monstrous debt; and, what is worse, terror and distrust form the basis of public morals, and have forced the nation to become melancholy, pusillanimous, stupid, and mute. The freedom of Peru alone can offer to you a safe country. To the intimate ties which unite you to the Americans you have only to add your wishes and your conduct, in order to form a great family of brothers. Respect for persons, for property, and for the holy Roman Catholic religion, are the sentiments of the United Provinces. I assure you of them in the most solemn manner.
“Inhabitants of Peru! The eyes of more than three parts of the world are 484 upon your present actions. Will you confirm the suspicions which have arisen against you during the last nine years? If the world sees that you know how to profit by this happy moment, your revolution will be as important to it as the united force of the whole continent. Value it, for the sake of the millions of generations which may come after you. When the rights of man, so long lost sight of in Peru, shall be re-established, I shall congratulate myself on the power of belonging to institutions which may consecrate them: I shall have satisfied the dearest wish of my heart, and have achieved the noblest work of my life.
“Jose de San Martin.
“Head-quarters, Santiago de Chile,
Nov. 13. 1818.”
“Liberty, the daughter of Heaven, is about to descend on your beautiful country; and under her shadow you will take that high rank among the nations of the earth to which your opulence entitles you. The Chilian squadron, which is in sight of your ports, is only the precursor of the expedition which is to secure your independence. The moment wished for by all generous hearts is approaching. The territory of Chile, and its adjacent isles, now breathe freely, delivered from the yoke of the oppressor. Our naval forces are able to contend with those of all Spain, as well as against her commerce; and in them you will find a firm support.
“It will be an inscrutable enigma to posterity, that the enlightened Lima, far from favouring the progress of Columbian independence, has endeavoured to paralyse the noble and generous efforts of her brethren, and to deprive them of the enjoyment of their imprescriptible rights. But it is time to wash out this stain, and to avenge the innumerable outrages that you have received from despotism as the reward of your blindness. Cast your eyes on the ruin that has been spread by the tyrants over your delicious land: you will see it engraven in indelible characters, in the depopulation, the want of industry, the monopolies, the hard oppression, and the contempt under which you have so long groaned. Run to your arms; and overturning, in your just indignation, the colossus of despotism which weighs you down, you may arrive at the height of prosperity.
485“Do not imagine that we mean to attempt to treat you as a conquered people. Such an idea could never have entered the heads of any but the enemies of our common happiness. We only aspire to see you free and happy. You will frame your own government, electing the form most congenial to your habits, your situation, and your inclinations: you will be your own legislators; and consequently you will constitute a nation as free and as independent as ourselves.
“What are you waiting for, Peruvians? Hasten to break your chains. Come; and at the tombs of Tupac-Amaru, and Pumacahua, of those illustrious martyrs to liberty, swear to the contract which is to secure your independence and our eternal friendship.
“Bernardo O’Higgins.”
“Countrymen!—Yes, I will flatter myself that it cannot be long before I give you this delightful name. The echoes of the cry of liberty in South America have resounded even to the shores of cultivated Europe, more especially to those of Britain; and I could not resist the mighty temptation to defend a cause which, interesting human nature, involving the happiness of half the globe, and of millions of generations, has decided me to take in it a personal and effective part. The republic of Chile has consequently entrusted her maritime forces to my direction and command. The dominion of the Pacific is consigned to them, as well as the co-operation in the long-wished-for bursting of the chains which have oppressed you. Doubt not of the near approach of that great day on which, together with the dominion of tyranny, the degrading condition of Spanish colonies which now disgraces you will be at an end; and you will occupy among the nations that noble place to which you are called by your population, your riches, your geographical position, and the course of circumstances. But you must be our coadjutors in preparing for success, in removing obstacles, and opening to yourselves the path of glory; secure of the cordial assistance of the government of Chile, and of your true friend,
“Cochrane.”
The above proclamations were published before the sailing of the great expedition to Peru. They are referred to in the Introduction, and show the hopes held out to the Peruvians by the invading chiefs.
486The violation of all the promises made in these proclamations by San Martin, produced that spirit of disgust against him which forced him to fly from Lima. It is curious, that within a very few days of his flight, the following address to Lord Cochrane was sent by the new government of Lima:—
“In consideration of the services rendered to Peruvian freedom by the Right Honourable the Lord Cochrane,—owing to whose genius, worth, and bravery, the Pacific is freed from the insults of enemies, and the standard of freedom is planted on the shores of the South,—
“Resolves,
“That the Supreme Junta shall, in the name of the nation, offer to Lord Cochrane, Admiral of the Chilian squadron, its most sincere acknowledgments of gratitude for his achievements in favour of the people of Peru, heretofore under the tyranny of military despotism, but now the arbiter of its own fate.
“The Supreme Junta, on being informed of this resolution, will do what is needful for carrying it into effect; causing it to be printed, published, and circulated.
“Given in the Chamber of Congress at Lima,
27th September, 1822.
(Signed) “Xavier de Lima Pizarro, President.
(Signed) “Jose Sanches Carion, Secretary.
(Signed) “Francisco Xavier Marcateque, Secretary.
“We order the same to be presently executed.
(Signed) “Jose de la Mar,
(Signed) “Felipe Antonio Alvarado,
(Signed) “El Conde de Veste Florida.
“By order of his Excellency,
“Francisco Valdivieso.”
Lord Cochrane had the satisfaction of receiving the above just before he left Chile.
The passage on pages 478-480 is in Quechua with Spanish orthography. Double “cc-” is the consonant now written as “q”; other letters tend to have their Spanish values. The author’s reference to “ancient language” sounds ominous, but the Quechua family continues to have millions of native speakers—more than any other indigenous American language.
The printer doesn’t seem to have had access to capital Ñ; I’ve substituted it where appropriate. A quick trip to the article “Cases” in Savage’s Dictionary of the Art of Printing indicates that capital letters with diacritics of any kind were hard to come by. (His examples, intended for English, don’t include tilde, but there’s generally a lower-case ç cedilla somewhere.) You can tell the printer is English, because digraphs like “ll” and “cc” are routinely split at line-break although each represents a single sound.
the Spaniard, after murdering you
text has mur-/during at line break
Hatun Chile Llactacc Apunmi, quellcamuyqui: Tucuy hatun Quichua, Aymara, Puquina Llacctacunapi causaccunaman, tucuy, tucuyman.
[While the English and Spanish versions refer generically to “Natives (Naturales) of Peru”, the Quechua lists them by name. Quechua and Aymara are widely spoken in Peru and neighboring countries; Puquina (Pukina) is a now-extinct language used by the Incas.]
Chayamusunquichisñan Diosninchispa ccuyayninhuan camasoan mitta, paipa Justiciamraycu cusi causacunayquichispac Peruanocuna
[I can see where the Spanish would hesitate to let any Quechua word be used for the Christian God—but what was the problem with “justice”?]
íman mnnascanchista maipi ccactinchispas
[“mnna-” doesn’t seem phonetically plausible, but I don’t know Quechua, so better not mess with it. ]
I wish she would explain the italicized passages in this and the following section. The text comes out looking like the product of computerized typesetting when someone forgot to close the <i> markup.
like the lavas of the volcano
text has lavas of / of the at line break
you will take that high rank among the nations of the earth to which your opulence entitles you
[Or, if you prefer, you will assume among the Powers of the Earth that separate and equal Station to which the laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle you.]
EXTRACTS
from the
Correspondence printed in the Government Gazette of Chile, Feb. 24th, 1821,
between
THE BRITISH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND ZENTENO, THE CHILIAN MINISTER OF MARINE,
ON THE SUBJECT OF THE BLOCKADE OF THE PORTS OF PERU.
The British Commander’s letter is dated Buenos Ayres, September 7th, 1820. It begins by mentioning the news of blockade transmitted by Captain Searle. It goes on to say—
“The British government knows very well that a blockade is not illegal on account of its mere extension; but the illegality depends, according to the law of nations, on the adequacy of the blockading force to maintain the ports and coasts it pretends to blockade in so constant a state of blockade, that no ship may enter or sail without eminent peril of being detained; that if the force be inadequate to maintain the blockade generally, that is to say, in all its parts, it becomes null and of no effect; and the blockading ships may not form it partially where they may chance to find themselves, as I have pointed out in the instructions given to Captain Searle, and of which a copy was sent to Your Excellency.
“In consequence of the neutrality which His Britannic Majesty wishes to observe between the contending parties in South America, His Majesty’s subjects have been allowed to establish friendly correspondences with the people of Chile: nor can I resist the right which the government of Chile has to establish and maintain blockades, on the footing that other belligerents establish and maintain them consistently with the principles acknowledged by the law of nations. But it is clear, that if the state of Chile claims the exercise of this right, it must submit to exercise it within the limits, and subject to the restrictions, imposed by political rights.
488“According to these principles, the alleged blockade of the coast in question must be considered and held absolutely illegal, in the opinion of the government of His Britannic Majesty; so that it cannot operate on the ships or property of His Majesty’s subjects, without a violation of the law of nations. I consequently feel obliged to protest formally against the legality of the blockade, for the reasons above stated. I hope that Your Excellency will have the goodness to order your decree of blockade to be so modified and altered; and that such orders shall be given to the commander of your squadron as shall prevent any kind of coercion not permitted by the law of nations against the British ships and property, under pretence of keeping up the blockade.
“I am sure I need not repeat here to Your Excellency the assurance of my ardent wish to preserve, as heretofore, our amicable relations with the government of Chile and its local authorities, so necessary for the protection of the subjects of His Britannic Majesty who are engaged in lawful commerce, and to maintain that neutrality which His Majesty wishes should be observed by all those acting under his orders.
“I have the honour to subscribe myself,
“With the highest respect and consideration,
“Your Excellency’s most obedient humble servant,
(Signed) “T. W. Hardy,
“Commodore and Commander-in-chief of the ships and vessels of His Britannic Majesty on the coast of South America.”
To this Zenteno answers, on the 6th of December, 1820. His letter begins by acknowledging the receipt of Sir Thomas’s letter, and saying that of course neutral property would be respected according to the law of nations; and his opinions on that head quite agree with the English commander’s wishes. Zenteno then says,—
“But even if this agreeable coincidence had not been, as it is, sufficient to satisfy the pretensions of Your Excellency in all respects, the prosperity that has attended our arms has, in fact, set at rest all question and cause of doubt. Our petty force, perhaps diminished in apparent magnitude by distance, was not believed sufficient to maintain the blockade in all its extent; yet it has had the glory of setting at liberty, and of placing in the hands of the American independents, all the ports and coast of Peru, including Guayaquil, and also much of the interior of the country, excepting only the port of Callao; and 489 moreover, from the very centre of that port, from under the fire of its batteries, the Spanish ship of war Esmeralda, of 40 guns, has been cut out by our naval forces; and our strength thereby augmented, while that of the enemy is reduced to nothing.
The rest of the letter is filled with professions of friendship to the British nation and the British commander, and is signed by order of the Supreme Director.
“Jose Ignacio Zenteno.”
There was no farther question about the right to blockade.
If I understand the opening paragraph correctly, blockades are only legal under “the law of nations” if they are completely effective. All right, then.
the prosperity that has attended our arms has, in fact, set at rest
“i” in “in” invisible
It is always a melancholy task to record ingratitude; but the consequences of that shown both by the Protector of Peru, and the Director of Chile, have been so fatal to their own power, that it may serve as a warning to the future governors of those new countries. Happily the good cause must survive and flourish ’spite of those hindrances caused by the base passions of individuals. The good and heroic who suffer will, as much as is in human nature, disregard their own personal disgusts; reflecting, that scarcely in any case has the founder of a great general good enjoyed the benefit of his own labours; but posterity profits by them, and that secondary immortality, fame on earth, will pursue their steps.
I venture, therefore, to print the following address to the government of Chile from the officers of the squadron; convinced that while it states their services and grievances, endured at the hands of individuals, the ill will not be attributed to the sacred cause in which it was suffered, but to the unfortunate circumstances that placed such a man as San Martin in a situation to curb the generous efforts of our countrymen in the cause of South America, and to over-rule the timid but well-meaning rulers of Chile. The opinions entertained by Peru and Chile are sufficiently proved in the address from the government of Lima to Lord Cochrane, and by the notice of the squadron in the Chilian state paper given in the Postscript to the Journal.
“We, the captains of the Chilian navy, beg leave to lay most respectfully before the government a brief statement of our services, privations, and sufferings; not with the view of enhancing our merits, but that justice may be done, and that the pay and stipulated emoluments to which we are entitled may no longer be withheld, and that our minds may be tranquillized as to 491 future fate; anxiety and doubt as to which, being of all things most distressing.
“First, then, it is known that since the capture of the Isabel, the dominion of the Pacific has been maintained by the Chilian navy; and that such have been the exertions of our commander and ourselves, that with Chileno crews, unaccustomed to the arts of navigation, and a few foreign seamen whom we alone could controul, not only the shores of this land have been effectually protected from injury or insult, but the maritime ports of the enemy have been closely blockaded in the face of a superior naval force. By means of the navy the important province, fortifications, and port of Valdivia, were added to the republic. By the same means the Spanish power in Peru was brought into contempt, and the way opened for the invasion of that country; which, so far as the navy was concerned, was crowned with success. The ships of war of the enemy have all fallen into our hands, or have been compelled by our means to surrender. Their merchant vessels have been seized from under their batteries; whilst the Chilian transports and trading vessels have been afforded such perfect security, that no one, even of the smallest, has been compelled to haul down its flag. Among these achievements, that of the Esmeralda has reflected lustre on the Chilian marine equal to any thing recorded in the naval chronicles of ancient states, greatly adding to its importance in the eyes of Europe; and by the vigilance of the naval blockade, the fortifications of Callao were compelled to surrender.
“The happy event of such surrender, so long hoped for, was deemed by all to complete our labours in Peru, and entitle us, if not to a remuneration from that state, as in the case of those officers who abandoned the Chilian service, yet at least to a share of the valuable property taken by our means; as awarded under similar circumstances by other states, who, by experience, are aware of the benefit of stimulating individuals by such rewards for great enterprises for the public good. But, alas! so far from either of these modes of remuneration being adopted, even the pay so often promised was withheld, and food itself was denied, so that we were reduced to a state of the greatest privation and suffering; so great indeed, that the crew of the Lautaro abandoned their vessel for want of food, and the seamen of the squadron, natives as well as foreigners, were in a state of open mutiny, threatening the safety of all the vessels of the state. We do not wish to claim merit for not relieving ourselves from this painful situation by an act that would have been of a doubtful nature as to its propriety; namely, by acquiescence in the intentions 492 of the general commanding in chief the expeditionary forces; who, having declared us officers of Peru, offered, through his aides-de-camp Colonel Paroissieu and Captain Spry, honours and estates to those who should in that capacity promote the further views he then entertained. Nor do we envy those who received estates and honours. But, having rejected these, we may fairly claim the approbation of government for providing the squadron of Chile with provisions and stores at Callao, out of monies in our hand justly due for the capture of the Esmeralda, when such supplies had been refused by the said general and commander-in-chief. We may justly claim similar approbation for having repaired the squadron at Guayaquil, and for equipping and provisioning it for the pursuit of the enemy’s frigates Prueba and Vengauza, which we drove from the shores of Mexico in a state of destitution to the shores of Peru; and if they were not actually brought to Chile, it was because they were seized by our late general and commander-in-chief, and appropriated in the same manner as he had previously intended with respect to the Chilian squadron itself. We may add, that every endeavour, short of actual hostilities with the said general, was made on our part, to obtain the restitution of those valuable frigates to the government of Chile. In no other instance throughout the whole course of our proceedings has any dispute arisen but what has terminated favourably to the interests of Chile, and to the honour of her flag; and we may justly observe, that while private friendships have been preserved with the naval officers of foreign powers, no point has been conceded that we could justly maintain, consistently with the maritime laws of civilised nations; by which our conduct has been scrupulously guided, even in its exercise towards the subjects of our native land. And it is no less true, that such has been the caution with which we have acted, that no act of violence contrary to the law of nations, nor any improper exercise of power, can in any one instance be laid to our charge.
“We may add, that during our connection with the squadron, the Chilian flag has waved in triumph, and with universal respect, from the southern extremity of the nation to the Californian shore; while the population, and the value of all property in and contiguous to the naval port, have been increased at least three fold; and the commerce and the revenue it produces have augmented in a far greater proportion: which commerce, so productive to the state, might, without the protecting aid of its navy, be annihilated by a few of those miserable privateers which the terrors of its name alone deters from approaching.
493“The period has now arrived at which it is essential for the wellbeing of the service in general, and indispensable to our private concerns, that our arrears, so long uncalled for, should be liquidated; and, far as it is from our desires to press our claims upon the government, yet we cannot abstain from so doing, in justice to the state we have the honour to serve, as well as to ourselves: because the want of regularity in the internal affairs of a naval service is productive of relaxation of discipline, seeing that just complaint cannot be repressed, nor the complainants chastised; and because discontent spreads like a contagious disease, and paralyses the system.
“If the Supreme Government would permit us to entreat their attention to the relative conduct of Great Britain and Spain in the management of their naval affairs, and the respective effects of such different management to the interests of those nations, we might notice the extraordinary fact, that the navy of Spain, though well equipped, provisioned, and stored, and though navigated under scientific officers, and with seamen equally conversant in nautical affairs with those of England; yet, from being placed under the superintendance of military and civil governors, and the total want of stimulus to individual exertion, did never, from the commencement of the Spanish wars with Britain, capture from the numerous fleets, squadrons, and detached vessels of that nation, which were intercepting their commerce and blockading their ports, one single ship of war of any description whatsoever. Spain allowed no reward for the capture of ships of war; vainly imagining that large bodies of men might, for successive periods of years, be made to undergo hardships and privations, and to encounter dangers and death, for no other reward than their provisions, and that pittance in the shape of pay which they could as readily obtain by following the safe and ordinary, and comparatively easy, avocations of life: while, on the other hand, it has been the policy of England to pay to her navy the entire pecuniary value of all its prizes, ships, fortifications, and captures of every description; and not only so, but even to grant, as a further stimulus to exertion, an additional bounty out of the public treasury.
“The consequence is, that England, though a small island, derives from the maritime strength a power and influence in the affairs of the world extending to every extremity of the globe, while Spain has not only lost most of her foreign acquisitions, but almost her own existence as an independent nation. It would seem, however, from the last account of the proceedings of the government of that country, that the importance of reviving a maritime 494 power, which their own negligence and impolitic parsimony has brought to decay, is now clearly perceived; and that they even propose to send out a respectable naval force to the Pacific. When it is considered that the squadron of Chile is promised only a moiety of the prize-money, the whole being granted to the English navy, and without any of that emolument in the shape of bounty-money which is allowed in England; and when it is also considered that Chile has been at no cost in our professional education, but has been totally exempt from expense in rearing and educating officers for her naval service, an expense to which England and all other naval powers are subject;—it is not too much to require that our stipulated pay and prize-money, which have been so long withheld, should immediately be paid. We reject, with indignation, the opinion attempted to be impressed on the minds of the officers and men by agents on shore—that every public mark of approbation, of reward, and even our pay, have been withheld in consequence of a notification from the Peruvian government, that unless the accusations against those who have remained faithful to Chile is attended to with a view to justify that government in the measures they pursued, the government of Chile will incur the displeasure of those who have made themselves powerful at their expense. But though we indignantly reject such an opinion, we cannot help observing, that the exertions made in Peru to rear a navy, the measures they have taken, and the success they have had, present a remarkable contrast to that disregard and neglect which are here so prevalent, and which tend so fatally to the downfal of a navy already reared. And if we, the captains, were longer to abstain from informing the government that such is the state of the ships of war that no operation of any difficulty or danger could be commanded, and that even their safety, if ordered to sea, would be endangered, we should not continue to deserve that confidence which it has ever been our ambition to merit. Nor, if we were to dwell solely on our own claims to the attention of the government, should we acquit ourselves of our duty.
“Permit us, therefore, to call to your notice, that since our return to Valparaiso with our naked crews, even clothes were withheld until the fourth month had expired; and during all this period no payment was made: whereby the destitute seamen and marines could not procure blankets or ponchos, or any covering to protect them from the cold of the winter, so much more severely felt on returning from the hot climates in which they had been for nearly three years employed.
495“The two months’ pay which was offered the other day to the seamen could not now effect any such purpose, the same, and more, being due to the pulperia-men; to whose benefit, and not that of the seamen, it must have immediately accrued. Judge, then, of the irritation produced by such privations, and the impossibility of relieving them by such inadequate payment; and whether it is possible to maintain order and discipline among men worse circumstanced than the convicts of Algiers! And we are persuaded, that we shall stand acquitted of any suspicion of giving a colouring to facts beyond reality, when we affirm, that confidence will be for ever gone, and the squadron entirely ruined, if measures of preservation are not immediately resorted to.
“With respect to the offer of one month’s pay to ourselves, after our faithful and persevering services, after undergoing privations such as never were endured in the navy of any other state, and would not have been tolerated in our own, we are afraid to trust ourselves to make any observations; but it is quite impossible that it could have been accepted under any circumstances: nor, if it had been received, would it have placed us in a better situation with respect to our arrears than if, upon our arrival here four months ago, we had actually paid three months’ salary to the government for the satisfaction of having served it, during a period of two years, with unremitting exertions and fidelity.
“In conclusion, we have most respectfully to express our ardent hope, that the Supreme Government will be pleased to take all that we have stated into their serious consideration; and more especially that they will be pleased to comply with their existing engagements to us with the same alacrity and fidelity with which we have acted towards them, the duties of each being reciprocal, and equally binding on both parties.”
England, though a small island, derives from the maritime strength a power and influence in the affairs of the world extending to every extremity of the globe, while Spain . . .
[The Navy’s much-vaunted prize-money stopped being awarded to individual ships in 1918, and was abandoned entirely in 1945. But I don’t suppose this played a very large role in the disintegration of the British Empire. For what it’s worth, casual research into the usual metrics—per capita GDP, standard of living, quality of life—indicates that 200 years after Maria Graham’s time, neither the United Kingdom nor Spain ranks in the top ten worldwide.]
Account of the useful Trees and Shrubs of Chile, drawn up for the Court of Spain, in obedience to the Royal Edict of July 20th, 1789; and forwarded with Samples of the Woods, &c. 10th December, 1792.
The Copy whence this was translated was lent me by a gentleman who was then Secretary to the Captain-General, and in whose office it had remained.
1. Abellano, Quadria Avelana, grows in the neighbourhood of Valdivia, Conception, and Maule. It grows to the height of six yards, and one in circumference; three or four yards from the ground it divides into branches of considerable size, and very leafy. Its timber lasts but a short time; it is used for bands to sieves, for oars and linings to vessels, and for turnery. The flower is like that of the hazel of Spain. The nut is six or seven lines in diameter, covered with a hard shell, containing a loose kernel of two lobes within one pellicle, as large as coffee, but rounder, oily, pleasant, and agreeable; which is eaten roasted, or ground into flour, or in sauces. The shell, powdered and boiled, is said to be good in dysentery, and the smoke is useful in faintings: chewing it is recommended to sweeten the breath.
2. Aceytunillo, is found in the districts of Conception and Colchagua; it grows eight yards high, and one thick. The fruit, which is of the size of the olive, is not eaten; but the wood is used for turnery.
3. Albarcoque, Apricot, is found all over the country, and is the same with that of Spain; but the fruit has less flavour. The wood is used for cabinet work; it is grey mottled with yellow, and rather brittle.
4. Albergilla, a kind of Cytisus, is low, delicate, but very strong; it grows in Conception.
4975. Alerce, the red Cedar of Molina. This tree is only found in Valdivia. There is a great deal of it, but it grows at a considerable distance from the port, in the skirts of the Corderillas. It yields plank of from eight to ten yards in length, from twelve to eighteen inches in breadth, and from four to six in thickness; it is brittle, being liable to split on driving nails into it. It is used to plank ships, and for floors and roofs of houses, and lasts well: for which reason it is much used, large quantities of it being embarked in Chiloe for Conception, Valparaiso, Callao, and other places on the coast. There is reason to believe that it would make excellent water-casks; because the Abbe Molina says, in his work on the natural history of Chile, published in Bologna, 1782, that the water contained in casks made of it, and carried to Europe when he went thither, far from having grown bad (while that contained in other barrels had become rotten several times), acquired a delicate taste, and was only accidentally tinged by the colour of the wood; and staves for casks have been furnished to several vessels of war, at their particular request.
6. Algarobilla, is small and delicate; the seed is used to make writing ink: it grows in greatest abundance near Rancagua and Guasco.
7. Algaroba, grows in the dry plains to the northward of the capital (St. Iago); it grows four yards high, and half a yard in thickness. It produces yellow pods, three inches long and two lines thick, which are eaten by sheep, who fatten well on them: the wood lasts very long, even under water; and is used for door-sills and thresholds, for axle-trees, and for mills.
8. Algodon Gosipium, Cotton, thrives every where, if well treated. That of Guasco and Copiapo is the best, on account of its softness and the length of its staple.
9. Almendro, Almond, is most abundant in the district of Santiago; it is exactly the same with that of Spain, and its fruit is used for the same purposes: the wood is too brittle for use.
10. Arayan, Myrtle, is found from Conception to Coquimbo. There are two principal kinds; the white, called also chequen, and the red. Each of these grows to six yards high, and half a yard in girth. The wood is little used on account of its crookedness: in medicine it is used as in Spain. Its fruit is a black berry, the flesh of which is white and rather dry. The natives make a pleasant drink from it. If it were cultivated in walks or pleasure-grounds, it would be charming by its beauty and fragrance.
11. Belloto, Achras Mammoso, is only found in the neighbourhood of 498 Quillota and that of Rancagua; its height and size are such as to allow the fishermen to make canoes of a single piece of it, and it lasts long in the water: troughs for salting meat, washing, and other domestic uses, are also formed of it. It produces bellotas, which are used for feeding pigs.
12. Boldo, Ruizia, grows in the province of Conception, and every where to the southward of Santiago; its height is eight yards, and its girth above one. A bath, with an infusion of the leaves of this tree, is good in cutaneous disorders, swelling of the glands, and rheumatism and dropsy. These leaves, bruised and heated in wine, are useful in defluxions of the head; the juice of them, dropped into the ear, alleviates pain. Its fruit is of the size of a pea; it is sweet, but has little flesh: the stones serve for making rosaries. The wood is not generally used; but it is excellent for pipes for wine, which it ameliorates. M. Frezier, quoted by the Abbe Molina, probably did not observe the inner bark of this tree carefully, especially in the season when it seems perfectly to resemble the Oriental cinnamon.
13. Bollen, Kaganeckia, abounds in Maule, Rancagua, and Quillota; it grows to the height of four or five yards, and its girth is about a foot: the wood is close-grained, and serves for turnery.
14. Canelo, South American Cinnamon, grows in every province from Valdivia to Coquimbo, and in both Juan Fernandez and Mas Afuera; it commonly grows about fifteen yards high, and is two in circumference. It is a sacred tree among the Indians; who assemble under it in their religious and political ceremonies, and also whenever they invoke their deity Pillam. Besides the superstitious purposes to which they apply this tree, they use it in medicine. The bark, which is five lines thick, is juicy, but pungent; the pith is whitish, and is about an inch in circumference. The green wood is spongy; but when dry it is hard, and fit for any use which does not expose it to water: it affords straight planks for house-timber, and preserves goods from moths. When it is burnt it emits a smoke that is hurtful to the eyes, but which has an agreeable smell, not unlike cinnamon; the name of which it has borrowed. On being cut, an aromatic gum, like incense, distils from the tree; and, exposed to the sun, the same gum forms itself into globules between the wood and the bark. The decoction of the leaves or bark of this tree is good to bathe in, in paralytic and other weakening disorders; taken into the mouth it eases the tooth-ache, cures cancer, and heals ulcers in the throat. If the decoction is very strong, it is corrosive; and applied as a lotion, is good for the itch, scurvy, and ringworm. Mixed with salt and urine, 499 it kills lice in horses, and cures the scab. A fumigation of canelo dries up pustules and ulcers of the worst kind; and finally, it is useful in spasmodic affections, convulsions, and debility of nerves. It destroys all noxious insects, and dissipates contagion: an infusion of its branches freshens and restores the colour of indigo when turned green.
15. Carbon, grows in the districts of Guasco, Coquimbo, and Cuzcuz. It is short and thick, and used for small articles of turnery; but it is incomparable for firewood: two logs, that might not each be more than three-quarters of a yard long and one-third thick, suffice to keep a stew boiling, night and day, besides other kettles, even enough for eight or ten people.
16. Cardon, Pourretia Coarctata. Its leaves are great masses, from three to four palms long, sharp, and furnished with short, sharp, curved prickles. In spring it produces a single stem from fourteen to sixteen palms high, and three or four inches thick, the bark of which is strong; but the pith is spongy, and nearly equal to cork, though less solid. Its flower is beautiful yellow, and contains a portion of fragrant and pleasant honey, with a resinous dust on the stamens. This honey applied to the ear alleviates pain and restores hearing. The decoction of the pith of the trunk is as beneficial as that of the herb caliguala: it grows all over the state.
17. Castaño, Chesnut, is the same with that of Spain; from whence it was brought. There are several orchards of them about the capital and near Quillota.
18. Chacay, is found from Conception to Coquimbo; it grows six yards high, and half a yard thick: it is thorny. The wood is incorruptible; and with it ranchos are built. The infusion of its bark is good against imposthumes.
19. Chañar, or Chilimuco, a species of Achras (Lucumo Espinoso), abounds in Coquimbo and the other northern districts. It grows eight yards high, and one thick; it is a crooked tree, and grows in very thick bushes. Its fruit is very sweet, in the shape of a date; but it gives the head-ache to those who eat of it. The wood is used for small turners’ ware; and, for want of better, it is the common wood used for building houses at Copiapo.
20. Chari, grows near Coquimbo; it is about four yards high: its wood is weak, and is only used in constructing ranchos.
21. Chilco, is a small shrub; in Conception, where it grows, the decoction of it is reckoned cooling.
22. Chonta, a wild cane found in the islands of Juan Fernandez, fourteen yards long and a quarter of a yard in diameter, at the foot; it is hollow; 500 from the solid part walking-sticks are made, which are esteemed for their weight, and their shining black and yellow spots.
23. Citron, grows in the neighbourhood of Santiago, the same with that of Spain.
24. Cypres, grows in the districts of Valdivia, Conception, Maule, Colchagua, Rancagua, and Santiago; it is very like that of Spain, and in the Cordilleras attains to the height of fifty yards, and to the circumference of three and a half: the branches begin to shoot off at the height of five or six yards. Its wood is used for beams, doors, pillars, and ornamental planking; it is more solid and tough than that of Spain, but not so fragrant, and the smell is apt to afflict the workmen employed to cut it with head-ache: it bears exposure to the sun and rain well. Its colour is red: it is resinous and fit for marine uses, being light and durable. It is aromatic; balsamic and vulnerary gum exudes from it. The decoction of its leaves is good in hypochondria, dysentery, and tooth-ache. The bruised leaves, applied as a cold plaister, stop bleeding.
25. Ciruelo, Plum-tree, the same as that of Spain; whence many varieties, which flourish in all parts of Chile, have been imported.
26. Coihue o Coibo, grows in Valdivia, Conception, and the neighbourhood of Santiago; it is very large, since it grows thirty yards high, and from four to six in thickness. It is said there is one in Chillan fifteen yards in girth. It is used for knee-timber for ships; and canoes of two yards wide are formed from it. It also affords planks and cart-wheels. The fruit is of the size and texture of a white fig, but is neither eaten nor applied to any other purpose. A fungus upwards of a foot broad, and of a semicircular form, which is the best tinder, grows on this tree. The bark makes a red dye, and is used to close wounds.
27. Coleu, Rattan, is a solid cane; the smaller one, called Butre, grows six yards long, and an inch thick: it is chiefly used instead of lath in roofing houses. That of the Cordilleras grows to ten yards in length, and two inches in thickness: it is principally used for lances. It grows abundantly in Conception, and in the heights of Valparaiso: the first kind is also found in some parts of the province of Santiago.
28. Coliguay. There are two sorts which grow from Conception to Coquimbo. It grows about four yards high, and half a yard thick. The wood is weak, and is used only for ranchos, and for firewood; when burnt it is 501 as fragrant as incense: its leaves contain an acrid milky juice, which causes blindness if it accidentally falls into the eye.
29. Copado, is diminutive on the coasts; but grows to three yards high, and furnishes thorns* nine inches long, slender, and strong as those of the quiscos (a variety of torch thistle), of which there is also abundance in the country: its stem is of no use whatever.
* These thorns are used as pins, and as knitting needles.
30. Corcolen. Both the red and the yellow variety are found in Conception; the red grows four yards high, and a quarter of a yard thick; the yellow is equally thick, but only two yards high. Its branches are beautiful, full of leaves; it is abundant of flowers, yellow, and fragrant as those of the aroma: it is fit for shrubberies. The wood is good, but has no peculiar destination.
31. Crucero (like the English caper), grows about Rancagua; it is low and slender: the plant is used as a purgative.
32. Cuculi, is found in Rancagua; its size is sufficient to furnish good plank, but it is not abundant.
33. Culen, Cytisus Arborea, grows to the height of four yards, and the thickness of a foot; it is both cultivated and wild, and very abundant: the leaves and bark are medicinal. It is used like tea, and is good for complaints in the bowels, flatulency, and indigestion; the dry leaves in powder, or the green leaves mashed, used as a plaister, are good to close wounds. A wholesome and palatable drink is made from the buds. In spring resinous globules exude from the bark, which the shoemakers use instead of wax.
34. Datil, newly discovered in Conception; so that its uses are not yet known.
35. Durasno, Peach, grows everywhere, and produces all the varieties of fruit known in Spain.
36. Espinillo, is only found in Juan Fernandez; it grows five or six yards high, and half a yard thick: the wood is extremely light, but it is useless, even as firewood, burning very dully.
37. Espino, Mimosa. It grows in abundance all over the country: it grows commonly from three to five yards high, and is as thick as that one man can barely stretch his arms round it. The wood is solid, heavy, hard, and tough, yellow without, and red at heart; it makes the best charcoal, and is exceedingly profitable to the owners of the thickets, on account of the abundant 502 firewood it furnishes. It is excellent for large enclosures for cattle, for house-timber, and for espaliers for vines, because it does not rot under ground, although the yellow part becomes worm-eaten in the air. It is also used for turnery, for cart-wheels, and for lintels for doors. The flower is like the aroma of exquisite perfume. The fruit is a black seed in a pod, very good for cattle; if bruised and spit upon, it emits so intolerable a smell, that it is necessary to burn paper in the room. It makes excellent writing-ink, being steeped in water and bruised, and mixed with copperas, and placed in the sun.*
* The same shrub grows abundantly in the Mahratta mountains.
38. Floripondio, Datura Arborea, is very common; it grows five yards high, and a quarter thick, with many branches. Its flower is beautiful, and smells very sweet; but the wood is of no use. It takes grafts of the cherimoya, which thrive well on it; but the fruit has not been tried, for fear of poison, because that of the floripondio itself destroys dogs.
39. Godocoipo, is rather a rare tree in the neighbourhood of Rancagua; it grows to the height of four yards, and the thickness of two feet: it is used by the cabinet-makers.
40. Guautru, grows in Conception, three yards high, and nine inches thick; the bark is used in hysteric affections.
41. Guayacan, is found about Coquimbo, Cuzcuz, and Quillota; grows four yards high, and half a yard thick: its solid wood is as good as box, and is veined with blue and yellow. Combs, bowls, balustrades, and other domestic articles, are made of it. The infusion of it is astringent, and is good in many complaints.
42. Guayo grows in Conception to the height of eight yards, and is one yard in girth; the wood is white, compact, tough, and fit for turnery. Sticks are made of it; which, being steeped in urine, acquire a red, shining colour. From the seed a purgative medicine is prepared; and the bark tans peltry, and dyes it red.
43. Guayun, a small rare shrub, growing on the banks of rivers. The leaf is large and whitish, and is furnished with a spine at the top. The seed is purple.
44. Guigñan, or Goigan, is found in Conception, Rancagua, and some other districts; it grows four yards high, and three quarters in circumference. Its wood is very useful. Its seed is of the size, shape, smell, taste, and strength of pepper; the infusion of it is agreeable and stomachic, useful in the beginning 503 of dropsy, and in child-bearing. From this tree an aromatic gum exudes, which is used as a cataplasm for pains in the head, strains of the muscles or tendons, and in disorders proceeding from bad air, with even better effect than the oil of Maria. The bark yields a balsamic vulnerary essence, which is useful in gout, rheumatism, sciatica, pains in the limbs, and even coldness of feet.
45. Guilli Patagua, is found in Conception, Maule, Colchagua, and Quillota; it resembles the service-tree of Spain, and grows eight yards high, and three quarters in girth: the bark serves for tanning, and is a powerful emetic. The leaf, dried before the fire, is as pleasant as the herb of Paraguay; taken green, it is used in certain disorders with effect. Its fruit is insipid, and is not used.
46. Guindo, Cherry, is like that of Spain, except that the fruit is not so good. Dried cherries are prepared in Chile for the Lima market; and cherry-water is much esteemed as a refrigerent. There are wild cherry trees in Conception, whose bark is white; their growth is like that of the cypress, and the fruit is green, with little flesh, but pleasant to the taste.
47. Fig, is exactly that of Spain.
48. Hueril, is found in various parts of the country. It is a shrub whose bark is thought the best refrigerent.
49. Junco, only found at Rancagua; it is short, delicate, and of no especial use.
50. Laurel, grows in Valdivia, Conception, Maule, and Colchagua; it likes damp situations, and strikes its roots deep. Its usual height is twenty yards, and one and a half in girth. Planks of fourteen yards in length are obtained from it, and the wood is fit for carved work, being white, pliable, and incorruptible; in the centre are dark veins, whose ramifications are pretty: it is useless in water. It is very light when dry, but will bear little weight, and is brittle. The flower, leaf, and bark, are all fragrant, and are used in colds and headaches: from the inner bark sneezing powders of great efficacy are made. The warm decoction of the leaves is good in glandular diseases, and as a bath strengthens the nerves; the fumigation with it is useful in paralytic affections, convulsions, and spasmodic complaints: a drink composed of it is useful in some severe disorders.
51. Lilen, is found in the districts of Cuzcuz and Coquimbo, six yards high and one thick; it is used in building, and is excellent for wood-work in mines.
50452, 53. Limo y Limon, Lemon and Lime, the same as in Spain.
54. Lingue, Ligue, or Linea. It grows twenty-four feet high and two thick; its solid marbled wood is used for capstans, troughs, trays, and even masts of small ships, and other purposes where it is not exposed to worms. It rots in water. The bark is good for tanning; dyes shoe-heels and walking-sticks red. The flowers and fruit, or bean-like seeds, are sweet; they make the flesh of birds bitter: they are bad for cattle and horses; but the country people are fond of a drink made from an infusion of them.
55. Litre o Pilco, Laurus Caustica, is very common; it grows to four yards high, but is very slender: the wood is close-grained and hard; it is used for knee-timber in ships, wheels, axletrees, and ploughshares, instead of iron. The shade of this tree is noxious, producing great swelling on those who rest under it; and to touch it causes blains and sores. Anodynes and refrigerents are the proper cure. From the small berry it produces, the Indians make a very agreeable chicha and sweetmeats. The root is very thick, with knots three quarters of a yard thick, and furnishing marble slabs fit for inlaying; also for centre-pieces for wheels.
56. Lolmata, Cactus, Great Torch-thistle, also called Quisco, is common everywhere; it grows five or six yards high, and three quarters thick: it produces spines nine inches long, so smooth and hard, that they are used for knitting-needles. The wood is used for small planking, looms, and the huts of the poor; it is very durable when kept dry.
57. Lucumo, Achræs Lucumo (of which two kinds are cultivated, the Bifera and the Turbinata). This appears to be a tree imported from Peru; it grows best in the neighbourhood of Coquimbo, but flourishes at Quillota: the fruit it bears is very sweet, of a pale orange colour within, with a large shiny seed very much resembling a chesnut.
58. Lum, of two kinds; the first, called Lum, or Siete Camisas, is the Steryoxylon rubrum, and the White Lum, or Barraco, the Steryoxylon revolutum, of the Flora Peruviana et Chilena: these trees grow six or seven yards high and a foot thick. The wood is solid, and the bark is a purgative.
59. Luma*, grows in Valdivia and Conception: it is used for tillers, bits, bolts for ships; for nuts and screws; for presses, axletrees, and shafts for carts; also, for hand-spikes. It is a durable wood; and the trees give spars of from eight to ten yards long, and from six to ten inches square: it is crooked, and 505 hard to cut down. There are two kinds, the red and the white: the latter is very inferior. (The King having heard of the excellence of this wood in 1789, ordered a quantity to be sent to Spain, which was done accordingly.)
* I suspect the same with the last.
60. Manzana, Apple, the same as in Spain; the silk-worm will feed on it.
61. Maniu, or Manihue, grows in Conception; it arrives at the height of twenty yards, and the girth of three. The stem is clean and straight for five or six yards from the ground, where it throws out a beautiful head seven or eight yards in diameter; the leaf is narrow, soft, and pointed, and perfectly green on both sides; the wood is white, solid, and strong, and a little brittle: it is used in buildings under cover, for the rain rots it; in working it splits like pine, which it resembles in colour, for which reason the people of Valdivia call it by the same name.
62. Maqui, is found in most provinces of the state; the sap which exudes from its buds cleanses wounds and sores; and the leaves, dried and powdered, heal and cicatrize them: the fresh leaves mashed clean and cure ulcers in the mouth. The wood is light and sonorous, fit for musical instruments and the ornamental parts of furniture; it is admirable for lathing for roofs, as it hardens with time, and is exceedingly durable. The bark steeped furnishes strong filaments, from which better twine is made than from those of spartum. Of its dark-purple berries, something like pimento, the country people make a preserve, which is much sought after even in the towns; mixed with the grape when pressed, it communicates to the wine an agreeable flavour; infused in water, it is a powerful refrigerent.
63. Mardoño. This tree is found in Conception and Rancagua; it grows to the height of three yards, and about a quarter thick; it produces no useful fruit: it rots easily, and therefore only serves for firewood.
64. Mayo, grows in Conception and the southern provinces; it grows seven yards high, and about three feet thick; the wood is light: in Juan Fernandez they make small vessels of it; its bark yields a yellow dye.
65. Mayten, is found all over Chile; it rises to the height of ten or twelve yards, and grows to two yards in thickness; its trunk is straight and clean, and its roots run deep: the timber is white without and red within; it is tough and easily worked, and very proper for all curious purposes. The tree is beautiful in public walks and shrubberies, being always green and leafy. Sheep and cattle are fond of the young branches; the decoction of its leaves is a febrifuge, and bruised they are anodyne.
50666. Membrillo, Quince. This and the fruitful Lucumo are much alike, being both delicate in their growth, and furnishing excellent tough twigs for basket-work; the fruits of both are alike in size and colour, but not in taste, one being bitter and the other sweet. (The Quince is also much larger, and its shape like that of Europe: the shape of the Lucumo is like an orange.)
67. Michay, grows in Valdivia, Conception, Juan Fernandez, and in the neighbourhood of Santiago. It grows as thick as a man’s arm, and is about a yard high; it yields a lively and lasting yellow dye. A kind of caterpillar like the silk-worm forms its coccoon in this shrub. This wood serves for inlaying.
68. Mitrin, is low and scarce; it yields a black colour.
69. Molle, Schinus Molle, is found in Rancagua, Quillota, Cuzcuz, and Coquimbo. It grows little more than eight yards high, and two and a half in girth. The heart of this tree is very solid, and is used for pillars, for the axletrees of waggons, and gables and corner-posts of dwellings. Where a part is buried under ground it takes root and thereby secures the building better. This tree yields a gum which, applied to the head as a plaister, relieves spasms. If the bark be wounded a liquor flows from it; which becoming thick, is excellent for nervous complaints, and affords a good stomachic and cardiac medicine.
70. Mora, Mulberry, grows in Coquimbo and Santiago; is like that of Spain: the timber is durable, and good for carving, though it seldom produces fruit. The tree grows so readily, that dry fences of it in Coquimbo sprouted indifferently above or below wherever they were placed.
71. Mudeu, grows in Conception; it is a lofty tree, and grows three yards thick. We do not know its peculiar uses.
72. Narangillo, grows in Aconcagua; it is sixteen or twenty yards high, and of sufficient girth to cut logs of eighteen inches square and twenty-one feet in length. The timber is tough, and applicable to most uses. In medicine it is said that, infused in baths, it relieves rheumatic pains.
73. Naranjo, Orange. Both the bitter and sweet like those of Spain.
74. Natri, is a tree of Conception, of whose qualities we are ignorant.
75. Nipa, grows every where from Conception to Coquimbo; it grows five yards high, and one half thick: the wood is useful for all common purposes, and baths and fumigations of all parts of the plant are wholesome.
76. Nogal, Walnut, is the same as that of Spain.
77. Notru, is called Cirnellillo in Conception, where it is most common. 507 It grows four or five yards high, and one quarter thick: the wood is red and fit for ornamental work. The decoction of its bark and leaves is good in glandular affections, and for coldness of the feet. The steam of this plant is good for toothache, &c.
78. Olivillo, is found in Conception; its greatest height is twelve yards, and its girth is one. The leaf is like that of the olive, but it produces no fruit. The timber is excellent and durable, and is used in mines; and in Coquimbo and Guasco, where it grows stunted and crooked, it is considered as the best fuel for smelting metals.
79. Olivo, Olive, grows well all over the country; and is exactly that of Europe.
80. Palma, the Date Palm, is rare, and grows in Quillota; and its nearly tasteless fruit is without a stone. The most common and useful palm in Chile is that of the small cocoa-nut: the nut resembles the large one in all but size, and is used in confectionary. When the trunk is cut down, one end being placed in the fire a delicious honey exudes from the other. The wood is useless; the stem is tall, straight, and large. This tree does not reach its full growth in less than fifty years.
81. Palmilla, is found in Conception; is pretty, about four yards high, and useless.
82. Palo Negro, grows in Conception; it is a small shrub, the wood of which is used for handles to axes and other tools.
83. Palpal, is a low shrub of Conception, of whose uses we are ignorant.
84. Palqui, a shrub with a large root; the branches are about as thick as a finger. The bark, steeped in water, is good both externally and internally for cutaneous diseases. It is said to be unwholesome for cattle who browse on it. (There are two varieties near Quintero; one with purple flowers, which grow in clusters about the size and shape of yellow jasmine, smells very sweet during the night. The whole plant yields excellent ashes for the soap-boiler.)
85. Patagua, grows in the neighbourhood of Santiago, Rancagua, and Conception. It is good for silk-worms. It loves moist situations: it grows about ten yards high, and one and a half thick. The wood is useful for building, for farm purposes, and for furniture. It has five or six coats of bark, each of five lines thick: it is used for tanning. An infusion of it is said to be serviceable in internal abscesses.
50886. Payhuen, abounds in the hilly country round Aconcagua; it grows three yards high, and one thick. It furnishes excellent browsing for cattle, and when burnt emits a very fragrant odour; but we know of no other use for it.
87. Pellin, a tree of Conception and Valdivia, whose height and size allow of cutting spars of sixteen yards long, and twelve inches square. It spreads its roots widely on the surface, but does not strike them deep. The timber serves for gun-carriages, for keels and false keels to ships, also for bolts, on account of its lasting qualities, whether in air, earth, or water. The bark dyes wool of a deep mulberry colour.
88. Pela, or Pilo, grows, in Valdivia and Conception, to six yards in height, and one in girth: the wood is white, solid, and durable; it is good for ploughshares, axle-trees, &c. The seed dyes black.
89. Peral, Pear, the same as that of Spain. The decoction of its leaves is good for swelled feet; and the decoction of a species of polipody (Quintral) that grows on it is good for bruises.
90. Perallillo, a middling-sized tree of Juan Fernandez, where it is not very plentiful; it yields a middling kind of timber.
91. Peumo, grows both in Chile and Peru. It grows very upright to the height of sixteen yards, and three yards in girth. The timber lasts well under water. The bark is used by tanners, it yields an orange-coloured dye, and is applied in cataplasms to broken limbs. The fruit, being steeped in tepid water, is supposed to relieve dropsy. The tree is proper for public walks and shrubberies, on account of its beauty, especially when amidst its tufted leaves its abundant red or white berries are seen.
92. Pichi, grows in Conception, and raises its twisted trunk of two feet thick to the height of five or six yards; the bark is ragged, and the head very bushy. The seed is about the size of a kidney-bean, and horses and oxen are extremely fond of it.
93. Pino, Pine. Large woods of it are found in the Andes of Valdivia and Conception, and it is cultivated in many places; it rises to the height of forty yards, and is four in girth. The wood is very desirable for masts of ships. Its nut is larger than that of Europe, and is the principal harvest of the mountain Indians. The cone is not so close as that of Europe, so there is no need to put it to the fire to open it; but when ripe the seed falls out: women eat it to increase their milk. The resin of this tree is believed 509 to be good for headaches. The timber of this pine is thought better than that of the Baltic, for masts and other naval purposes. In 1781 a great deal was cut for the squadron of Don Antonio Bacaro; and samples being sent to Spain, the King ordered that it might be used.
94. Pinosillo, is low and scarce. We did not learn its use in Conception, where it grows.
95. Pitra, is found in all places to the south of Santiago; it grows eight or ten yards high, and one thick: the wood is weak when green; it rots under ground, and is little used except for fuel for baking pottery and bricks. The trunk is full of knots; below the outer bark there is a kind of soft fretwork covering, that serves excellently for tinder. Bruised in wine this bark is good for contusions, &c. The decoction of the leaves and bark is good in pains of the legs, and coldness of the extremities.
96. Quebracho, is most plentiful about Maule, but grows freely in other places, especially between Valparaiso and Concon. It is little more than a shrub: the wood is of a fine grain and heavy, so it is used for carvers and turners’ work.
97. Quelen Quelen, a small delicate shrub; it is found in the districts of Colchagua, Rancagua, and Valparaiso. The leaf is narrow and pointed; the flower blueish; the root like liquorice, but with little taste. The gum of this plant is used for various illnesses proceeding from cold; the wood is looked upon as antiepileptic. The whole plant is used for firewood.
98. Queuli, is a sort of Achras. It is only found in Conception; it grows twenty-five yards high, and three in girth: it loves a damp situation. The timber is dark-red, easy to work, and takes a good polish. The fruit is like a long bellota, composed of a large firm husk, and a sweet yellow pulp, which is eaten both raw and boiled: it is esteemed unwholesome.
99. Quillay, is found in most parts of the country; it grows eight yards high, and two thick. The bark of this tree is used to clear colours in dyeing goods, and to cleanse woollen and silk clothes: beaten between two stones and mixed in water, it makes a lather like soap. It is considered wholesome in hysterical affections. The timber is apt to become worm-eaten in the sun, but it lasts well either under water or under ground; hence it is used in mines and for mill-wheels, and also for cart-wheels. (The authors of the Flora of Peru and Chile call this tree Smegdadermos, I think. The bark does not contain alkali, but a gum or mucilage, which froths as beer does; 510 besides some other astringent substance, of which no person yet seems to know the nature.)
100. Quisco, the same as Lolmata.
101. Radan, a large tree, which is found in the district of Colchagua; it does not grow high: it is little used.
102. Rasal, is like a wild walnut. We have not seen its flower or fruit. The wood is light and fit for musical instruments: the leaves and bark boiled, give a good black dye.
103. Rauli, grows in Conception and Maule, thirty or forty yards high, and five thick. It does not divide into branches till near the top. The timber is of a fine red colour; it is easily wrought, and is used by coopers and carvers. The bark gives a red dye.
104. Resino, a bush that grows in Juan Fernandez; it produces a gum applied to plaisters for various weaknesses, and is used to burn in churches instead of frankincense.
105. Retamo, Broom, grows three or four yards high, and a quarter in thickness; its wood is used for balls: it is like Spanish broom, but more leafy; oxen and sheep are very fond of it. The seed-vessel is globular, about the size of a hazle-nut.
106. Roble. When this tree is a sapling, it is called Gualle; at its mature age, it is Roble; and when old, Pellin. It grows in the province of Conception, and in the southern part of that of Santiago, but is most abundant on the banks of the Maule, where there are impenetrable forests of it. The common height of the roble is thirty yards: some of the trees grow to that of fifty yards, and from three to five in thickness. The timber is excellent both for civil and naval architecture, with the exception of masts and yards. Wheels and trucks for carts and gun-carriages are made of it. The bark is used for tanning; and, prepared with lime, it dyes leather red.
106. Romero, Rosemary, grows everywhere, of the same sort as that in Spain. There is an indigenous kind called Romarilla, which grows about three yards high, and half a yard thick; it is very bushy: it serves for hoops for casks, for brooms, and other similar purposes.
107. Sandalo, Sandal-wood, is found in Juan Fernandez; the wood is very odoriferous, and it is used for various purposes. We do not know if it has any peculiar properties: there is but little of it.
Sauce, Willow. There are three kinds; one like that of Europe; another called Simaroon; and a third Mimbre. They are very common, and 511 grow to nine yards in height, and one in girth. The decoction of the leaves, when cold, is cooling and good for the stomach; it is also good for bilious complaints, and expels worms. The wood is used for carved stirrups, also for charcoal for gunpowder.
108. Sauco, is common, and is much used by apothecaries.
109. Talinay, a large tree, so called from the name of the hill near Coquimbo where it is most abundant. It is only durable in water.
110. Tava, is a small shrub of Rancagua and Coquimbo. The wood is of no use, but the seed mixed with copperas makes good writing ink.
111. Tebo, a sort of Myrtle, which grows to a very large size in the province of Aconcagua. The timber is yellow, and very solid.
112. Temu, or Palo Colorado, Red-wood, is found in Conception, Quillota, and Juan Fernandez; it rises to the height of from eight to twelve yards, and grows to the thickness of one: it is like a myrtle, but more bushy. The gum which exudes from its buds mixed with salt, and injected into the eye, is said to cure cataract. It produces a largish fruit of a red and yellow colour, which is said to cause abortion.
113. Tinco, grows in Conception to the height of twelve yards, and the girth of one and a half; the timber is full of resin, and is fit for small vessels. A great deal of it is sent from Valdivia to Peru.
114. Tique, a middling-sized tree produced in Cuzcuz. It is not very serviceable.
115. Tralhuen, in the provinces of Conception and Santiago, is a small, dry, thorny, and durable shrub, with a twisted and rugged trunk; it is close-grained and fit for turnery. It serves for posts in vineyards where the vines are trained high. The wood gives out a red dye, little used.
116. Traruboqui, Coquilboqui, Codunoboqui. There are two kinds of this, one of which is a ground creeper; it is very curious and red, and is as thick as the finger; it is used for lath-work in roofs, and other places: it does not decay in water, and it makes ligatures as tough and lasting as hide. The other climbs to the tops of trees; its branches are as pliable as thread, and are used for lashing joists of houses and roofs: the seed is small, sweet, and highly flavoured.
117. Triaca, grows ten yards high, and eighteen inches thick; it grows very straight, and its timber is used for rafts.
118. Ulme, grows ten yards high and eighteen inches thick; the wood is used for boat-timbers, and when it is green it burns like oil.
512119. Yaque, it is a thorny plant of two yards high; it is used to make lie for washing linen.
“This list was drawn up in obedience to the order of His Majesty, dated July 1789, and was forwarded 10th December, 1792.
(Signed) “Jude Thaddeus de Reyes.”
“Given to me at Santiago de Chile, by Don D. R., in 1822.
“M. Graham.”
London:
Printed by A. & R. Spottiswoode,
New-Street-Square.
A “line”, used in several measurements, is 1/12 inch, so six lines is half an inch, and two lines is about 4mm. The notes on medicinal uses cover the spectrum from On the whole, probably not (I spotted at least one “cures cancer”) to Some researcher really ought to look into this.
[1] Abellano, Quadria Avelana
text unchanged: error for Avellana
[The monospecific genus Quadria has since been synonymized with Molina’s Gevuina, making this G. avellana, Chilean wildnut.]
[4] Albergilla, a kind of Cytisus
[See notes to Journal entry for 30 May for more about Cytisus, broom.]
[10] Each of these grows to six yards high
text has Each of / of these at line break
[11] Belloto, Achras Mammoso
[Search me. Linnaeus’s genus Achras has been synonymized with Adanson’s Manilkara, which doesn’t seem to exist in Chile. In other genera, there are any number of plant species called mammosus, -a or -um (the word means “bosomy”), though most of them were named well after Maria Graham’s time. And the word belloto can mean any of half a dozen different plants, most of them found in Chile.]
[16] Cardon, Pourretia Coarctata
[Now Puya chilensis, because Molina got there first.]
[19] Chañar, or Chilimuco, a species of Achras (Lucumo Espinoso)
[For what it’s worth, the Spanish name chañar applies to today’s Geoffroea decorticans, a member of family Fabaceae found in part of South America, including northern Chile.]
[22] it is hollow;
semicolon invisible at page-end
[26] Coihue o Coibo
[She forgot to translate “o”, but we know what she means. (The same will happen a few more times, with either “y” or “o”, when we get to the L’s.)]
[33] Culen, Cytisus Arborea
text unchanged: error for Arboreus
[Messrs. Lewis and Short tell me the noun cytisus can be both masculine and feminine, but that’s not something your average botanist would have known. This is the plant discussed at some length in the journal for 30 May; looking it up there, I arrived at Otholobium glandulosum, which grows primarily west of the Andes—especially Chile—and is called culén in Spanish.]
[37] The flower is like the aroma of exquisite perfume
text has aroma, with superfluous comma
[38] Floripondio, Datura Arborea
[Now Brugmansia arborea, angel’s trumpet.]
[55] Litre o Pilco, Laurus Caustica
[Now Lithraea caustica, it grows nowhere except one stretch of Chile. In the wild, that is. It can be found at a handful research facilities, where its toxic properties have been solidly confirmed:
A Health and Safety risk assessment would undoubtedly condemn this tree as being too dangerous for gardens, on account of its toxic sap, so perhaps its rarity in cultivation is for once a good thing.]
[57] Lucumo, Achræs Lucumo
text unchanged: error for Achras Lucuma
[Discussed in the Journal for 20 June. It is now Pouteria lucuma, which is easier to spell.]
[58] Lum, or Siete Camisas, is the Steryoxylon rubrum, and the White Lum, or Barraco, the Steryoxylon revolutum
text unchanged: error for Stereoxylon (both times)
[Now Escallonia rubra and E. revoluta, respectively. The genus is collectively “redclaws”.]
[69] Molle, Schinus Molle
[Unexpectedly, it still has Linnaeus’s binomial from 1753. Other names include “American pepper”, “peppertree”—with optional adjective “California” or “Peruvian”—and “false pepper”. With all that, it is surprising the author has nothing to say about any culinary uses.]
[98] Queuli, is a sort of Achras.
[Spelled right, for variety’s sake.]
[99] The authors of the Flora of Peru and Chile call this tree Smegdadermos, I think
[Close. I found a genus Smegmadermos, now synonymized with Molina’s Quillaja.]
[106] Roble
[GBIF’s Species Search comes up with no less than 52 plants with vernacular name roble, including several from genus Nothofagus (southern beech) that are found in Chile. This genus, spun-off from Linnaeus’s Fagus in 1851, has an odd distribution: southern South America; northwestern Europe . . . and a stretch from New Guinea through eastern Australia to New Zealand.]
[106] Romero, Rosemary
[Two consecutive plants are numbered 106. Call this one 106½.]
Sauce, Willow.
[The author forgot the number; I guess it would be 107½.]
The original of this text is in the public domain—at least in the U.S.
My notes are copyright, as are all under-the-hood elements.
If in doubt, ask.